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In the first chapter of this thesis, the attempt has been made to descrihc 
and depict on the socio-cultural environment of Southeast Asia before tSic 
coming of Islam to the region. Broadly speaking, in this chapter has been 
described that why the region was called as further India or sometimes liiUc 
China. Much of the Indian cultures and rituals have been practiced m 
Southeast Asia and sometimes even Southeast Asian languages have been 
influenced by Indian languages. 
As the spread of Islam to various parts of coastal India set the stage tor 
its further expansion to island Southeast Asia, Arab trader--
and sailors regularly visited the ports of Southeast Asia long before thcx 
converted to Islam. Initially the region was little more than a middle ground 
where the Chinese segment of the great Eurasian trading complex met the-
Indian Ocean trading zone to the west. At ports on the coast of the Mala} an 
peninsula, east Sumatra, and somewhat later north Java, goods from China 
were transferred from East Asian vessels to Arab or Indian ships, and 
products from as far west as Rome were loaded into the emptied Chinese 
ships to be carried to East Asia. By the 7th and 8th centuries A.D., sailors and 
ships from areas within Southeast Asia - particularly Sumatra and Malaya -
had become active in the seaborne trade of the region. Southeast Asian 
products, especially luxury items, such as aromatic woods from the rainforests 
of Borneo and Sumatra, and spices, such as cloves, nutmeg, and mace liom 
the far end of the Indonesian archipelago, had also become important export^ 
to both China in the east and India and the Mediterranean area in the v\esi 
These trading Hnks were to prove even more critical to the expansion of Islam 
in Southeast Asia than they had earher been to the spread of Buddhism and 
Hinduism. 
As the coastal trade and shipping of India came to be controlled (Ironi 
the 8th centur>' onward) by Muslims from such regions as Gujarat and xanou^ 
parts of south India, elements of Islamic culture began to filter into island 
Southeast Asia. But only in the 13th century after the collapse of the far-tluna 
trading empire of Srivijaya, which was centred on the Straits of Malacca 
between Malaya and the north tip of Sumatra, was the way open for the 
widespread proselytization of Islam. With its Great War fleets. SrivnaNi) 
controlled trade in much of the area and was at times so powerful that it couki 
launch attacks on rival empires in south India. Indian traders. Muslim or 
otherwise, were welcome to trade in the chain of ports controlled b} Srivijaxa 
Since the rulers and officials of Srivijaya were dcvoui 
Buddhists, however, there was little incentive for the traders and sailors of 
Southeast Asian ports to convert to Islam, the religion of growing numbers o! 
the merchants and sailors from India. With the fall of Srivijaya, the way wa^ 
open for the establishment of Muslim trading centres and efforts to preach the 
faith to the coastal peoples. Muslim conquests in areas such as Gujarat and 
Bengal, which separated Southeast Asia from Buddhist centres in India Ironi 
the 11th centur}- onward, also played a role in opening the way for Muslim 
conversion. 
As was the case in most of the areas to which Islam spread, peacelul 
and voluntary conversion was far more important than conquest and force in 
spreading the faith in Southeast Asia. Almost ever>'where in the islands of the 
region, trading contacts paved the way for conversion. Muslim merchants and 
sailors introduced local peoples to the ideas and rituals of the new faith and 
impressed on them how much of the known world had already been 
converted. Muslim ships also carried Sufis to various parts of Southeast Asia. 
where the\ were destined to play a vital role in conversion as they had in 
India. The first areas to be won to Islam in the last decades of the 13th centur\ 
were several small port centres on the northern coast of Sumatra. From these 
ports, the religion spread in the following centuries across the Strait ol 
Malacca to Malaya. 
On the mainland the key to widespread conversion was the powerful 
trading city of Malacca, whose smaller trading empire had replaced the fallen 
Srivijaya. From the capital at Malacca, Islam spread down the east coast o! 
Sumatra, up the east and west coasts of Malaya, to the island of Borneo, and 
to the trading centre of Demak on the north coast of Java. From Demak. she 
most po\Nerful of the trading states on north Java, the Muslim faith \^as 
disseminated to other Javanese ports and, after a long struggle witli a 
Hindu-Buddhist kingdom in the interior, to the rest of the island. From 
...i^ 
Demak. Islam was also carried to the Celebes, the Spice Islands in the easicrn 
archipelago, and from there to Mindanao in the southern Philippines. 
This progress of Islamic conversion shows that, the port cities c! 
coastal areas were particularly receptive to the new faith, Here the tradiiiL 
links were critical. Once one of the key cities in a trading cluster converted i 
was in the best interest of others to follow in order to enhance persi)n<i' 
ties and provide common basis in Muslim law to regulate business deals 
Conversion to Islam also linked these centres, culturally as well a> 
economically, to the merchants and ports of India, the Arab Countries, and iht 
Mediterranean. Islam made slow progress in some areas such as central la\a 
where Mindu-Buddhist dynasties contested its spread. Factualh the earlier 
conversion to these Indian religions had been confined, mainly to the rulinL 
elites in Java, and on the other hand islands were left opened lor mas^ 
conversions to Islam, which the Sufis eventually exploited. The island o( Bali 
where Hinduism is deep rooted at the popular level, remained largel} 
impervious to the spread of Islam. The same was true for most o! the 
mainland of Southeast Asia, where centuries before Islam. lhera\ada 
Buddhism reached from India and Ceylon, and won the fervent adherenee 
among the ruling elites as well as in the peasant masses. 
In the second chapter of the thesis, an attempt has been made on the 
varieties of Asian Muslims in the ASEAN countries. As the Southeast Asian 
region were influenced by different external forces in the course of its iowi 
histor}. In the early centuries of the Christian era. the sprawl of the Indian anu 
Chinese civilizations stretched in the region. Subsequently, the Arab- aiui 
Fiuropeans entered the area. The arrival of various external groups conlrihuicd 
to the growth of heterogeneity in the region's societies. Southeast Asia's iiiiiiai 
contact with Islam is undoubtedly a by-product of Arab trade in the remon. 
and Arab traders arrived with Islamic faith to the regions in eighth ccniur-
Islam became identified with state power in Southeast Asia from ihi 
fifteenth century, shortly after the foundation of the trading empiic o' 
Malacca, based on the west coast of the Malay Peninsula. But after the fall o: 
Malacca to the Portuguese in the early sixteenth century. Muslims dispcrsct! 
to other parts of the Indonesian archipelago where Islam became most dcepl> 
accepted among coastal trading communities. In Java. Islam was later adoptcci 
by local princes to underpin and support their mythical power but primanlx a> 
a cultural veneer on entrenched animist and Hindu-Buddhist beliefs \\hose-
syncretic legacy is to be found in eastern and central parts of the island I he 
Islamic faith was also employed to mobilize opposition to Dutch colonuii 
control. Within Southeast Asia, the most significant Islamic communitiev can 
be found in Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei. 
In contrast to the Arab Countries, Islam in Southeast Asia is lar more 
multi-religious and multi-cultural. This diversity is exemplified in Muslim 
majorit) countries such as Brunei, and in Indonesia and Malaysia with ihcir 
significant non-Muslim minorities as well as the Muslim minorities' 
communities of Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines. Vietnam. Cambi^ dia 
and Myanmar. In Indonesia, Islam becomes more visible in the political and 
institutional landscape, from the government to NGOs. Multiple and dncr^^ 
voices had discussed and debated the status and role of Islam in lndonc^lai; 
society. Muslim scholars and professionals in Indonesia are producing sonic 
of the most creative thinking on religious and social reform, dcmocrati/alion 
pluralism, and women's rights in the Muslim world. 
In the Southeast Asian mainland, Islam is in minority position like 
Cambodia. Myanmar (Burma), the Philippines, Singapore and fhailand. U itii 
the exceptions of Cambodia and Singapore, heightened ethno-religiou-
identity tin the face of discrimination by the dominant culture has lea t> 
abortive separatist violence which has been met with repressive reaci'oii 
Cham, the Islamic minority in Cambodia are the displaced survivors of the 
Kingdom of Champa (once located in central Vietnam), which xa^^ 
extinguished by the southwards drive of the Vietnamese in the ilflccnUi 
century. 1 hey enjoyed a tolerated existence after independence till 1970s, and. 
then the} became victims of civil war and the bestiality of the Khmer Rouge 
A significant number escaped as refugees to Malaysia, since the downfali (>! 
the Khmer Rough regime in 1979, the Cambodian Cham have virtual!) 
disappeared as a separate community. 
In third chapter. The Malaysian domestic political process rests within 
the framework of a constitutional monarchy, parliamentary democracy, based 
on the British model. Islam contributed significantly to ideas and office^ oi 
political authorit) and was anchored in Malay identity. Historicall), it na> 
constituted only one ingredient of Malay political life and has had to compete 
with and accommodate at least two other fundamental organizing c()ncc|n^. 
Malay kingship and Malay nationalism. The unity of the state was symboli/cd 
by Islam. 
Islam in Malaysia's domestic context serves as an expression o\ 
confessional, ethnic, interest in a society that is ethnically divided between 
Malays and non-Malays. The political perception of Malaysia as inherent!) 
Malay with special rights due to that ethnic community is balanced against I1K 
large-scale presence of other ethnic communities as an irreversible fact and b\ 
the constitutional commitment to the parliamentary process which enables 
communal representation. The poly-ethnic complexity of Malaysian socici\ 
has been shaped against the political context of Malay dominance and by the 
fragile "balance" of the Malaysian population overall. 
A Constitutional guarantee to Malay special rights was "bargained' 
against a corresponding recognition of just solid right for the non-Mala\ 
communities. The exchange of Malay political leadership for unhindered 
Chinese economic activity served as the unwritten covenant, although some 
Mala}' opposition continued against such inter-communal co-operation and 
the "selling away of the birthright of the Malays", led in particular b\ Islamic 
Part}' of Malaysia-PAS. Nevertheless, the electoral success of the first inter-
communal coalition party, the Alliance (a tripartite coalition) represenlmg ihr 
main ethnic communities through United Malays National Organi/aiion 
UMNO, the Malayan Chinese Association-MCA, and the Mala\an iiuliai 
Congress-MIC. in 1955 and the dominance of UMNO within ilui 
organization helped its claim to a mandate of leading Malay to independence 
fhe Islamic revivalist movement, popularly known as the I)ak\\ai 
(literally, "to summon or call") movement, emerged in Malaysia in (he U^ '^ n^  
Importance of the Dakwah movement was that, Islam became highlighted a^^ a 
pillar of Malay identity. The state was forced to respond, to this rc\i\aii^! 
movement by giving increasing attention to Islam, and the subscqiicni 
adoption of an Islamization strategy of its own. The pivotal moment m iho 
institutionalization of the revivalist movement occurred in 1969 ai ttn. 
University of Malaya, when the National Association of Muslim Studciii 
established a Muslim youth organization named Angkatan Bella Ulan 
Malaysia-ABIM, or the Malaysian Muslim Youth Movement. ABIM grc\\ u 
a position of strength in the mid-1970s under the stewardship of studcm 
activist Anwar Ibrahim. The year 1969 was also marked by a series of bloods 
race riots resulting tensions between ethnic Malays and ethnic Chinese Di 
Mahathir Mohammed began his political career with such pro-Malay zeal hut 
he was expelled from the party, which he leads nowadays, in 1969 his book. 
The Malay Dilemma, which called for political reforms giving Mala\s 
privileges over other races, was banned. 
The Dakwah movement not only achieved a formidable position m iht 
political sphere, but also transformed Malay thinking and culture I IK 
government felt threatened by the opposition PAS and the student-based 
Dakwah movement. It decided to approach any Islamic issue in a positnc 
manner, politically and economically. Dakwah groups were co-opled and liic 
government embarked on projects such as subsidizing pilgrimages to Metci 
and helping to set up the International Islamic University and a ihink-iaiik 
called the Institute of Islamic Thought. Other Islamic-oriented programs were 
introduced alter Anwar Ibrahim joined UMNO in 1982, and by the end o! IIK 
1980s more and more of the government's policies had been "ABlMi/cd.'^ 
As Prime Minister, Mahathir co-opt the mainstream influence o! 
Islamic thinking and had also greatly expanded ties with the international 
Islamic community, yet he had been a consistent and forthright opponent d 
Islamism. In 1994, Mahathir moved decisively to ban Al-Arqam. a Sufi scei 
based on radical Islamic principles and founded in Malaysia in 1968. So greai 
was the Association of South East Asian Nations' (ASEAN) fear ol' the scii 
that the religious affairs ministers of the six ASEAN states at the time mei in 
Malaysia to discuss measures to be taken against it. The day after the ASI'AN 
meeting, Malaysia's National Fatwa Council issued a decree forbidding !hc 
sect from spreading its teachings or running its substantial businesses m 
Malaysia. 
Mahathir's dramatically ousted his apparent heir. Deput\ Prime 
Minister Anwar Ibrahim, in 1998, and had transformed the political 
opposition in Malaysia, which saw its greatest opportunity to challenge 'he 
Mahathir hegemony by riding a wave of popular discontent over cronMsin, 
corruption, and restrictions to democracy and civil liberties. PAS. ihc 
Chinese-dominated Democratic Action Party, and the new .lusticc Pa'i\ 
headed b> Anwar's wife Wan Azizah came together in an uncas\ elcclorai 
coalition to challenge the ruling party in the 1999 national elections. 
A silent participant was, of course, Anwar. However, he was noi 
universalh viewed as a beacon of hope. His critics view him as having tncci 
to import an Iranian-style Islamic revolution when he first came u< 
prominence in the 1970s. In the early 1980s he travelled to leheran to nuci 
with Iranian leader, Ayatollah Khomeini. He set about forging links wuh 
Islamic movements in Indonesia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. His choice )t 
Kuala Lumpur's mosques as a venue from which to launch his "refomui:,'' 
campaign was perhaps not coincidental. 
Malaysia's future is less precarious than Indonesia's, despite the 
weakness of its civil society and the lack of press freedom. Prime Minister 
Mahathir has been a consistent opponent of Islamism, Islamic movements 
such as Al-Arqam have been sidelined, and Mahathir is still sidelining those. 
who align themselves closely to former Deput}- Prime Minister. Anwar 
Ibrahim. There is the danger that a more conser\'ative UMNO will use Islam 
for partisan purposes and pick up on tiie prevailing Islamist sentiment, bu; i 
anything, UMNO has been weakened dramatically by the Anwar episode, a^  
has Malaysia by the t^ mancial crisis, although on this score a recovery ol son-
has been unfolding. The challenge for the future will be the containmcni it 
the Dakwah mo\ement and UMNO's ability to head off a groundswcli o\ 
support for the socially conservative PAS. 
In the fourth chapter attempt is made to examine the success ancl 
failure of Islamic religio-political party in the multi-religious and muUi 
cultural society of Malaysia. Malaysia gives us a good glimpse to !hc 
complexit) of religion-politics interplay in contemporary Muslim socicu 
Malaysia gained independence from the British rule after almost tuo 
centuries, fhe independence was negotiated by Malay bureaucrats who were 
groomed within the British colonial administration. The Malay resistance to 
the British colonial power took the form of quiet and peacetiil withdrawal ot 
cooperation, refusing to work for British plantations and mining. The British 
administration retaliated by importing foreign workers from Southern India 
and China. 
The anti-British movement was led by Malay National Party (MNI') 
and later became known as Parti Al-Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), and its rival 
UMNO (the United Malay National Organization). Anti-British sentiments 
were sparked by the growing economic power and influence of ethnic 
Chinese under the British rule. In the course of reasserting the Malay rights 
PAS. for instance, has repeatedly failed to articulate a model for iiuci 
religious cooperation in the context of the multi-religious and multi-cultural 
Malaysian society. Its cynical manipulation of Malay-Chinese coopcratiori tnj 
electoral gains is a case in point. PAS's failure to relate the unixcrsalisiK 
vision of Islam to its socio-political situation has alienated the non-Mu^iin 
communities and strained its relationship with Chinese-based political pariic-
PAS's parochialism and its inability to forge a working relationship with non 
Malay political parties continue to be a stumbling block, in its efforts to i^ un 
wider support among the Malaysian electorate, both Malay and non-Mala\ !; 
is undeniable that the Islamic movement has been an essential force ni I!R 
development of Malaysian society. PAS and the array of smaller 
organizations and groups have been actively involved in moulding soudl 
values and attitudes, and shaping public institutions and policies. Islainn 
organizations and groups have been reacting to policies and actions taken b> 
UMNO leaders rather than playing a proactive role. The posture adopted lv 
Islamic groups is very often apologetic, aimed a mitigating the negaiivL 
influences of the developmental policies promoted by the government, rattici 
than advancing an alternative developmental vision of their own. 
And in the last chapter, in the context of Islam in Southeast Asia, there 
is an important countervailing dichotomy which will also play an increasing 
role in influencing the development of the fundamentalist modernist equatic^n 
the majority-minority issue. There are two manifestations of this, first, liic 
Muslim majority versus non-Muslim minority, as in the case of Malaysia aru! 
Indonesia, and second, the Muslim minority versus a non-Muslim majoritN as 
in the case of Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore. One key element \\\[\\ 
reference to Malaysia is to rationalize a role for the large non-Muslim 
constructed which can accommodate the diversity of population composition 
fhere seems to be a tendency on the part of Muslim reformers in Malaxsia 
and Indonesia to stress universalistic ideals of mankind, and such causes a-
social justice, land reform and corruption-free government, whicli 
transcending the concerns that affect only Muslims, embrace problems which 
confront all citizens of the natibn-state irrespective of religion and ethnicity li 
is emphasized that the concerns of the Islamic wnma are the concerns ol 
umma of mankind. 
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PREFACE 
Islam in Southeast Asia is complex and dynamic. Islam in Southeast 
Asia is significant not only as a religion but also as a political force. Religion 
and politics not only interact with each other in this area, one influences the 
other strongly to determine the shape of things. Religion, in fact, has become 
the chief instrument of assertion of one's identity in a multi-religious society 
and that of political legitimacy for ruling either and status quoits power. In 
Southeast Asia, Islam is the largest religion and it is the religion of 
predominant majority in some of the countries of this region like Indonesia 
and Malaysia, and of significant minority in some other countries like 
Thailand, Myanmar and the Philippines. 
The thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter deals with the 
historical background of socio-cultural of the region before the coming of 
Islam. The spread of Islam to various parts of coastal India set the stage for its 
further expansion to the islands of Southeast Asia. Arab traders and sailors 
regularly visited the port of Southeast Asia long before they converted to 
Islam. 
The second chapter of the thesis analyzes Islam in contemporary 
Southeast Asia. In contrast to the Arab countries, Islam in Southeast Asia is 
far more multi-religious and multi-cultural. This diversity is exemplified in 
Muslim majority countries such as Brunei, and in Indonesia and Malaysia 
with their significant non-Muslim minorities as well as the Muslim minorities' 
communities of Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, 
Vll 
and Myanmar. In Indonesia, Islam has become more visible in the political 
and institutional landscape, from the government to NGOs. Multiple and 
diverse voices discuss and debate the status and role of Islam in Indonesian 
society. Muslim scholars and professionals in Indonesia are producing some 
of the most creative thinking on religious and social reform, democratization, 
pluralism, and women's rights in the Muslim world. In the mainland 
Southeast Asia Muslims are in minority position like Cambodia, Myanmar 
(Burma), the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. With the exceptions of 
Cambodia and Singapore, heightened ethno-religious identity in the face of 
discrimination by the dominant culture has led to abortive separatist violence 
which has been met with repressive reaction. 
The third chapter discusses the role of Islam in Malaysian politics as 
well as the development of political Islam in muUi-ethnic and multi-cultural 
society of Malaysia. 
The fourth chapter is the central theme of this thesis that is to examine 
and analyze the success and failure of Islamic religio-political movements in 
multi-cultural society of Malaysia. The failure of Islamic political party (PAS) 
to relate the universalistic vision of Islam to its socio-political situation has 
alienated the non-Muslim communities and strained its relationship with the 
Chinese-based political parties. PAS's parochialism and its inability to forge a 
working relationship with non-Malay political parties continue to be a 
stumbling block in its efforts to gain wider support among the Malaysian 
vni 
electorate, both Malay and non-Malay. It is undeniable that the Islamic 
movement has been an essential force in the development of Malaysian 
society. PAS and the array of smaller organizations and groups have been 
actively involved in moulding social values and attitudes, and shaping public 
institutions and policies. Islamic organizations and groups have been reacting 
to policies and actions taken by UMNO leaders rather than playing a 
proactive role. The posture adopted by the Islamic groups is often apologetic, 
aimed a mitigating the negative influences of the developmental policies 
promoted by the government, rather than advancing an alternative 
developmental vision of their own. 
The concluding chapter brings together analyze and the finding study 
of Islamic religio-political movement in Malaysia. 
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Introduction 
Islam was introduced in Southeast Asia, especially in the Malay 
archipelago, which covers the present-day Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, 
Singapore, and the southern parts of Thailand and the Philippines, through 
several gradual, complex processes. 
Islam in Southeast Asia is significant not only as a religion but also as 
a political force. Religion and politics not only interact with each other in this 
area, but one influences the other strongly to determine the shape of things to 
come. Religion, in fact, is the instrument of assertion of ones identity in a 
multi-religious society. In Southeast Asia, Islam is the largest religion and it is 
the religion of the predominant majority in some of the countries in this 
region like Indonesia and Malaysia, and of significant minority in some other 
countries like Thailand, Myanmar and the Philippines, and others. 
Southeast Asia is the cultural as well as the geographical crossroads of 
Asia where Sinic, Hindu, Islamic, and Western civilizations have met and 
interacted for almost a millennium.^ 
The name for the region was first coined in the 20th century. It was 
previously known as Further India (as opposed to the Indian subcontinent).'* 
The subregion includes 11 countries, some on the mainland, which is also 
known as Peninsular Southeast Asia or Indo-China and some wholly in the 
archipelago.^ 
Indochina or sometimes mainland Southeast Asia includes all of: 
• Myanmar (formerly Burma) 
• Thailand (formerly Siam) 
• Cambodia 
• Lao PDR (Laos) 
• Vietnam 
The Malay Archipelago (Malay: Nusantara), variously Malay World, 
an ethno-cultural notion, or maritime Southeast Asia consists of: 
• Malaysia 
• Singapore 
• Brunei 
• Indonesia 
• East Timor 
• Philippines 
The spread of Islam to various parts of coastal India set the stage for its 
further expansion to island Southeast Asia. As we have seen, Arab traders and 
sailors regularly visited the ports of Southeast Asia long before they 
converted to Islam. Initially the region was little more than a middle ground, 
where the Chinese segment of the great European trading complex met the 
Indian Ocean trading zone to the west. At ports on the coast of the Malayan 
peninsula, east Sumatra, and somewhat later north Java, goods from China 
were transferred from East Asian vessels to Arab or Indian ships, and 
products from as far west as Rome were loaded into the emptied Chinese 
ships to be carried to East Asia. By the 7 and 8 centuries A.D., sailors and 
ships from areas within Southeast Asia, particularly Sumatra and Malaya, had 
become active in the seaborne trade of the region. Southeast Asian products, 
especially luxury items, such as aromatic woods from the rainforests of 
Borneo and Sumatra, and spices, such as cloves, nutmeg, and mace from the 
far end of the Indonesian archipelago, had also become important exports to 
both China in the east and India and the Mediterranean area in the west. These 
trading links were to prove even more critical to the expansion of Islam in 
Southeast Asia than they had earlier been to the spread of Buddhism and 
Hinduism.® 
1.1 Geographical and Climatic Factor 
Southeast Asia's land and climate have been of great importance in the 
historical and cultural development of the region. Because it is located on the 
equator, the region has a climate different from the main land Asia. The high 
mountain ranges separate Southeast Asia from China and India. The sea 
provides Southeast Asia's major access to the rest of the world. The region 
has an uneven coastline with many good harbours, abundant rainfall, and a 
vast network of rivers which provide rich farming land.^ The geographic 
location of the area and its openness to the sea has given this region a variety 
of peoples and cuhures. 
The region consists of all the mainland peninsula and the Malay 
archipelagoes. Malay archipelagoes are series of islands, the 3,000 islands of 
Indonesia, and the 7,000 islands of the Philippines. The land area has dense 
jungle-covered mountains and the flat plains of river valleys and delta 
regions. Almost 80 percent of Malaya is covered with dense jungles. 
All of Southeast Asia lies within the humid tropics and it differs from 
its neighbours in being considerably wetter than India and warmer than China. 
However, this generalization masks an unusual degree of climatic complexity, 
particularly as it relates to rainfall. At sea level, temperatures are fairly 
uniform, both across the region and through the year, and it is attitudinal 
difference which has the greatest influence. But temporal and spatial patterns 
of rainfall are more varied and complex. Thus seasonality in Southeast Asia is 
a function not of temperature but of rainfall, and it is the pattern and timing of 
the rainfall that is of fiindamental importance to human activity.^ 
The climate of Southeast Asia is usually called "tropical".'^ A tropical 
climate is one in which the average monthly temperature is not below 64.4 F. 
Such tropical areas have a monotonously high temperature and much 
humidity. The climate of Southeast Asia in general is affected by its nearness 
to the equator, the seasonal monsoons, levels of those land areas above sea 
level, and nearness to the sea. The greatest determining factor in the tropical 
climate of Southeast Asia is the monsoons." 
Mostly, the Southeast Asian region is affected by monsoons. The 
monsoons-Southwest and northeast are a factor the region's inhabitant must 
reckon with in cultivating their crops and navigating in open seas. The 
southeast monsoon winds that hit the leeward side of the various mountains 
ranges between December and February. The monsoon belt is generally 
synonymous with the rice belt, the most Southeast Asia is known for both dry 
and wet rice cultivation. Rice is the principal crop and staple diet to the 
people of the region. Rice cultivation of the region began in Myanmar and 
Thailand around 3500 B.C., though the technique of wet rice cuhivation may 
not have been known in Southeast Asia until after the impact of Indian culture 
in the beginning of the Christian era. 
1.2 Earliest Peoples of Southeast Asia 
For thousands of years successive waves of migrants moved down 
from the Asian continent towards the south. They made their way from the 
interior of the 'heartland' down towards the Malay Peninsula, some settling, 
some moving on along the island chain that constitutes Indonesia until they 
reached the Philippines. The last major influx occurred some 4,000 years ago 
with the arrival of the people who still constitute what may be described as 
the basic population of the area.'^ 
- Malays and Javanese 
The more advanced Malay peoples can be differentiated into two 
groups. The "older," or Proto-Malay, this group resided in the interior regions 
and contributed to the ethnic composition of such important peoples as the 
Minangkabau in central Sumatra. The Proto-Malays also predominated in the 
population of the Greater and Lesser Sunda Islands to the east. The 
"younger," or Deutero-Malay, this group was apparently more Mongoloid in 
character. The Deutero-Malay tended to settle in coastal areas and became 
more mobile. This group established coastal enclaves at attractive points 
along the eastern shores of Sumatra and contributed the bulk of the Javanese 
population. Sea-gypsy fishermen-pirates, who long infested the Malacca 
Straits and the northern coasts of the Java Sea, along with the Buginese 
traders of the Celebes north of Macassar, were of this group.''' 
Basic cultural accomplishments of the Malays generally included the 
preparation of stone adzes, the use of outrigger canoes, wet-rice cultivation, 
domestication of cattle and buffaloes, weaving, and pottery making. At some 
time B.C., Deotero-Malay seamen carried their products and their language 
far into the southern ocean areas beyond India to the coasts of East Africa and 
Madagascar. They may have introduced yams, bananas, and sugar cane into 
Africa.'^ 
- Mons and Khmers 
The Mons people entered the peninsula by way of the upper bend of 
the Mekong River Sometime before Christian era. They also entered Burma 
by way of the Salween River corridor at the same time. They came in great 
number, and eventually they set up their own state, which came to be known 
by the Indian name of Dvaravati.'^ 
They are hillside-cultivating nomads and speaking hundreds of distinct 
dialects occupied the watersheds between the Mekong River and the Annam 
coast, and were dispersed throughout much of Laos and northern Thailand 
and the Shan plateau of Burma, as well as in the hills peripheral to the Sittang, 
Chindwin, and Irrawaddy Valleys. They include the Moi, Mau, and Meo east 
of the Mekong, the Lahu, Wa, and Kachin tribes on the Yunnan borders, and 
various types of Karens in Lower Burma. At an early time the Mons became 
skilled cultivators and also merchants, shipbuilders, and seamen. Their 
seaborne contacts extended to the northern Coromandel Coast of India and to 
inland Telingana. 
The Khmers probably followed the Mons down the upper Mekong 
route but turned eastward to settle first in the region of modem Laos and in 
the Korat Plateau. Cambodia proper was fully assimilated by the Khmers near 
the end of the 800s, after which the Mon territory along the shores of the Gulf 
of Siam was also brought under Khmer control. ^ ^ 
- Vietnamese 
The Vietnamese probably originated in what is now South China. They 
settled in Tonkin basin area of peninsula and built great dykes and drainage 
systems. They were subjected to the full impact of Chinese culture. The 
Vietnamese were Indonesian, non-Chinese people, with linguistic and cultural 
affinities with the Thai and the Mon-Khmers.** 
- Pyu people 
The ancient Pyu peoples came from eastern Tibet southward, not later 
than the third century A.D. They probably came down the Salween and 
Mekong river gorges of western Yunan. The Pyu was totally destroyed by the 
Thai in 835. Shortly thereafter another wave of Tibeto - Burmans came into 
the region via the Shan state. 
- Shans, or Thai 
About 700 A.D., the Thai migrations began from Yunan. One of the 
directions they took was toward the eastern hills of Myanmar, where they 
came to be known as the Shans.'^ So, the Shan or Thai peoples long occupied 
the watersheds between the headwaters of the Red river on the east, the upper 
Mekong valley on the west, and the Yangtse River on the north. 
The decline of the state of Nam Chao began long before its final 
liquidation by Mongol armies in 1253. During the intervening centuries, Thai 
peoples migrated southward over a wide area extending from India's Assam 
(a variant of Shan) province across northern Burma into the Shan and Laotian 
plateaus, to the very borders of Tongking and the Khmer Empire of 
Cambodia.^^ 
Such, then, were the principal geographical and ethnic factors which 
provided the context for the historical development of Southeast Asia. 
Therefore, many different languages spoken in an area where so many 
different races have met. Malay and Javanese belong to what is called the 
Indonesian group of languages. Malay, however, has become to a certain 
extent lingua franca throughout the Archipelago. 
1.3 The Process of Indianization 
Southeast Asia has been overshadowed by India and China, which 
were great powers with established civilizations long before her own 
historical period begins. The term 'Indianization' has been generally applied 
by scholars to the impact of Indian culture upon Southeast Asia.^ ^ 
It was not China but India that so influenced the spiritual as well as the 
material life of the Malays. Till the nineteenth century they owed nearly 
everything to her alphabets, religion, a political system, law, astrology, 
medicine, literature, sculpture in stone, gold and silver work and the weaving 
of silk to India. The Indians, who built the oldest temples and chiselled 
Buddhist in Sanskrit as early as the fourth century A.D. in Kedah, must have 
been preceded by traders, who sailed to and fro long before the Brahmins and 
monks and literature adventurers brought the Hindu rehgion and Buddhism 
and Sivaite ideas of royalty.^^ 
The civilizations of Southeast Asia developed forms of Hinduism and 
Buddhism that had distinctive local features and were attuned to the local 
cultures, but the framework of their religious life was essentially Indian. 
Stories from the Ramayana and the Mahabharata became widely known in 
Southeast Asia and are still popular there in local versions. The people of Bali 
(in Indonesia) still follow a form of Hinduism adapted to their own genius. 
Versions of the Manu-smrti ("Laws of Manu") were taken to Southeast Asia 
and were translated and adapted to indigenous cultures until they lost most of 
their original content.^ '* 
Direct evidence of the spread of Indian influence in Southeast Asia 
during the first four centuries is rather scanty. We have the indirect evidence 
of the Chinese dynastic chronicle. According to them there was an 
Tndianized' kingdom in Cambodia from the first century A.D. This is the 
kingdom which they called Funan and which they say was founded by a 
Brahman named Kaundinya (King of Mountain). The State of Champa, 
situated along the coast of present Indo-China above Cambodia, enters history 
at the end of the second century. The Chinese records place Sanskrit 
inscriptions which are earlier than A.D. 400 show that Champa had become 
an Indianized state under a Hindu ruler.^ ^ 
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Indian forms of political organization were responsible for the creation 
of the first towns and cities in Southeast Asia. These elaborate capital cities 
were designed according to the Hindu - Buddhist concept of the Universe and 
so were carefully planned and built. The great ruins at Angkor, Cambodia are 
a good examples. Centres of Indian learning grew and much knowledge from 
Hindu-Buddhist sources passed in this way to the upper levels of the Asian 
society. The great King Asoka was directly responsible for introducing 
Buddhism into Burma, where it took root immediately and began to spread 
throughout the northern part of the peninsula. 
The first Indianized states of the mainland were the kingdoms of 
Funan, Champa, and Langkasuka, all of which date from the first two 
centuries A.D. They were located along the sea routes from India to China. 
Langkasuka was located on the Malay Peninsula, Champa occupied a 
series of fertile plains in central Vietnam, and Funan occupied the plains of 
the Mekong delta region. All of theses Indianized states were basically sea 
powers and trade centres, only Funan was in a position to expand on land.^ ^ 
Srivijaya, Indian cultural influence in the lands of Indonesia was very 
small until the decline of Funan, but with the rise of a new and powerful state 
at Palembang on the lower coast of Sumatra, Indian influences increased. The 
area had been of minor importance earlier, but with an increase in seaborne 
trade by way of the Malacca Straits, especially in the tremendous Persian 
trade, Palembang began to flourish. The Srivijaya Empire of Palembang 
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became the most important Indianized state in Southeast Asia. As trade 
continued to flourish, the Empire grew both politically and culturally. At the 
same time, the central and eastern portions of Java, which were engaged in 
rice-cultivation, began to consolidate and also to play a role of importance 
since they were producing a good surplus of rice. These areas grew into 
independent states that would eventually be Indianized. Srivijaya, however, 
continued to be the dominant state for six centuries even though it produced 
little more than forest products. Its main income was derived from the 
services its skilled workers rendered in refitting ships. Trading also stopped 
here to replenish provisions, and Srivijaya also provided a safe harbour from 
the stormy straits. Richly endowed Buddhist monasteries here soon became 
the centres of learning. The cultural and economic growth of Srivijaya is 
recorded in the annals of a Chinese Buddhist pilgrim-scholar, I-Ching, who 
first came to the city in 671. He found over 1,000 monk-scholars there and 
was impressed with their leaming. After a pilgrimage, I-Ching returned to 
Srivijaya in 685 and remained for four years studying and writing. This 
account gives details of Srivijayan's life, whose builders tended to use wood 
extensively in their buildings. 
Saliendra, The central Javanese state had been converted to Mahayana 
Buddhism in the late eighth century and the Saliendra rulers of that area found 
that this form of Buddhism complemented their own local Javanese Hindu 
concepts of royalty and kingship. The power of these rulers declined in the 
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middle of the ninth century and they were able to take over the kingship of 
Srivijaya by a marriage in 860 A.D. The word Saliendra means "King of the 
Mountain," a definite Buddhist-Saivite word. The Saliendra left one of the 
biggest monuments as a tribute to their rule, the great Mausoleum at 
Borobodur in northwest of Jakarta, Indonesia. Borobodur was to represent the 
cosmic mountain, Mt. Meru, so important to Hindu-Buddhist ideas of the 
world. 
The rise of the Cambodian Empire began with the overthrow of Funan 
by the Chenla Khmers in the early seventh century. In 802 A.D. a minor 
Khmer prince emerged the victor following a civil war that had been started 
by Srivijaya. He took the name of Jayavarman II, and became a vassal of 
Srivijaya. He then began a war of unification and completed his conquests of 
the Khmer states in 819. At the same time he stopped being a vassal to 
Srivijaya, and declared an independent Cambodian Empire. He re-established 
the Deviraja (God-king) cult in order to strengthen his rule further. With the 
establishment of his Empire, the Angkor period of Cambodia begins. The 
ruins at Angkor remain today a monument to the architectural and artistic 
genius of the Khmers. The city's well-planned streets and temple complexes 
with their rich ornamentation and statuary are a tribute to these early artisans 
and their civilization. Angkor Wat, a Vishnu temple, is one of the wonders of 
the world and is a leading tourist attraction of Cambodia.^'' 
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In the Malay Peninsula, Hinduism was deeply ingrained into the 
customs of the local people in the form of local adat, or norms of customary 
law and conflict resolution. Although with the advent of Islam many practices 
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were changed, but these adat were not abolished. 
The Malay word often translated as 'state' or 'government', kerajaan, 
means literally 'the condition of having a Raja'. The Raja was the primary 
objects of loyalty, he was central to every aspect of Malay life. The Malays 
referred to themselves as the slaves of the Raja. The law, too, was said to be 
the Raja's 'possession'. 
The pre-Islamic ruler appears to have been the focus of political and 
spiritual life, at least in what has been called the Indianized period, the 
Malays drew upon Buddhist and Hindu writings to describe his position, the 
pre-Islamic founder of Malacca is portrayed in unmistakable terms in the 
Malay Annals as a buddhisattva, the Buddhist enlightened being who 
renounces nirvana in order to remain in this world and assist the spiritual 
liberation of his fellow beings. The word translated as 'loyal' is bhakti 
'devotion', and it suggests the devotion which devotionalist Hindus 
(Bhaktis) expressed towards their teacher or guru, he was no ordinary 
teacher but assumed a God-like position in the eyes of his followers. Like a 
Malay ruler, and also in the fashion of a buddhisattva, his manner was often 
described as courteous and gentle and his words as 'fragrant and beautiful', 
moreover the guru was able to bestow on his devotees anugerah or divine 
14 
graciousness. This Sanskrit word anugerah, is precisely the term used by 
MusHm Malays to describe the gift of a prince. The Indian element which is 
lacking in the early documentation of the Malay world is the dominance of a 
Brahmin class, the sacred law which is merely obeyed and implemented by 
the Indian king. In the Malay world, as in other parts of Southeast Asia the 
importation of Indian ideas was selective. The caste system is not tasteful for 
Southeast Asians. 
Malay utilization of the medieval Islamic tradition of kingship was 
expressed at the most obvious level in the adoption of titles and descriptive 
formulae from the persianized Muslim world.^ *' The old Malay royal title, 
Yang di Pertuan, the 'One who is made Lord' or the Sanskrit, Raja, which 
were retained after Islamization, were not obviously less splendid epithets 
than Sultan or Shah?^ 
Rice paddy agriculture has existed in Southeast Asia for thousands of 
years, ranging across the subregion. Some dramatic examples of these rice 
paddies populate the Banaue Rice Terraces in the mountains of Northern 
Luzon in the Philippines, and in Indonesia. Maintenance of these paddies is 
very labour-intensive. The rice paddies are well-suited to the monsoon 
climate of the region. Dance in Southeast Asia also includes movement of 
the hands, as well as the feet. Puppetry and shadow plays were also a 
favoured form of entertainment in past centuries. The Arts and Literature in 
South East Asia is deeply influenced by Hinduism brought their centuries 
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before. In Indonesia and Malaysia, though they converted to Islam, they 
retained many forms of Hindu influenced practices. Cultures, Arts and 
Literature. An example will be the Wayang Kulit (Shadow Puppet) and 
literatures like the Ramayana and Mahabharata. 
1.4 Early Malay Kingdoms 
Small Malay Kingdoms appeared in the 2"'* or 3'"'' century A.D. The 
peninsula lack broad, extensive, fertile plains and were unable to support the 
pattern of densely populated classical Southeast Asian civilizations that 
flourished in Cambodia and Java. Nevertheless, Chinese sources indicate that 
perhaps 30 small Indianized states rose and fell in the Malay Peninsula, 
mostly along the east and north-western coasts. The most important of these 
states, Langkasuka, controlled much of northern Malaya. The Peninsula 
developed an international reputation as a source of gold, hence the name 
given to it by Ptolemy, Golden Chersonese. It also became an important 
source of tin and was populated by renowned seafarers. While scholars still 
debate over the precise location of the famed Langkasuka, archaeological 
evidence leaves no doubt that the modem state of Kedah (referred to in 
ancient Indian texts as Kadaram or Kataha) in the northwest of the Peninsula 
was an important centre of early Indian influence and trade.^ "* 
Between the 7"" and 13"* centuries, many of these small, often 
prosperous peninsula maritime trading states came under the loose control of 
Srivijaya, the great Sumatra-based Empire. At various times the Cambodian 
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Angkor and Javanese Majapahit empires and the Tai Ayutthaya (Ayudhia) 
kingdom also claimed suzerainty in the region. There was even military 
expedition by the Cholas of South India some time in the beginning of the 
11* century A.D., when Rajendra Chola attacked parts of peninsula and 
Sumatra.^ ^ 
However, Hindu influence was not spread by the sword but by trade. 
This trade was maritime that is confined to the coastal areas of the Malay 
Peninsula. The centres of Indian trade were places such as Pasai, Indragiri, 
and Jambi in Sumatra, Kuala Muda in Kedah, and Surabaya in Java. Later, the 
centres of trade became powerful centres of polhical influence and expansion. 
First, there was the great Malay Buddhist Empire of Srivijaya in Sumatra 
followed in the 14* century A.D. by its conqueror and successor, the Hindu 
empire of Majapahit in Java. The military and political expansion of these two 
empires meant also the theological expansion of Buddhism and Hinduism in 
the peninsula. These early states left a living legacy, traces of which can still 
be found in the political ideas, social structures, rituals, language, arts, and 
cultural practices of the Malays.^^ 
-Establishment of Malacca 
Parameswara was a Hindu Srivijayan^^ prince who escaped the 
Majapahit^^ capture of Palembang. He then settled on Temasek Island - now 
Singapore - where he briefly instituted himself as the regent after killing a 
Siam representative, Temagi. However, his rule in Temasek didn't last long as 
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native Malays later chased him out. From the island, he fled to Muar before 
deciding to make Malacca his new capital in 1402. In 1414, Parameswara 
converted to Islam after marrying a princess from Pasai. After his conversion, 
he assumed the title Sultan Megat Iskandar Shah. His conversion also 
encouraged his subjects to embrace Islam. From then on Malacca became a 
sultanate. 
According to the Malay Annals (Sejarah Melayu)^^ legend has it that 
the king saw a mouse deer outwit a fox in Malacca. He took what he saw as a 
good omen and decided to establish a capital for his kingdom there. Today, 
the mouse deer is part of modem Malacca's coat of arms. 
Malacca had a well-defined government with a set of laws. On top of 
the hierarchy sat the Sultan who was the absolute monarch. After him was a 
bendahara,^^ a position similar to that of a prime minister. Most of all, a 
bendahara was an adviser to the Sultan. A bendahara is a common person 
appointed by the Sultan and it was the highest ranking office that could be 
held by any commoner. After bendahara laksamana's '*' authority is 
paramount. Laksamana is an admiral and was responsible for the state and the 
sultan's security. He commanded the army. Later comes the temenggung ''^  
which more or less is the chief of police. At the bottom of the nobility are 
penghulu bendahari, the treasurer of the state and the shahbandars 
responsible to matters of trades and ports. The most famous Malaccan 
bendahara is Tun Perak.'*^ 
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The sultanate was governed with several set of laws. The formal legal 
text of traditional Malacca consisted of the Undang-Undang Melaka (Laws of 
Malacca), variously called the Hukum Kanun Melaka and Risalat Hukum 
Kanun, and the Undang-Undang Laut Melaka (the Maritime Laws of 
Malacca). The laws, as written in the legal digests have gone through an 
evolutionary process. The legal rules that eventually evolved were shaped by 
three main influences, namely the early non-indigenous Hindu/Buddhist 
tradition, Islam and the indigenous "adat". 
The Sultanate thrived on entrepot trade and became the most important 
port in Southeast Asia during the 15th and the early 16th century. 
Furthermore, Malacca became a major player in the spice trade, serving as a 
gateway between the Spice Islands and the high-paying Eurasian markets. 
This is reflected by the Portuguese writer Duarte Barbosa'*'' who wrote "He 
who is lord of Malacca has his hand on the throat of Venice".''^ 
One of the factors that contributed to the rise of Malacca was the 
monsoon winds that enabled Arab and Indian traders from the west to travel 
to China in the east and vice versa. At the height of its power, the Sultanate 
encompassed most of modem day Peninsula Malaysia, the site of modem day 
Singapore and a great portion of eastern Sumatra. It was also the centre of 
Islam in the eastern sphere, where imams and ustazs came to discuss religion 
and the like. Muslim missionaries were also sent by the Sultan to spread Islam 
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to other communities in the Malay Archipelago, such as in Java, Borneo, and 
the Philippines. Most of South East Asia at that time was Hindu. 
The Sultanate's most important regional rivals were Siam in the north 
and the declining Majapahit Empire in the south. Majapahit was not able to 
control or effectively compete with Malacca within the archipelago, and came 
to an end during the later 15th century. Siam on the other hand attacked 
Malacca three times, but all attacks were repelled. 
At the same time, Malacca had a good relationship with the Ming 
government of China, resulting in Zheng He's visits. Parameswara had met 
the Chinese emperor in China to receive a Letter of Friendship, hence making 
Malacca the first foreign kingdom to attain such treatment. In 1409, the Sultan 
paid tribute to the Chinese emperor to ask for protection against Siam. 
Moreover, one of the sultans, Mansur Shah even married a Chinese princess 
named Hang Li Po. This Sino-Malacca relationship helped deter Siam from 
threatening Malacca further. 
1.5 European Domination 
The closing of the overland route from Asia to Europe by the Ottoman 
Empire and the claim towards trade monopoly with India and south-east Asia 
by Arab traders led the European powers to look for a maritime route. In 1498 
Vasco da Gama,"*^  sent by King John II of Portugal, found the way around the 
Cape of Good Hope to India, and in 1511 Afonso de Albuquerque"^^ led an 
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expedition to Malaya which seized Malacca after a month-long siege and 
made it the capital of Portugal's eastern empire. 
The son of the last Sultan of Malacca fled to the island of Bintan off 
the southern tip of Malaya, where he founded a new state which eventually 
became the Sultanate of Johore. Freed from Melaka's domination, the Malay 
world broke up into a series of quarrelsome successor states, of which the 
most important were Aceh, Brunei, Johore and Perak. Other states such as 
Banten, Yogyakarta, Kedah, Selangor, Sulu and Terengganu also emerged as 
independent sultanates. By the late 16th century the tin mines of northern 
Malaya had been discovered by European traders, and Perak grew wealthy on 
the proceeds of tin exports. But the European colonial powers were bent on 
expanding further into the region. The Portuguese gained control of the spice-
rich Moluccas (Maluku), and in 1571 the Spanish captured Manila. 
The Dutch arrived in the region in 1596. They hated the Portuguese 
both for religious reasons and as commercial rivals, and were determined to 
evict them from the wealthy islands they called the East Indies. Led by the 
Dutch East India Company (VOC), they soon overcame the weak sultanates 
in Java and founded Batavia (Jakarta) as their capital in 1619. From there they 
expanded across the archipelago, forming an alliance with Johore against their 
main enemies, the Portuguese at Melaka and the powerful Sultan of Aceh."*^  
In 1641, after several attempts, the VOC - Johore alliance captured Malacca, 
breaking Portuguese power in Malaya for good - Portugal was left with only 
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Portuguese Timor. Backed by the Dutch, Johore established a loose 
hegemony over the Malay states, except Perak, which was able to play off 
Johore against the Siamese to the north and retain its independence.^^ 
The weakness of the Malay states in this period allowed other people 
to migrate into the Malay homelands. The most important of these were the 
Bugis, seafarers from eastern Indonesia, who regularly raided the Malay 
coasts and finally seized control of Johore following the assassination of the 
last Suhan of the old Malacca royal line in 1699. Other Bugis raiders took 
control of Selangor. The Minangkabau peoples from Sumatra also migrated 
into Malaya, and eventually established their own state in Negeri Sembilan. 
The fall of Johore left a power vacuum on the Malay Peninsula which was 
partly filled by the Siamese kings of Ayutthaya kingdom,^ who made the five 
northern Malay states - Kedah, Kelantan, Patani, Perils and Terengganu -
their vassals. Johore's eclipse also left Perak as the unrivalled leader of the 
Malay states. 
The economic importance of Malaya to Europe grew rapidly during the 
18th century. The fast-growing tea trade between China and Britain increased 
the demand for high-quality Malayan tin, which was used to line tea-chests. 
Malayan pepper also had a high reputation in Europe, while Kelantan and 
Pahang had gold mines. The growth of tin and gold mining and associated 
service industries led to the first influx of foreign settlers into the Malay 
world - at first Arabs and Indians, later Chinese - who colonized the towns 
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and soon dominated economic activities. This established a pattern which 
characterized Malayan society for the next 200 years - a rural Malay 
population increasingly under the domination of wealthy urban immigrant 
communities, whose power the Sultans were unable to resist. 
English traders had been present in Malay waters since the 17th 
century, but it was not until the mid 18th century that the British East India 
Company, based in British India, developed a serious interest in Malayan 
affairs. The growth of the China trade in British ships increased the 
Company's desire for bases in the region. Various islands were used for this 
purpose, but the first permanent acquisition was Penang, leased from the 
Sultan of Kedah in 1786. This was followed soon after by the leasing of a 
block of territory on the mainland opposite Penang (known as Province 
Wellesley). In 1795, during the Napoleonic Wars, the British occupied Dutch 
Malacca to forestall possible French interest in the area. When Malacca was 
handed back to the Dutch in 1815, the British governor, Stamford Raffles, 
looked for an alternative base, and in 1819 he acquired Singapore from the 
Sultan of Johore, The twin bases of Penang and Singapore, together with the 
decline of the Dutch as a naval power, made Britain the dominant force in 
Malayan affairs. British influence was increased by Malayan fears of Siamese 
expansionism, to which Britain made a useful counterweight. During the 19th 
century the Malay Sultans became loyal allies of the British Empire. 
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1.6 The Process of Islamization 
The Islamization of the region is rather a continuing process which 
affects not only our present, but our future as well. The religious history of the 
region is complex. First, Hinduism, then Buddhism, Islam and later 
Christianity offered models which moulded the indigenous cultural-religious 
matrix for millennia. There was instead a great mingling of religious 
traditions unparalleled in any other region of the globe. Islam made and 
continues to make a profound impact upon the socio-cultural, political and 
economic life of Southeast Asia. 
Islam first entered Southeast Asia, the region of present-day Thailand, 
Malaysia, and Indonesia, among other countries, through the merchants of the 
Muslim-controlled Indian Ocean trade route. Geographically, Southeast Asia, 
particularly the Malay Peninsula, was an important stop for ships sailing south 
from China or east from India. The port city of Malacca, in present-day 
Malaysia, had become an important world trading centre since the 15"' 
century. Malacca began as a small fishing village as mentioned by either 
Marco Polo in 1292 or Ibn Batuta in 1345, who travelled through the region." 
Islam arrived in Southeast Asia at the end of the 13'*" century with 
traders from India, who introduced the religion first to northern Sumatra, an 
island presently in Indonesia. Although at the time only a few regions in India 
had converted to Islam, it was traders from these regions, particularly Gujarat 
in northwest India, who brought Islam to Sumatra.^'' It was generally 
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accepted that it were Indian Muslims, who introduced Islam to Southeast 
Asia. Prior to the arrival of Islam, Southeast Asia already was heavily 
influenced by Indian culture and religion, including Hinduism. When Indian 
merchants and missionaries later introduced Islam to the region, they were 
careful to retain whatever previous Hindu or animist customs were necessary 
to gain the widespread adoption of Islam. It has been suggested that had the 
more orthodox Arabs been the first to bring Islam to Southeast Asia, their 
insistence that the locals entirely abandon their old customs might have 
dissuaded them from converting. Thus, Islam in Southeast Asia has a different 
character than orthodox Islam in Arabia, but had it not been for the tolerance 
of the Indian missionaries, Islam nay not have even taken root in Southeast 
Asia at all. 
But it did take root, and by the mid-15"^ century, Islam had spread from 
Sumatra to Malacca, its major trading partner, and surrounding areas, such as 
Brunei. The third ruler of Malacca, Sri Maharaja Muhammad Shah (1424-45), 
is said to be the first Malaccan ruler to convert to Islam, and his son, Muzaffar 
Shah (1446-59), proclaimed Islam the state religion of Malacca.^^ 
In 1509, the arrival of Portuguese ships at the Malaccan port sparked 
the downfall of the short-lived Malacca sultanate. While the fleet maintained 
that it had come only to trade, Indian merchants in Malacca who had 
experienced the recent Portuguese capture of Goa, on the west coast of India, 
warned Malaccan authorities not to be too friendly with the Portuguese. The 
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Portuguese left, disgruntled, only to return in 1511 to capture Malacca for 
themselves.^^ The Portuguese authority in Malacca was accompanied by 
Christian missionaries, but they had little luck in converting the population. 
Despite the numerous changes in power than have since occurred in 
Southeast Asia, from the Portuguese, later to the Dutch, British, and Chinese, 
Islam has retained the hold it first established on the population in the middle 
of 15^*^  century. Brunei remains a sultanate today, the last one in the world, 
and present-day Malaysia and Indonesia also have large Muslim populations. 
Today, the Malays belong to the orthodox Sunni sect. The total impact 
of Islamic culture and then had come from many directions. Islamic Malay 
culture is actually woven from numerous diverse strands. The early 
propagators came principally through India, especially from the Malabar 
coasts and Gujarat. For example, Richard Winstedt opines that conversion to 
Islam was facilitated by the early Indian missionaries who were able to 
en 
syncrytise Islamic teachings with existing beliefs. E.g., the people in that 
region were widely Hindus before the coming of Islam. And Hindus customs 
were being practiced at that time. It is, in fact, the result of the influence of 
the stronger culture over the weaker one. We can find numerous words in 
Malay language other than religious ones which are adopted from Sanskrit 
e.g.. Raja for "king", Rani for "Queen", Putra for "son", Putri for "daughter", 
Bahasa for "language", Bumi for "soil", Puasa for "fasting", Neraka for 
"hell", Shurga for "heaven", Agama for "religion", and so on. Sufism and 
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popular Islamic elements were brought to the Archipelago to a much greater 
extent from India than from Persia or Arabia. However, whether they had 
come directly or indirectly, Persian influences on the culture of the Malays 
has been particularly strong, especially on the Malay royal courts. Malay 
court ceremonies, the title "Shah" for the Sultans or rulers, literature and ideas 
on statecraft and kingship, the literary style of court literature, religious 
literature of Shi 'ite tradition, Sufi writings, and popular narratives, all bear 
indelible marks of Persian influences. 
In addition to the Indians and Persians, the Arabs also played a role in 
bringing to bear the influence of Islamic civilization on the Malays. By the 
seventeenth century A.D. there were already permanent settlements of Arabs 
in the Archipelago, and "wandering Arab traders, adventurers, and religious 
scholars had been a feature of Malay life for the past many hundred years. In 
the Philippines as well as in other parts of the Archipelago, the status 
accorded to the ''sayyid" (descendants of the Holy Prophet) enabled some to 
carve out kingdoms for themselves and ruled over the Malay subjects. As 
descendants of the Holy Prophet, as they claimed to be, they were regarded as 
having not only a charisma but piety and knowledge in religious matters. The 
Arabs were often involved in the local politics and with the esteem they were 
held by the local population they often ended up in a position of advantage. 
As opposed to the earlier propagators of Islam from India and Persia 
who were responsible for the spread of pantheistic mysticism and other 
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popular elements of Islam, the Arabs had familiarized the Malays with the 
orthodox teachings of the religion. This does not mean that the Arabs had had 
no hand in the spread of popular Islamic beliefs and practices, for, itinerant 
Arab mendicants performing magic and divination have been known in the 
Archipelago for a long time. In fact most of the keramat worshiped by the 
Malays are the graves or sites once connected with Arab traders or 
adventurers. And Arab merchants who travelled from village to village would 
often have semi-precious stones and talisman which they claimed had special 
magical qualities. 
More important than the role of the Arabs in advancing orthodox 
teachings is the closer contact the Malays enjoyed with the Arab world during 
the last two centuries. Two phenomena should be singled out; the first is the 
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'Wahhabr reformation, a movement which swept the Arab world in the 
middle of the eighteenth century, and the second is the "modernist" 
movement started in the last century by scholars like Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-
Afghani^ ^ and Muhammad Abduh^ *' of Egypt. The main aim of the 
'Wahhabr movement was to return to the purity of Islamic monotheism. 
Thus it campaigned and attacked vigorously any form of practice or belief 
that might contaminate these ideals. The pre-Islamic survivals, magical 
practices and saint-worship which had come to attach themselves to the 
religious practices of the Muslims, were condemned and attacked. The 
influence of the movement in furthering the character of orthodoxy among the 
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Malays had been quite considerable. The second movement too had its roots 
in the 'Wahhabr ideals, but the stress had been more on "modernistic" 
reforms. In Indonesia, the reform movements like Muhammadiya and 
others were not only interested in furthering the teachings of Islam but had 
built up organizations which also served the public by establishing schools 
and hospitals. In the Peninsula, the reformers of the modernist school were 
referred to as Kaum Muda ^^ and they lashed away at both the Malay 
peasantry as well as the aristocracy for subscribing to the un-Islamic beliefs 
and customs of the past, which feature a great deal not only in the rituals and 
ceremonials but also in the everyday life of the people.^^ 
Of the cultural influence that Islam had brought to the Malays, those in 
the field of literature have been the most profound. The literary heritage of the 
Malays has been exclusively written in the Perso-Arabic script, including 
those literary works carried over from the Hindu period. The connection of 
literary activity with the royal court is richly reflected in the literature. 
Treatises on duties of kingship and concepts of state are represented in books 
like Taj-us-Salatin (The Crown of Kings) and Bustan-us-Salatin (The Garden 
of Kings). Theologians who flocked to the royal courts translated and wrote 
works on Muslim jurisprudence, theology, and history. Even the state 
chronicles, which claimed a sacred origin for the ruling dynasties, were 
modelled on Persian or Indian works such as Shah-Namah^'* and Akbar-
Namah . Islam also introduced a wealth of writings on mysticism to the 
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Malay world. These writings do not present attempts at syncretism with 
polytheistic beliefs. They are doctrinal exercises in the tradition of Islam. 
Tales of heroes were among the earliest stories to be introduced to the area. 
Winstedt claims that "the first task of the missionaries was to substitute for 
the Hindu epics tales of the heroes of Islam".^^ These heroes tales fitted into 
the feudal structure of the society as did the Mahabharata and Ramayana in 
the Hindu period. 
As far as the basic tenets of Islam are concerned, the impact of Islamic 
ideology had been felt in the royal courts as well as in the villages. But the 
total impact of Muslim civilization apparently had different meanings at the 
different social levels. Thus literature about statecraft of doctrinal discussions 
on points of theology would principally belong to the courtly circles, while 
popular religious literature and the romances would inevitably find their way 
to the masses. The point to be made is that the scholarly tradition of Islam was 
nurtured within the precincts of the royal courts or if there was no royal 
patronage, there would have been schools established by scholars of repute 
and to these scholars the aspiring young students would flock to study 
religious knowledge. The Pesantren^^ (as it is known in Indonesia) and 
Sekolah Pondok (as it is known in the Peninsula) used to be the centres of 
religious instructions. Although such schools later became the stronghold of 
the conservative scholars as against the teachings of the so-called 
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"modernistic reformers", they had served for a long time as the point of 
reference for Islamic knowledge 
Today, Islam is declared the official religion of Malaysia, although 
Malaysia itself is not a theocracy, and freedom to worship any religion is 
guaranteed by the Constitution.^^ In the component Malay states there had 
been established government departments which dealt with the administration 
of religious affairs in all aspects. In the period of British administration, 
religious affairs and local Malay customs were under the jurisdiction of the 
Sultans and these were administered through either a department, a council or 
the Sultan's office. But after 1948, every state in the Federation of Malaya 
had established a religious affairs department. Muslims in Malaysia are also 
subjected to Islamic law which is applied as "personal law", and subjected to 
the jurisdiction of religious courts {mahkamah shariah) which are presided 
over by the religious judges. At the same time Islamic religious education in 
Malaysia has been given a new dimension with the establishment of religious 
faculties and departments in the universities. '^^  
Today, Islam in the modem state is primary in Malaysia and Indonesia, 
the heartlands of Southeast Asian Islam. The relatively small Muslim 
population of Myanmar (Burma) comprises two groups. The first includes the 
descendants of Indian immigrants (1880-1940), most of whom either left 
during the World War II or in the 1960s, mostly from economically low 
classes. This class also includes '"zerbadi", the offspring of Indian Muslim 
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males and Burmese females. But no data on the numbers or situations of these 
people, so it is possible that they no longer survive as a discrete group. 
Second, The Rohingha of the Arakan are Muslims in faith but Arakanese in 
all else. They have been and now are subject to considerable aggression on 
the part of the Burmese army. 
In Malaysia and Indonesia, two factors have determined the position of 
Islam in the post-war period. First, the newly independent states are modelled 
on the secular European tradition. They have constitutions, bureaucracies, 
national economic and social policies, and political pluralism. Political 
ideology ranges from variants of parliamentary democracy to versions of 
presidential and corporate rule. Essentially, the state is defined in terms of 
rational secularism. Second and contrasted with this, in the new states Islam 
for the first time gained a legitimate political voice. It was no longer a 
prescribed vehicle of protest and anti-colonial agitation. Islam and Islamic 
activists in both Netherlands East Indies and in British Malaya, especially in 
the Netherlands East Indies, had a long and proud history of resistance to the 
European imperium. But with the legitimization of at least some political 
pluralism with independence, the focus has changed. Islamic parties have 
entered the new political process as contributors rather than as resisters. This 
has not happened in Thailand or the Philippines, where Muslim minority still 
resist the central governments, occasionally violently, in the name of Islam.''^  
In Malaysia and Singapore, however. Islamic political parties very quickly 
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found themselves in a rather serious dilemma. A further complication in both 
states has been that Islam was very organized in the pre-war period, and such 
important factors as the teaching of religion, the collection of zakat mdfitrah 
(charity/ tax), the hajj, and judicial administration had become fully 
controlled by the state bureaucracy. This process continued after 
independence with the establishment of ministries of religion and department 
of religious affairs. The public existence of Islam had become accommodated 
with the institution of nation-state. This again is the dilemma of contemporary 
Islam." 
The history of Islam in Southeast Asia is the history of "varying 
degrees of non-acceptance". The Muslims of Southern Thailand have in the 
past resorted to violence (the Patani Liberation Front), as have the Moro of 
the southern Philippines (the Moro Liberation Front), resistance in both areas 
continue.^ '* Recently, on 28th April 2004, in a clash between the Thai 
government with the Muslim resistance movement in the south of Thailand 
resulting in about 100 deaths.^^ 
In Indonesia (90 percent Muslim) the history of Islamic political 
parties has been complex and characterized by the formation of large 
overreaching groups, followed by their splitting into various specific interest 
and ideological groups. The interesting point about these regroupings and the 
shifting alliances that went with them is that they were not based on 
differences of doctrine. One can not explain the sometimes bewildering 
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political changes in terms such as "traditionalism" or "modernism". Instead, 
differences arose over competition for the political posts available to Muslim 
representatives in alliance with secular parties. The detailed history is 
unedifying, probably because the Muslim parties have never gained power or 
even the balance of power, yet the experience has not been with profit for 
Muslims. The Islamic perspective is politically important and has been 
recognized in the fields of family law and in parts of education systems, but 
no farther. To some extent, Islam still remains an ideology of resistance in 
Indonesia, albeit in a more sophisticated form than before World War II. 
More recently, under the New Order government. Islamic political 
movements have been subsumed under a general "United Political Party" that 
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emphasized Pancasila, as the national ideology. 
In Malaysia, more than half of the population is Muslim, and Islam is 
recognized in the constitution as the official religion of the country. The rulers 
{sultans) of the various states in Malaysia are guardians of Islam in their own 
states. Each state has a Department of Religious Affairs, and there is also a 
national Council for Religious Affairs. Muslim political representation is 
divided into two unequal parts. On the one hand is UMNO (United Malay 
National Organization),^^ an ethnic Malay secular and nationalist party that 
has been dominant since independence. It has accommodated Islam to a 
reasonable degree, but not to the extent of allowing religion to determine the 
policy in any sphere. On the other hand, there has been a succession of 
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"Islamic" parties concentrated almost entirely on the east coast and in the 
northeast, the rural heartlands of Islam. The latest party is the PAS (Partai 
Islam Se-Malaysia), whose program is avowedly Islamic. Although the 
Islamic parties have controlled states in the Malaysian Federation, they have 
never come close to forming a national government. 
The history of Islam in Southeast Asia falls into tree parts. Initially 
(1500-1800), it was an ideology of rule in the Malay-speaking lands and the 
inspiration for an extensive and complex literature. Second, in the period of 
high colonialism it became subordinated to European forms of government, 
heavily bureaucratized, and politically suppressed. In literature, there was 
little except repetition until the inspiration of West Asian reform movements 
reached Southeast Asia in the late nineteenth century. Most of the Islamic 
revival was derivative of the West Asian models. Finally, with independence 
came real political accommodation between Islam and the states in the areas 
of Muslim majorities, Malaysia and Indonesia. Both Malaysia and Indonesia 
have established "Islamic Banks", in southern Thailand as well. These operate 
on a variety of Muslim contracts which eschew interest {riba), instead profit 
stems from various sharing and commission arrangements. The central banks 
of Malaysia and Indonesia exercise supervisory control. 
1.7 Islamic Reformism 
The Islamic reformist movement in Malaya can be traced to the 
heartland of Islam encompassing present-day Arabia, especially during the 
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late nineteenth century when Islam was generally on the decline in the face of 
Western onslaught, both militarily and economically. This was in sharp 
contrast to the period from the eighth to the sixteenth centuries when Muslims 
dominated at least three large empires, namely the Ottoman in South-East 
Europe and the Middle East, the Safavids in Iran, and the Mughals in India. 
For the reformist movements, the leading figures must include Jamal 
al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897), Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905), and Rashid Rida 
(d. 1935).^ ° Their message was principally that Muslims should be better 
equipped for the challenges of the modem world. In calling for the unity of 
the Muslims to oust colonialism and imperialism and preserve their identity at 
a time when Muslim countries were colonized, al-Afghani also defined the 
idea of a dynamic Muslim, one who values science (spirit of philosophy), 
reason, and action. 
They had to get rid of the illusion of the conservative Ulama who, in 
forbidding the pursuit of modem science and technology, are really the enemy 
of Islam. Al-Afghani's close friend and disciple, Muhammad Abduh 
(formerly the Mufti of Egypt and Rector of Al-Azhar University in Cairo), 
and Rashid Rida, a faithful guardian of Abduh's ideas, echoed these 
sentiments.^' 
The dynamism of Islam and the promise of the future which these 
scholars conjured up acted like a cleansing wind in much of the Islamic 
world, and Malaysia (then Malaya) was no exception. It should be borne in 
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mind that Malay scholars have gone to Mecca, Medina, and Cairo to study 
since the early times, while numerous others had either migrated there or 
performed the pilgrimage. The scholars and elite were especially significant 
because of their exposure to Islamic reformism whilst there and their 
contribution to the spread of similar ideas upon their return to Malaya. 
Al-Azhar University in Cairo served as a centre of activities for Malay-
Indonesian Muslim students such as Djanin Taib, Kahar Muzakkar, Farid 
Ma'ruf, and Ilyas Yunus who all played a part in the anti-Dutch struggle in 
Indonesia. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, newsletters and Islamic bulletins 
produced by the Malay and Indonesian students at al-Azhar University, 
especially Seruan Azhar (call from Azhar), contained messages of reformist 
Islam and pan-Islamism conveyed to religious teachers, Majlis Agama 
officials and Al-Azhar graduates in Malaya. 
The impact that Islamic reformism had upon Malaya in general, and 
Malayan Islam in particular, can be illustrated by highlighting, briefly, the 
propagation of reformist ideas among the most notable Islamic reformists in 
the Malay Archipelago (Muhammad Sarim, 1979, Hamka, 1958, Muhammad 
A.Zaki, 1971.^^ 
The three to be singled out here, al-Hadi (b.l862), Tahir Jalaluddin (b. 
1869), and Abbas Taha (b. 1885) were all proficient in both Arabic and Malay 
and had spent a considerable period of their lives in the Arabian heartland, 
particularly in Cairo and Mecca, and acknowledged the influence of Islamic 
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reformism upon their thoughts. Their contribution to the spread of reformist 
ideas in the Malay world lay mainly in their role as founders and editors of 
reformist journals and newspapers of the time. 
The most notable these journals was al-Imam, a monthly, founded by 
al-Hadi himself Al-Imam emphasized the importance of education and 
modernity for the Malays, and the need for them to get rid of un-Islamic 
practices in their daily lives. Tahir Jalaluddin, in his many writings, called for 
a return to the true principles of Islam based on the Holy Qur'dn and Sunnah. 
He was particularly incensed at the Ulama 's passivity, their failure to perform 
their role, and their perversion of Islam with un-Islamic aspects of the adat, 
and consequently, their perpetuation of Malay decadence. In similar vein, 
Abbas Taha, who succeeded Tahir as the editor of al-Imam and particularly 
his role as editor of his own newspaper, Naracha (1911), clearly indicated his 
concern and opposition to the heavy concretions of folk Islam and traditional 
eclecticism.^^ 
In Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore a basic distinction can be drawn 
between reformist movements that seek to transform culture and society and 
those that seek to employ the political process to establish Islamic states. In 
the Philippines the distinction is between those who would establish a Muslim 
state in the southern region and who envision the Muslim community as a 
component of a pluralistic state. Muslims in southern Thailand have been 
influenced by Malaysian reformists and have organized to protect and expand 
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the rights of Muslims in an overwhelmingly Buddhist society. In Southern 
Asian states where Muslims are small minorities, Burma, Cambodia, and 
Vietnam, Islamic reformism did not emerge until after World War II. In these 
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countries reformism is a religious movement of little political significance. 
Modem Southeast Asia has been characterized by high economic 
growth by most countries and closer regional integration. Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore have traditionally experienced high 
growth and are commonly recognized as the more developed countries of the 
region. As of late, Vietnam too is experiencing an economic boom. Myanmar, 
Cambodia, Laos and the newly independent East Timor are however still 
lagging. 
On August 8, 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) was founded by Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and 
the Philippines. Since Cambodia's admission into the Union in 1999, East 
Timor is the only Southeast Asian country that is not part of ASEAN. The 
association aims to enhance cooperation among Southeast Asian 
communities. ASEAN Free Trade Area has been established to encourage 
greater trade among ASEAN members. ASEAN has also been a front runner 
in the integration of Asia-Pacific region through East Asia Summits.^^ 
39 
Notes and References 
Husain Mutalib, Islam and Ethnicity in Malay Politics, (Singapore, 1990), p. 
11. 
Asghar Ali Engineer, Islam in Southeast Asia, (New Delhi, 1985), p. 1. 
Angel M. Rabasa, Political Islam in Southeast Asia: Moderates, Radicals and 
Terrorists, (New York,, 2003), p. 13. 
D. R .Sardesai, Southeast Asia: Past and Present, (New Delhi, 1997), p. 3 
Ibid., p. 6. 
Brian Harrison, South-East Asia: A Short History, (New York, 1955), p. 30. 
David G. Hunt, Southeast Asia: Concepts, Culture, Factual Background, (New 
York, 1972), p. 2. 
Ibid., p. 3. 
Jonathan Rigg, Southeast Asia: A Regional Transition, (London, 1991), p. 6. 
Charles A. Fisher, Southeast-Asia: A Social, Economic and Political 
Geography, (London, 1966), p. 21. 
David G. Hunt, op. cit., p. 6. 
D.R. Sardesai, op. cit., p. 7. 
Saul Rose, Britain and South-East Asia, (London, 1962), p. 9. 
John F. Cady, Southeast Asia: It's History And Development, (New York, 
1964), p. 12. 
Ibid., p. 13. 
David G. Hunt, op. cit., pp. 18-19. 
John F. Cady, op. cit., pp. 14-15. 
Ibid., p. 16. 
D.R. Sardesai, op. cit., p. 11. 
John F. Cady, op. cit., pp. 19-20. 
21 F.J. Moorhead, A History of Malaya and Her Neighbours, V.l, (London, 
1959), p. 24. 
^^  D.G.E. Hall, A History of South-East Asia, 4* Edition, (New York, 1981), p. 
12. 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
40 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
Sir Richard Winstedt, Malaya and its History, (London, 1958), p. 24. 
D.R. Sardesai, op. cit., p. 18. 
Brian Harrison, op. cit., p. 12. 
David G. Hunt, op. cit., pp. 21-22. 
Ibid., pp. 23-25. 
adat, one of the most important structural elements of Islamic society in 
Southeast Asia is adat, which denotes refined culture and more specifically 
local custom and indigenous law, established through practice and repeated 
precedent. In the Malay world adat should first of all be viewed as a cultural 
concept that can be understood only within the context of the historical process 
of Islamization. During this process, largely oral traditions were written down 
and somewhat reformulated.(see more detail of adat in Esposito, John L.(ed.), 
The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World, V.l, (New York, , 
1995). pp. 19-20. 
Bhakti (Sanskrit): is an originally Sanskrit term, used in many South Asian 
languages, that means intense devotion, expressed by action (service) and/or 
placing oneself at the mercy of the divine. A person who practices Bhakti is 
called a Bhakta. It is a Hindu religious movements in which the main spiritual 
practice is the fostering of loving devotion to God, called bhakti. They are 
monotheistic movements generally devoted to worship of Shiva or Vishnu or 
Shakti. 
M. C. Ricklefs and P. Voorhoeve, Indonesian Manuscripts in Great Britain, 
(London, 1977), p. 120. 
A.C. Milner, 'Islam and Malay Kingship', in Ahmad Ibrahim and Sharon 
Siddique (eds.). Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia, (Singapore, 1985), pp. 
25-27. 
David G. Hunt, op. cit., p. 11. 
D.R. Sardesai, op. cit., p. 18. 
Frederica M. Bunge, Malaysia: A Country Study, (Washington D.C., 1985), 
p. 7. 
Brian Harrison, op. cit., p. 30. 
41 
38 
39 
^^  Ibid., pp. 47-49. 
^^  Srivijaya, (200's - 1400) was an ancient Malay kingdom on the island of 
Sumatra which influenced much of the Malay Archipelago. Records of its 
beginnings are scarce while estimations range from the 200's to the 500's. The 
kingdom ceased to exist around 1400. In Sanskrit, sri means 'shining' or 
'radiant' and vijaya means victory or excellence. 
The Majapahit Empire was an Indianized kingdom in eastern Java and ruled 
much of the southern Malay Peninsula, Borneo, Sumatra, Bali, and the 
Philippines from about 1293 to around 1500. Its greatest ruler was Hayam 
Wuruk, whose reign from 1350 to 1389 marked the empire's peak. 
Sejarah Melayu or The Malay Annals, is a historical Malay literary work that 
chronicles the establishment of the Malacca Sultanate and spans over 600 
years of the Malay Peninsula's history. The single volume was believed to have 
been first compiled and edited by Tun Seri Lanang, the bendahara (equivalent 
to the prime minister of a sultanate) of the Royal Court of Johor in 1612, 
having been commissioned by Sultan Alauddin Riaayat Shah while he was 
held captive in Aceh. The subjects covered in the work include the founding 
of Malacca and its relationship with neighbouring kingdoms, the advent and 
spread of Islam in the region, the history of the royalty in the region as well as 
the administrative hierarchy of the sultanate. 
Bendahara is an ancient Malay senior position within a Malay government, 
especially in Malay states before the intervention of European powers in the 
Malay World during the 19th century. A bendahara is appointed by a sultan 
and is not a hereditary post. It is the highest ranking officer that could be held 
by any commoner people. In modem times, it is typical to render the position 
as prime minister. Though bendahara's duties are similar to that of a prime 
minister's, the two terms are not interchangeable. One clear difference is the 
amount of power one has. In ancient times, Benda is an ancient Malay title of 
nobility, usually given to the chief of public security. The Temenggung is 
usually responsible for the safety of the monarch as well as the state police and 
army. The office was usually a stepping stone to the higher title of Bendahara, 
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or prime ministerhara was typically the highest ranking official after the sultan 
while the sultan has the uhimate authority over the land. In short, theoretically, 
the sultan was not answerable to the bendahara, or to anyone else for that 
matter. The suUan was not a figurehead unlike the Yang di-Pertuan Agong in 
modem day Malaysia. In modem day Malaysia, the Prime Minister holds more 
political power instead of the sultan. 
Laksamana is a position within the armed forces of the ancient Malaccan 
Sultanate. Usually translated as "Admiral", the Laksamana is in charge for the 
security of the Sultanate and most importantly the China-India trade route 
within the Straits of Malacca, the lifeline of the Empire. He is in full command 
of the Malaccan fleet outranked only by the Bendahara and the Sultan. 
Temenggung is an ancient Malay title of nobility, usually given to the chief of 
public security. The Temenggung is usually responsible for the safety of the 
monarch as well as the state police and army. The office was usually a 
stepping stone to the higher title oi Bendahara, or prime minister. 
Barbara Watson Andaya & Leonard Y. Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 
(London, 1988), p. 70. 
Duarte Barbosa (d. 1521) was a Portuguese writer and trader. Lived during the 
15th and the 16th century, his father was Diogo Barbosa. He traveled with 
Ferdinand Magellan in the Armada de Molucca expedition along with 
approximately 260 persons of various ranks. He was a supernumerary in the 
expedition. During his journey, he wrote detailed account of foreign cultures. 
Barbara Watson Andaya & Leonard Y. Andaya, op. cit., p. 73. 
M.A J. Kennedy, A History of Malaya: A.D. 1400-1959, (New York, 1962), 
p. 22. 
Afonso de Albuquerque, (1453 - December 16, 1515) was a noted Portuguese 
naval general whose activities helped establish the Portuguese colonial empire 
in India. 
D.R. Sardesai, op. cit., p. 70. 
Ibid., p. 66. 
/biJ., pp. 64-65. 
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'^ The kingdom of Ayutthaya was a Thai kingdom that existed from the 1350 to 
1767. King Ramathibodi I (Uthong) founded Ayutthaya (DtJStJl) as the capital 
of his kingdom in 1350 and absorbed Sukhothai, 640 km to the north, in 1376. 
Over the next four centuries the kingdom expanded to become the nation of 
Siam, whose borders were roughly those of modern Thailand, except for the 
north, the Kingdom of Lannathai. Ayutthaya was friendly towards foreign 
traders, including the Chinese, Indians, Japanese and Persians, and later the 
Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, British and French, permitting them to set up 
villages outside the city walls. The court of King Narai (1656-1688) had strong 
links with that of King Louis XIV of France, whose ambassadors compared the 
city in size and wealth to Paris. 
M.A J. Kennedy, op. cit., p. 65. 
M. B. Hooker, Islam in Southeast Asia, (Leiden, 1983), p. 4. 
D. G. E. Hall, op. cit., p. 222. 
Husain Mutalib, op. cit., p. 12. 
Charles A. Fisher, op. cit., p. 128. 
R.O. Winstedt, The Malays: A Cultural History, (London, 1950), pp. 35-36. 
Wahhabi, The religious movement known as the Wahhabiyah, sometimes 
anglicized as ''wahhabism" is founded on the teachings of Muhammad Ibn 
Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792), who wrote on a variety of Islamic subjects such 
as theology, exegesis, jurisprudence, and life of the Prophet Muhammad. A set 
of issues dominated the teachings of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and 
distinguished the Wahhabiyah from other Islamic movements. These include 
tawhid (the unity of God), tawasul (intercession), ziyarat al-qubur (visitation 
of graves and erection of tomb), takfir (charge of unbelief), bid'ah 
(innovation), and ijtihad and taqlid (original juristic opinions and imitation of 
tradition). See more in Esposito, John L. (ed.), The Encyclopaedia of the 
Modern Islamic World, V.4, New York, Oxford University Press, 1995. pp. 
307-308. 
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897). He claimed to be from Afghanistan, 
though he was actually an Iranian. Afghani was an able, effective, and restless 
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agitator. He was much more interested in philosophy than in theology and 
more interested in politics than in philosophy. In politics, he was an activist 
rather than a theoretician. Like most activists, he had a tendency to 
oversimplify his concepts and set right against wrong. Like the Wahhabis, he 
idealized the period of the first four caliphs and believed in transcendentalism. 
Unlike the Wahhabis, Afghani in the importance of reason in Islam. For a 
detailed study of al-Afghani and his Pan-Islamic movement see N.R. Keddie, 
An Islamic Response to Imperialism, (Berkley and Los Angeles, 1968) and 
Elie Kedourie, Afghani and Abduh, {London, 1966). 
Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
Muhammadiya, (which translates as Followers of the Prophet Muhammad) is 
an urban-based religious organization which was found in 1912 by a mosque 
official. He was inspired by the ideas of the Egyptian theologian Muhammad 
Abduh, who had urged a cleansing of Islamic thought through a return to a 
original texts. This enterprise in renewal was an attempt through education and 
social welfare to reconcile Islam with the modem world. Muhammadiya was 
not engaged in politics under the Dutch, but with the proclamation of 
independence in 1945, it became a constituent part of Masyumi (Consultative 
Council of Indonesian Muslims) and aspired to create an Islamic state. 
Masyumi was banned in 1960 because of its implication in the regional revolts 
of the late 1950s. Muhammadiya has continued to exist in persuit of its original 
purposes, with an over -lapping connection with the United Development 
Party founded in 1973 by merging all Islamic parties. Like other all 
organizations Muhammadiya has been obliged to dilute its Islamic identity by 
adhering to the state philosophy of Fancasila as its sole ideology. 
Kaum Muda, modernist group. 
Mohd. Taib Osman, Islamization of the Malay: A transformation of culture', 
in Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia, Ahmad Ibrahim and Sharon Siddique 
(eds.), (Singapore, 1985), pp. 44-46. 
Shah Namah, ('Book of King'), celebrated work of the Persian epic poet, 
Firdousi, in which the Persian national epic found its final and enduring form. 
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Written for Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna, the Shah Namah is a poem of merely 
60,000 verses, mainly based on the khvaly-namak, a history of the kings of 
Persia in Pahlavi (Middle Persian) from mythical times down to the 1?"^  
century. Firdousi versified and updated the story to the downfall of the Sasanid 
empire (mid-7'^ century), and, for nearly 1,000 years, it has remained one of 
the most popular works in the Persian-speaking world. (See more details in 
Abd al-Firdousi in The Encyclopaedia Britannica, V.IO, 15' Edition, 
Chicago, Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc., 1994. p. 46.) 
Akbar Namah, (Persian: -^^ >J^>), which literally means History ofAkbar, is a 
biographical account of Akbar, the third Mughal emperor. It includes vivid and 
detailed descriptions of his life and time. The book was commissioned by the 
Great Mughal, and written by Abul Fazl, one of the members of Navaratans of 
Akbar's royal court. It is stated that the book took seven years to be completed 
and the original manuscripts contained a number of paintings supporting the 
texts, and all the paintings represented the Mughal School of painting. 
R.O. Winstedt, op. cit., p. 145. 
Pesantren, a type of school in Southeast Asia offering secondary-level training 
in Islamic subjects if termed pesatren on Java, surou on Sumatra, pondok in 
Malay Peninsula, and pandita ("school") in the Philippines. Pesantren derives 
from the sixteenth century, when learning centres known as the "place of 
learning for the Islamic faithful (santris) ", were established. Surou was a place 
for worship in early Southeast Asia, while Pondok derives from travellers' inn 
(Ar. Funduq) of the Middle East. Pandita was the local term for a holy man in 
the Philippines.(see more details of Pesantren in Esposito, John L. (ed.). The 
Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World, V.3, (New York, 1995). 
pp. 324-326. 
Pondok, A type of school in Southeast Asia offering secondary-level training 
in Islamic subjects iQxm&Apondok in Malay Peninsula. 
FredericaM. Bunge, op. cit., p. 110. 
Mahkamah Syariah, the Religious Court. 
Mohd . Taib Osman, op. cit., pp. 46. 
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M. Kamal Hasan, 'Malaysia', in John L. Esposito (ed.), The Oxford 
Encyclopaedia of the Modem Islamic World , V.3, (New York, 1995), pp.35-
38. 
Sharon Siddique, 'Singapore' in John L. Esposito (ed.) The Oxford 
Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World, V. 4, (New York, 1995), pp. 75-
77. 
Thomas M. Ladd, 'Patani United Liberation Organization', in John L. 
Esposito, (ed.) The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World, V.3, 
(New York, 1995), pp. 306-307. 
The 'author' was in Thailand at the time and also had witnessed the events 
along with getting news from TV and news papers. 
Pancasila, pronounced Pancasila, is the philosophical basis of the Indonesian 
state. Pancasila consists of two Sanskrit words, "panca" meaning five, and 
"sila" meaning principle. 
-Believe in the one and only God (Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa) 
-Just and civilized humanity Halleluja, praise duh lord {Kemanusian yang adil 
dan Beradab) 
-The unity of Indonesia (Persatuan Indonesia) 
-Democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of 
deliberations amongst representatives (Kerakyatan yang Di pimpim oleh 
Hikmat kebijaksanaan dalam PermusyawaratanlPerwakilan) 
-Social justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia {Keadilan Sosial bagi 
Seluruh Rakyat Indonesia). 
Azim A. Nanji (ed.). The Muslim Almanac, (New York, 1996), pp. 73-75. 
Chuk Kek Yoong, Mahathir Administration: Leadership and Change in a 
Multiracial Society, (Malaysia, 1987), p. 26. 
Safie Bin Ibrahim, The Islamic Party of Malaysia: Its Formative Stages And 
Ideology, (Malaysia, 1981), p. 8. 
Rashid Rida, (1865-1935), Rida was the most prominent disciple of 
Muhammad Abduh and one of the most influential scholars and jurists of his 
generation. Rida was bom near Tripoli, in present-day Lebanon. His early 
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education consisted of training in traditional Islamic subjects and a brief, 
disenchanting exposure to the secular curriculum of the Ottoman government 
school in Tripoli. His reformist views began to form in 1884-1885 when he 
was exposed to Jamal al-Din al-Afhani's and Abduh's journal al-Urwa al-
Wuthqa (the firmest bond). In 1897, Rida left Syria for Cairo to collaborate 
with Abduh. The following year he launched al-Manar, first a weekly and then 
a monthly journal comprising Qur'amc commentary (began by Abduh, 
continued by Rida, but never completed) and opinions on pressing legal 
political, and social issues of the day. Like Abduh, Rida based his reformist 
principles on the argument that the Shari 'a consists of ibadat (worship) and 
mu 'a malat (social relations). Human reason has little scope in the former and 
Muslims should adhere to the dictates of the Qur'an and Hadith. The laws 
governing mu 'a malat should confirm to Islamic ethics but on specific points 
may be continually reassessed according to the changing conditions of 
different generations and societies. 
Husain Mutalib, op. cit., p. 18. 
Ibid.,^. 19. 
Ibid., p. 20. 
Mark R. Woodward ,' Southeast Asia', in Richard C. Martin, (ed.), op. cit., V. 
2, pp. 582-583. 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a political, 
economic, and cultural organization of countries located in Southeast Asia. 
Formed on August 8, 1967, by Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and 
the Philippines, as a non-provocative display of solidarity against communist 
expansion in Vietnam and insurgency within their own borders. Following the 
Bali Summit of 1976, the organization embarked on a program of economic 
cooperation, which floundered in the mid-1980's only to be revived around a 
1991 Thai proposal for a regional "free trade area". The countries meet 
annually. 
http://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/History_of_Southeast_Asia 
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Introduction 
The Southeast Asian region has been influenced by different external 
forces in the course of its long history. In the first centuries of the Christian 
era, the sprawl of the Indian and Chinese civilizations stretched in the region. 
Subsequently, the Arabs and Europeans entered the area. The arrival of 
various external groups contributed to the growth of heterogeneity in the 
region's societies. Southeast Asia's initial contact with Islam is undoubtedly a 
by product of Arab trade in the region, Arab traders are believed to have 
brought the religion to the regions as early as the eighth century. 
Islam became identified with state power in Southeast Asia from the 
fifteenth century shortly after the foundation of the trading empire of Malacca 
based on the west coast of the Malay Peninsula. But after the fall of Malacca 
to the Portuguese in the early sixteenth century, Muslims dispersed to other 
parts of the Indonesian Archipelago where Islam became most deeply 
accepted among coastal trading communities. In Java, Islam was later adopted 
by local princes to underpin and support their mythical power but primarily as 
a cultural veneer on entrenched animist and Hindu-Buddhist beliefs whose 
syncretic legacy is to be found in eastern and central parts of the island. The 
Islamic faith was also employed to mobilize opposition to Dutch colonial 
control. Within Southeast Asia, the most significant Islamic communities are 
to be found in Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei.' 
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In contrast to the Middle East, Islam in Southeast Asia is far more 
multi-religious and multi-cultural. This diversity is exemplified in Muslim 
majority countries such as Brunei, and in Indonesia and Malaysia with their 
significant non-Muslim minorities as well as the Muslim minorities' 
communities of Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, 
and Myanmar. In Indonesia, Islam has become more visible in the political 
and institutional landscape, from the government to NGOs. Multiple and 
diverse voices discuss and debate the status and role of Islam in Indonesian 
society. Muslim scholars and professionals in Indonesia are producing some 
of the most creative thinking on religious and social reform, democratization, 
pluralism, and women's rights in the Muslim world. 
This chapter emphasizes on the current situation of Muslims in the 
countries wherein Islam is dominant and a growing factor in mainstream 
political life and in the countries which the religion of Islam is in minority. 
2.1 Islam in Indonesia 
Some 90 percent of Indonesia's 190 million inhabitants are Sunni 
Muslims, the largest population of Muslims in any country in the world today. 
The remainder of the population are Christians, Hindus, animists, or followers 
of varying Confucian and Buddhist beliefs. From the beginning, state and 
popular Islam continued to be imbued with a Hindu culture reframed within 
local traditions. 
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Early Islam in Indonesia was also greatly influenced by Sufi views. By 
the sixteenth century many of the Archipelago's best-known Muslim scholars 
were from the Sufi orders. In the years that followed, Sufi orders such as the 
Qadiriyah^ and Naqshbandiyah'^ attracted many Indonesians into their ranks, 
and branches were formed in many parts of the islands. 
Until the nineteenth century, contact with the rest of the Muslim world 
was relatively intermittent compared with the burgeoning interaction which 
was to follow. Muslim scholars from the Middle East and the Indian 
subcontinent continued to be the transmission channels for Islamic ideas, and 
a small but important group of Indonesians traveled to centres of the Islamic 
learning in the Arab world. Arabs and Turks were also political and religious 
advisers in local sultanates. The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw 
a significant increase in Indonesia's involvement with the rest of the Islamic 
world. There was also a significant rise in the number of Indonesian scholars 
going to the Arab countries for religious studies. And those who returned 
from these Arab countries became the backbone of religious education in the 
regions, along with the immigrants from the Arab states who taught religion 
and Arabic in the pesantren and madrasahs.^ This was also a period in which 
new religious ideas, and particularly modernism {kaum muda), made strong 
inroads into the religious thinking of the islanders. The reformers were 
particularly critical of the syncredc, "non-Islamic" accretions. They also 
argued in support of ijtihad (independent judgment) and rejected tag lid 
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(adherence to tradition). The most important modernist organization, 
Muhammadiyah, was founded in 1911. Its founder Ahmad Dahlan and other 
key members were studied in Cairo by the followers of Muhammad Abduh. It 
became heavily involved in education and social change. 
Religious thought in Indonesia can be characterized by a burgeoning 
indigenous literature on Islam and the large scale importation and translation 
of works by Islamic writers such as Hamka, as well as those considered more 
recent. Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid, became well recognized 
interpreters of Islamic thought in the islands. Among foreign Muslim writers, 
those most widely published in Indonesian have been Ali Shari'ati, Sayyid 
Qutb, Abu al-A'la Mawdudi, al-Ghazali, Hasan al-Banna, and Muhammad 
Iqbal. 
Muslims in Indonesia have been described as divided between those 
"nominal" Muslims who have been more deeply influenced by non-Muslim 
traditions and those more "orthodox" ones who follow a more universalistic 
pattern of belief and practice. The former, usually referred to as abangan 
have been described as imbued with Hindu and animist elements reinforced 
by Sufism to create forms of rituals and mysticism peculiar to Indonesia and 
especially to Java. Within this culture, ritual feasts {slametanf, spirit beliefs, 
traditional medical practices, and Hindu art and ceremonial forms intertwine 
with Muslim precepts. The latter group, termed santrC have perceived 
themselves as followers of a "purer" Islam, adhering more rigidly to rituals. 
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The Indonesian government over the past several decades has been more 
closely attuned to mystical sufism, while many orthodox Muslims have 
attacked what they considered to be un-Islamic tendencies within the national 
political leadership. 
However, greater contact with the rest of the Muslim world and the 
teaching of Islam to Indonesia's growing school population has provided a 
stronger foundation for a more universalistic interpretation of the religion. 
The teaching of religion in the schools is now compulsory. There has also 
been a greater interest in the hajj, and even more on wearing of Islamic dress 
by women, and concern over halal products. 
Part of the social change in Indonesia is the result of missionary 
(Da'wah) activities by organizations seeking to "make Muslims better 
Muslims" or to "Islamize Muslims." The postwar era has seen a proliferation 
of Islamic organizations, tracts, magazines, stuffy groups, and lectures 
seeking to bring to the Indonesians a better understanding of Islam. An 
Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Council was formed in 1967, led by former 
Masjumi leader Mohammad Natsir," and there has been considerable recent 
cooperation among individual Muslims from disparate organizations such as 
the Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama.'^ 
-Islam and Politics 
Islam has played an important role in twentieth century Indonesian 
politics. The first mass nationalist organization was Sarekat Islam, formed in 
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1912 and the dominant political organization of the colony for more than a 
decade. Given a great ethnic and linguistic diversity across the Archipelago. It 
differentiated the Indonesians from the Christian colonizers and gave them a 
sense of identity with universality. Sarekat Islam had an economic agenda that 
reinforced its religious platform. From the beginning it criticized un-Islamic 
(particularly Chinese) economic power in the islands and later attacked Dutch 
capitalism. The Sarekat Islam also aimed to oppose the proselytizing efforts 
of the Christian missionaries. Thus, the Dutch colonial administration tended 
to see Islam as a danger to domestic peace and order and expressed suspicion 
of returning pilgrims and students who had studied in foreign Muslim 
educational institutions. In 1922 Sarekat Islam broke into two parties, a left 
wing and an Islamic wing. The left wing became the nucleus of Indonesia's 
first political party, the Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist 
Party, PKI), and the Islamic wing became the first Islamic political party, 
albeit a minor one, Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesian, (Indonesian Islamic 
Federation Party, PSII).''* Later, the Sarekat Islam prohibited its members 
from joining any other political organization, the Communists were expelled 
from the Sarekat. 
In the decades preceding World War II and during the Japanese 
occupation, Islam's role in domestic politics was weakened. Through these 
years Islamic political power was further fractured by religious differences 
among Muslims who formed competing parties. In 1926 Nahdatul Ulama was 
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founded as a traditionalist counter to the reformist aspects,of Sarekat Islam 
and to what its founders saw as an undermining of the power of ttve_^«/awfl'.-
The postwar era saw the rise of three poUtical faces of Islam. At the 
party level, two major political organizations sought to dominate the Muslim 
majority in the new republic, both groups reflected the historic division 
among Muslims. Nahdatul Ulama supported more traditional non-modernist 
views, and Masjumi was formed as a modernist Islamic socialist party. They 
vied to lead Indonesians who were interested in a government based on 
Muslim values and expressed strong opposition to secular and particularly 
communist influences. In the country's first election in 1955 the Masjumi and 
Nahdatul Ulama each received approximately twenty percent of the national 
vote, and other Muslim parties obtained only a small percentage, the 
remainder went to primarily secular parties. The Masjumi became 
increasingly frustrated with its inability to influence the growing secularism 
of Indonesian politics, and in 1960 the party was outlawed for supporting 
dissident elements fighting the central government. This left the more 
traditional Nahdatul Ulama and small splinter parties to act as the legal voices 
of Islam at the national level.'^ 
During this period Muslim political leaders tried to impose the 
Shari'ah law in the Indonesian constitution. However, a compromise altered 
the charter to reflect a more secular and pluralist view of the role of religion 
in the state. A new national ideology, the Pancasila (Five Principles), 
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proclaimed as one of its five principles "belief in God" but did not describe 
this within a Muslim context, allowing Indonesians freely to choose their own 
religious expression. President Sukarno's statement, 
"The principle of Belief in God! Not only should the Indonesian 
people believe in God, but every Indonesian should believe in his 
own God. The Christian should worship God according to the 
teachings of Jesus Christ, Moslems according to the teachings of 
the Prophet Mohammad, Buddhists should perform their religious 
ceremonies in accordance with the books they have. But let us all 
believe in God. The Indonesian State shall be a state where every 
person can worship his God as he likes. The whole of the people 
should worship God n a cultured way, that is, without religious 
egoism. 
In the early years, the activities of Muslim militant group Darul Islam, 
originally formed in West Java in 1948. In part, Darul Islam rationalized its 
war against the Indonesian Republic on the grounds that secularist forces had 
rejected Islam as the basis of the state. Darul Islam spread its influence into 
East Indonesia, and it was not until 1959 that negotiations largely brought an 
end to this period of conflict. 
Following an attempted coup in 1965 in which the Indonesian 
Communist Party became involved, communists were considered enemies of 
Islam because of their perceived atheistic views and, to a lesser degree, 
because many landowners were members of religiously powerful families. 
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These events led to the fall of Sukarno regime, the military-dominated 
government of General, later President, Suharto held power in Indonesia. It 
was initially hoped that the military would work closely with Muslim political 
organizations. However, in the ensuing years important cleavages have 
developed between elements of the Muslim community and the Suharto 
regime. While the factors responsible for these differences are complex, they 
have centreed upon three core issues, government efforts to establish secular 
bases for centrally important areas of interest to Muslims, such as education 
and marriage, attempts to emasculate Muslim political power, and the 
reimplementation of the Pancasila as the national ideology. 
During the late 1970s and the 1980s, small elements in the Muslim 
community turned to violence to express their opposition to what they 
perceived to be an un-Islamic government, they demanded the formation of an 
Islamic state. An organization called Komando Jihad was accused of 
conspiring to overthrow the government, and other Islamic Youth Movements 
allegedly attacked shopping centres in the name of Islam and the Indonesian 
Islamic Revolution Board was charged with seeking Iranian support to 
eliminate Suharto's regime. The government forcefully repressed these 
activities and used the incidents as further proof of the need to take religion 
out of politics. This move to de-emphasize Islam in politics reached its zenith 
with the demand by the Suharto government that all mass organizations 
affirm that the Pancasila was their one ideology. Finally, Muslim 
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organizations have expressed increasing antagonism over what they see as the 
growing power of Christianity in the islands. 
Leading intellectuals such as Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman 
Wahid advocated focusing on a "cultural" Islam as opposed to a "political" 
Islam. The goal was Muslim renewal, spiritual and economic. This led to a 
strong revival of Islam in Indonesia during the 1980s, and then Suharto 
realized that Islam was becoming a force to reckon with. Non Muslims started 
to worry when in 1990 the government established the Indonesian Muslim 
Intellectuals' Association (ICMI) to promote Islamization of state and 
society.^° 
NU is the umbrella for Muslims tolerant of local culture that does not 
interfere with Islamic teachings. They stress the study of fiqh (Islamic 
jurisprudence) because it espouses the views of generations of scholars 
starting from the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). They only exercise ijtihad in 
the context of Islamic teachings, preferring taqlid, following traditional 
opinions. The political aspirations of the Ulama were presented by the NU 
party until the Suharto government forced all Islamic parties to unite into one 
government-supervised Islamic party, the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan 
(United Development Party, PPP), NU dropped its political aspirations and 
focused on religious, social, and economic development instead. This shift 
away from politics resulted in increased piety among Indonesian Muslims and 
a steady strengthening of a democratic-minded civil society. After Suharto 
58 
stepped down in 1998, the structure that repressed religion and society 
collapsed. Political parties representing Muslims to various affiliations were 
setup, religious organizations were free to have Islam as their sole 
constitution, and Muslims began to be fully represented in the democratically 
elected parliament. Freedom of religion also led to the emergence of groups 
such as Lashkar Jihad in 2000 that called for holy war against the Christian 
populated Malaccan islands. 
Although Suharto has resigned, his family and supporters still wield 
great power. This tension will animate Indonesian politics for years to come. 
In the post Suharto era, Indonesia is unlikely to see a single, dominant Islamic 
grouping any time soon, it is even less likely to see a clear Muslim consensus 
on the role of Islam in the state. 
The depression into which Indonesia is now sinking will worsen the 
ethno-religious imbalance between Chinese and indigenous ipribumi) 
Indonesians. Since the early 1980s, the ultraconservative wing of the Dewan 
Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII) has been unstinting in its critiques of the 
"Christianization" of Indonesian society. Thus, the political future of 
Indonesian Islam remains clouded. The economic crisis will worsen the plight 
of the urban under classes, the overwhelming majority of whom are Muslim.^^ 
2.2 Islam in Malaysia 
The Malay Peninsula, before the imposition of British rule in the late 
nineteenth century, was made up of traditional Malay states under the control 
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of hereditary Malay sultans. In these states Islam, which spread to this part of 
world during the twelfth to fourteenth centuries, was already strongly 
established at all levels of society. In some states, such as Johore-Riau, 
Malacca, Kelantan, and Trengganu, certain rulers were well known for their 
patronage of Islamic religious learning and scholarship. 
What formal education existed during the early part of the nineteenth 
century for the Malay community was purely Islamic religious education 
revolving around the reading and memorizing of the Qur'dn and the learning 
of basic religious teachings. The mosque was the only site of such education 
until the emergence of the pondok (as in Indonesian is Pesantren) in the late 
nineteenth century and the madrasah (school) in the beginning of the 
twentieth century. Islam was already strongly established during this period. 
Aspects of Islamic law were observed to varying degrees, although elements 
of pre-Islamic culture were still prevalent among the people as a whole. 
Among the sacral powers of the Malay rulers was responsibility for the 
defence and good governance of Islam as the state religion. 
The beginning of the twentieth century saw the emergence of an 
Islamic reformist movement that began to criticize the socio-economic 
backwardness and religious conservatism of traditional Malay society of the 
time. This new socio-religious activism began when several religious scholars 
studying in the Middle East came under the powerful influence of the 
revivalist and reformist ideas of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad 
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Abduh at the close of the nineteenth century. The leader of the Malay 
reformist movement, Sheikh Tahir Jalal al-Din (1869-1957), a student of 
Abduh, founded Al-Imam in 1906, the first periodical to spread the message 
of Islamic reformism in the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago. 
The Japanese interference during World War II did not seriously alter 
the position of Islam among the Malays. The Islamic reformist spirit was 
suppressed while Malay nationalist sentiments were gathering momentum. 
Post war Malay nationalism of a conservative orientation saw the foundation 
of the United Malay Nationalist Organization (UMNO) in 1946. The British 
formed the Federation of Malaya in 1948 but was rejected by the Malays. The 
Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (Partai Islam Se-Malaysia, known as PAS) 
originally developed from the defection of the Ulama faction in UMNO in 
1951 and became a registered political party in 1955. Its emergence marked 
another turning point in the development of Islamic thought in the Malay 
states. The British granted independence to the Federation of Malaya in 1957 
and in 1963 Malaysia came into being. 
Although the position of Islam as the official religion of post-
independence Malaysia, with the Malay rulers of each state serving as the 
guardians of the religion of Islam and Malay custom, was guaranteed in the 
constitution, only some aspects of the life of the Muslim community and the 
nation were influenced by Islamic values and norms. The government under 
the leadership of Tunku Abdul Rahman with the support of the British was 
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committed to a secularistic vision of the new nation and vigorously opposed 
the Islamic political struggle and ideals. As such, it came under strong attack 
from the PAS and Islamically oriented Malay organizations. Five years after 
the 1969 racial riots,^'' the PAS joined the coalition government of the 
National Front {Barisan Nasional). As a result, the government under the 
second prime minister of Malaysia, Tun Abdul Razak, established the Islamic 
Centre, which formed an important part of the Islamic Religious Affairs. Tun 
Abdul Razak's government gave increased attention to the educational, social, 
and economic development of the Malay Muslims to accommodate the 
demands coming from PAS. 
The assertive, and generally, anti establishment Da'wah (Islamic 
proselytization) movement emerged in the 1970s through the activities of 
youth organizations in secular educational institutions, including PKPIM and 
ABIM (the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia, established in 1971). It 
represented a new phase in Islamic thought and action, but its vision of Islam 
as a complete and holistic way of life was in fact a continuation and 
elaboration of earlier reformist and revivalist movements in the Middle East 
and Pakistan. 
The government under Tun Hussein Onn at first viewed the new 
phenomenon negatively and was extremely wary of the political effect of 
assertive, Malay-dominated Da'wah on the multiracial notion and its own 
political strength. It reached a high point around 1979-1982 with the victory 
62 
of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. The demand for the establishment of more 
Islamic institutions in the country was raised by several organizations in 
national seminars and international conferences held in Malaysia. The 
government under Tun Hussein Onn's premiership made some concessions 
and decided to conduct a feasibility study for the establishment of an Islamic 
bank in Malaysia, when Dr. Mahathir Mohamed became Prime Minister in 
1981, this was one of the projects that received his immediate attention. 
Under Mahathir's leadership the government took a more conciliator)' 
and positive approach towards the demands of the Da 'wah movement. PAS 
had been forced to leave the National Front coalition government in 1977 and 
had continued its struggle for complete implementation of the Shari'ah and 
the establishment of an Islamic state in Malaysia as an opposition party. It 
regarded Mahathir's Islamic initiatives and efforts as "cosmetic islamization" 
aimed at undermining the influence of the Islamic party. Anwar Ibrahim, the 
charismatic leader of ABIM and an articulate spokesman of non-partisan 
Da'wah in the 1970s, decided to support Mahathir by joining his government 
in 1982 in order to achieve his Islamic objectives from within the 
administration. Anwar's support gave a new lease of life to Mahathir's 
Islamic initiatives. The creation of the Islamic Bank and the establishment of 
the International Islamic University in 1983, followed by the establishment of 
International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization in 1987, were the 
63 
immediate results of Anwar's direct involvement in Mahathir's 
administration. 
During 1999, however, he appeared to tone down his rhetoric in the 
face of significant challenges to his political future resulting from the decline 
in the Malaysian economy and the trial of Anwar Ibrahim on charges of 
corruption.^'' 
All of the major Islamic movements in addition to PAS, ABIM, 
worked for the Islamization of the individual, family, community, and state, 
Darul al-Arqam supported workshops, clinics, and schools and stressed 
economic independence and Qur'dnic social values and also supported 
segregation of the sexes. The Tabligh emphasized preaching and appealed to 
the educated segments of the society.^^ 
PAS, as an opposition party, and some Islamic factions, continued to 
dwell on the ideal of an Islamic state, the abolition of secularism, and the 
complete implementation of the Shari'ah, including that of capital 
punishment (hudud) in the state of Kelantan. Currently, the state of Kelantan, 
is governed by PAS which is a conservative Islamic political party, with a 
proclaimed goal of establishing an Islamic state. To counter Islamic 
fundamentalism as supported by PAS, the head of the Barisan Nasional, 
Datuk Seri Abdullah Badawi, has proposed "Islam Hadhari".^^ 
Although the constitution declares Malaysia to be a secular state, there 
is much confusion on this subject. Several Muslims have argued, especially 
64 
after former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad's declaration that Malaysia is 
an Islamic state, that Malaysia is in fact an Islamic state. One Member of 
Parliament (MP), Badruddin bin Amiruldin, has stated in the Dewan Rakyat 
House of Parliament that "Malaysia ini negara Islam" ("Malaysia is an Islamic 
state") and that "you tidak suka, you keluar dari Malaysia!" ("You don't like 
it, you get out of Malaysia!") Badruddin reftised to take back his statement, 
and a motion to refer him to the House Committee of Privileges was rejected 
by a voice vote. However, the first Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, 
contradicted this stance in the 1980s, saying, "All talk on Islamic States is just 
an empty dream. No man in his right sense would accept a nation which bases 
its political administration on religion, and in a country like Malaysia with its 
multi-racial and muUi-religious people, there is no room for an Islamic 
State".^° 
-Islam and Politics 
As defined by the constitution of Malaysia, Malays must be Muslims, 
regardless of their ethnic heritage; otherwise, legally, they are not Malay. 
Consequently, apostate Malays will have to forfeit all their constitutional 
privileges, including their Bumiputra status, which entitles them to 
affirmative action policies in university admissions, discounts on purchases of 
vehicles or real estate, etc. It is legally possible to become a Malay (legally) if 
a non-Malay citizen with a Malaysian parent converts to Islam and thus 
claims all the Bumiputra privileges granted by Article 153 of the Constitution 
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and the New Economic Policy (NEP), etc. However, the convert must 
"habitually speak the Malay language" and adhere to Malay culture. A 
textbook for tertiary Malaysian studies following the government-approved 
syllabus states: "This explains the fact that when a non-Malay embraces 
Islam, he is said to Masuk Melayu (become a Malay). That person is 
automatically assumed to be fluent in the Malay language and to be living like 
Malay as a result of his close association with the Malays." 
Parallel to the civil courts, there are Shari'ah courts which conduct 
legal matters related to religious (Islamic) and family (Muslim) issues. Legal 
issues like Muslim divorce and Muslim apostasy are conducted in Shari'ah 
Court. Non-Muslims are not affected by this. 
Nine of the Malaysian states, namely Kelantan, Terengganu, Pahang, 
Kedah, Perak, Perils, Selangor, Johor and Negeri Sembilan have Sultans. 
These Malay sultans still maintain authority over religious affairs in states. 
The states of Penang, Malacca, Sarawak and Sabah do not have any sultan but 
the nominal kings (Yang Di-Pertuan) are still head of religion of Islam. 
As the religion embraced by the most populous ethnics of Malaysia, 
Islam plays an important part in Malaysian politics. Islam is seen by the 
Malay as a subject which could not be challenged conventionally or 
constitutionally. 
The newest format of the Malaysian Identity Card (MyKad) divides 
Malaysians into various religious groups, i.e. Muslim, Christian, Hindu, and 
66 
Buddhist. The introduction of this caused an uproar in Malaysian poHtics and 
is deemed discriminative by non-Muslims. This issue has, however, since 
receded and been accepted non-willingly by non-Muslims. 
Currently, one of Malaysia's states, Kelantan, is governed by PAS 
which is a conservative Islamic political party, with a proclaimed goal of 
establishing an Islamic state. Terengganu was briefly ruled by PAS from 1999 
to 2004, but the ruling Barisan Nasional Coalition has since won back the 
state. To counter Islamic fundamentalism as supported by PAS, the head of 
the Barisan Nasional, Datuk Seri Abdullah Badawi, has proposed Islam 
Hadhari. 
There is also an Islamic University in Malaysia called the International 
Islamic University Malaysia, and a government institution in charge of 
organizing pilgrimages to Mecca called Tabung Haji (Pilgrim Fund Board of 
Malaysia). In addition to this, the government also funds the construction of 
mosques.^' 
2.3 Islam in Brunei 
Islam is the national religion of the tiny, oil-rich sultanate of Brunei on 
the northwest coast of Borneo. An estimated two-third of Brunei's population 
of 350,000 are Muslims. Many Chinese immigrants, who make up about 15 
percent of the population, and small people indigenous tribes have converted 
to Islam.^ ^ 
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Brunei adopted Islam during the fifteenth century, or possibly as early 
as the fourteenth, after one of their rulers was installed as Sultan by the Sultan 
of the Malaysian state of Johore. As head of the faith, the Sultan has always 
been responsible for upholding the Islamic way of life, but he has traditionally 
delegated this responsibility to appoint non-noble officials. Islam provided a 
unifying theocratic and political base that allowed Brunei, a trading centre for 
jungle produce, to attain the status of empire during the sixteenth century. 
However, internal dissensions and European encroachment led to its 
disintegration, and Brunei probably would have disappeared entirely had not 
the British taken it on as a protectorate in 1888. In 1906 Brunei yielded 
control of internal affairs to a British Resident, with the Sultan retaining 
responsibility only for matters related to Islam.^ '^  
During the nineteenth century and through the mid-twentieth, the 
status and institutions of Islam continued to reflect traditions broadly shared 
with the sultanates of the Malay Peninsula. Brunei was truly a backwater, 
untouched by the religious controversies that occasionally feared elsewhere in 
the region. The British accepted Islam as the established way of life, while 
most Bruneians respected the British as akin to saviours of their country. 
The situation began to change after World War II. The British 
promoted experimentation with democracy even as control of internal affairs 
was returned to the Sultan with the adoption of the constitution of 1959. The 
socialist Brunei People's Party (BPP) emerged dominant by playing on the 
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disaffections of commoners over the hereditary privileges of the nobility and 
by proposing Brunei as the power centre of a new Pan-Islamic state that 
would recover territories in Borneo lost to private British interests during the 
nineteenth century. Revenues from oil exports, which began during the 
1930s, were fortuitously climbing, allowing the late Sultan Sir Omar Ali 
Saifiiddin to address the disaffection of his poorer subjects through an 
extensive social welfare system and the promotion of Islam. He built one of 
Asia's largest mosques, greatly expanded the Department of Religious Affairs 
established in 1954, and subsidized performance of the hajj to make it the 
norm rather than the exception for Brunei Malays. Sultan Omar abdicated in 
favour of his eldest son Hasanal Bolkiah (the twenty-ninth Sultan) in 1967, 
but he remained the power behind the throne until his son began asserting 
himself in the early 1980s. The resulting power struggle between them was 
often played out along religious lines, reflecting a rift within the royal family 
and the government between what have been called "ideologues" who want a 
theocratic Islamic state and "pragmatists" who are secularly oriented and 
open to Western values. 
Sir Omar, who died in 1986, was allied with the ideologues, many of 
whom attended Cairo's al-Azhar University and hold top positions in the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Education (a ministerial 
form of government was introduced at full independence from Britain in 
1984). Sultan and Prime Minister Hassanal, who often warns of the dangers of 
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religious extremism, is considered a pragmatist. Yet, to the dismay of many 
pragmatists, he has promulgated the concept of Malay Islamic monarchy as a 
national ideology that would entrench what the pragmatists see as an 
anachronistic system of governance. Some believe the Islamic monarchy is 
meant to preclude demands for an Islamic theocracy by mollifying the 
ideologues and keeping the general populace focused on religion rather than 
politics.'^'' 
Brunei's leaders are concerned that increasing integration into the 
world economy may undermine the country's internal social order. Today 
there is a rift between those who want an Islamic state and those who are 
more open to Western values. The role of Islam in Brunei government will 
continue to be examined and contested. 
2.4 Islam in Singapore 
The geographical position of Singapore defines the history and 
contemporary position of its Muslim community. Singapore is the 
northernmost island in the Riau archipelago, which links the east coast of 
Sumatra with peninsular Malaysia. This territory is the traditional home of the 
Malay people. Malay history is intimately linked with Islam, and the first 
Malay-Muslim trading city, Melaka (Malacca), flourished in the fifteenth 
century. The sacking of Melaka by the Portuguese in 1511 marked the 
beginning of an era of intrusions by various colonial powers interested in the 
strategic sea lanes through the Straits of Melaka. 
70 
In 1819 Sir Stamford Raffles founded the British colony of Singapore, 
which quickly flourished as an entrepot trading centre for the region. 
Singapore remained a British colony until it was granted self-government in 
1959. In 1963 it became a state within the Federation of Malaysia, and in 
1965 it separated from the Federation to become the independent Republic of 
Singapore. 
In terms of ethnic percentages, Singapore's population has remained 
relatively stable since the mid-nineteenth century. The major demographic 
change occurred early in the nineteenth century, when the Chinese gradually 
overtook the originally predominant Malays. By 1891 Chinese numbered 67.1 
percent of the population, Malays 19.7 percent, Indians 8.8 percent, and 
others (including Europeans) 4.3 percent. A century later in 1990, the resident 
Singapore population was 2.7 million, with Chinese forming the majority 
(77.7 percent), followed by Malays (14.1 percent), Indians (7.1 percent).''^  
The nineteenth-century Singapore Muslim community was divided 
into two broad categories: Muslims indigenous to the region (mostly Malays) 
who formed the majority, and a minority of wealthy and better-educated 
Indian Muslims, Arabs, and Jawi Peranakans (indigenized Indian Muslims), 
who formed the social and economic elite. This elite spearheaded the 
flowering of Singapore as a Muslim publishing and educational centre for the 
region. From the middle of the nineteenth century, the Dutch took repressive 
measures to prevent Muslims in the Dutch East Indies from performing the 
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pilgrimage, and so Singapore increasingly became a focal point for such 
departures. The British reluctantly realized the need to intervene in the affairs 
of the Muslim community, beginning with quarantine controls on departing 
and arriving pilgrims. In 1880 the British government passed the Islamic 
Marriage Ordinance; in 1905 the Muslim and Hindu Endowment Board was 
set up to regulate trusts and in 1915 the Islamic Advisory Board was 
constituted to advise the government on matters pertaining to the Muslim 
community. 
In August 1966, a year after Singapore's independence, the Singapore 
parliament passed the Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA), ushering 
in a new phase in the legal and administrative history of Islam in the countr>'. 
The Singapore Muslim Religious Council {Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura or 
MUIS) was constituted under the Act and inaugurated in 1968. MUIS is the 
supreme Islamic religious authority in Singapore and advises the government 
on matters relating to Islam. MUIS administers the mosque-building program, 
manages mosques and endowment properties, and coordinates the annual 
pilgrimage to Mecca. 
The Shari 'ah Court and Registry of Muslim Marriage was set up in 
1958. In addition to hearing divorce petitions, the Shari'ah Court also 
considers applications for inheritance certificates relating to Muslim estates. 
All appeals to either the Registry or the Shari 'ah Court are channelled to an 
appeals board formed by MUIS. MUIS, the Shari'ah Court, and the Registry 
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of Muslim Marriages are administered within the Ministry of Community 
Development. There is also a Minister in charge of Muslim Affairs who acts 
as a liaison between the Muslim community and the political leadership. 
In short, Singapore is Chinese-majority, secular state located in the 
Malay-Muslim world of Southeast Asia. The Singapore Malay-Muslim 
community is cognizant of its position as a national minority that is also part 
of a larger regional Muslim majority." 
2.5 Islam in Philippines 
In 1990 the Muslim population of the Philippines comprised between 
five and six million, or about 8.5 percent of the country's sixty-six million 
inhabitants.^^ The Mindanao region in the Philippines, once an independent 
kingdom, consisted of indigenous tribes. Islam came to this kingdom at the 
same time that it appeared in Siam. Arab traders preached Islam in this land 
but established their permanent settlements only at the end of the 13"^  centur>. 
Over the next century, the Muslims established their sultanate, and by the end 
of the 14 century the Islamization process had reached the point where being 
a Muslim became an acceptable passport into the community. In 1565 the 
Spanish arrived and initiated a series of attacks on the Muslim sultanates in 
the southern Philippine islands of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago. These 
attacks continued for the next 350 years. Although the Spanish failed to 
occupy the region, they did establish a few garrisons in the area. Moreover, 
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the rest of the PhiUppines came under their control and they were successful 
in converting the local people to Catholicism. 
Once direct rule had been imposed on Moro, the colonial government 
adopted a "policy of attraction" in the area to "develop, to civilize and to 
educate" the public. This policy had disastrous consequences. The 
government introduced a secular system of education and non-Muslim 
teachers were appointed to the Moro schools. This was seen as a direct blow 
to the authority of the traditional religious teachers. Muslims generally 
refused to send their children to secular schools, leading to significant 
illiteracy. To integrate the province into the larger framework of the 
Philippines, the U.S. colonial government encouraged non-Muslims from 
other parts of the Philippines to settle in Moro Province. The government 
provided loans to those settlers who lacked funds, and between 1903 and 
1906 increased the number of acres of land given to settlers from 40-200. In 
1902, a Land Registration Act was passed to determine the extent of private 
landholdings in the country. This was followed by Public Lands Acts of 1905, 
1913, 1914, and 1919. These gradually claimed all lands in the Philippines as 
state property, though individuals could apply for private ownership. The 
Moros lost ownership of their ancestral lands. According to the Act of 1919, a 
Christian Filipino could apply for private ownership of up to 24 hectares of 
land while a non-Christian could request only 10.^ ^ This led to the beginning 
of "legalized land gral)bing" in Mindanao. Finally, the government 
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encouraged foreign corporations to operate in Mindanao, which resulted in an 
upsurge in agro-businesses owned and managed by transnational 
corporations. 
All these programs created a deep sense of frustration in the minds of 
Muslims in the Mindanao and Sulu region. Immediately before Independence 
in 1946, the Moro leaders submitted a memorandum to the U.S. government 
stating "we do not want to be included in the Philippines Independence. For, 
once independence is launched, there will be trouble between us and the 
Christian Filipinos because from time immemorial these two peoples have not 
lived harmoniously...It is not proper (for two antagonistic) peoples to live 
together under one flag".''^  The U.S. did not accept the proposal. Thus, in 
1946 the newly independent Philippines had two major religious communities 
in the Sulu-Mindanao region, the Muslims and the Catholics. 
However, the Moros continued their struggle for an independent 
Mindanao in the post-Independence Philippines. Rather than accommodating 
the demands of the Moros, the new Philippine government continued with the 
colonial policy and adopted further repressive measures. It encouraged the 
further migration of Christian population into Mindanao. By the 1960s, the 
influx of settlers from northern and central Philippines made the Moros a 
virtual minority. A substantial inflow of domestic and foreign investment led 
to the transfer of wealth from Mindanao to other parts of the country. The 
Filipino government, like the colonial administration before it, passed a series 
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of laws to legitimize its expropriation of lands traditionally owned by the 
Muslim population for resettlement projects and plantation. Many lost their 
lands to Catholic settlers. Violent clashes between Catholics and local 
Muslims became a regular occurrence. Riots broke out in various parts of the 
region. Although the Moro elites were co-opted by the state, the gradual 
deterioration of the condition of the Muslims together with the 1968 Jabaidah 
massacre led to the formation of the Muslims (Mindanao) Independence 
Movement (MIM) in 1968, and this group declared Mindanao's 
independence.'*' 
In response to the MIM declaration, the Catholics launched the anti-
Moro Ilaga Movement, a group whose activities culminated in the June 19, 
1971, massacre of some 70 Muslims in a mosque at Bario Manili, North 
Cotabato. The government tried to co-opt MIM's top leaders by providing 
them with high positions in the administration. This disappointed many young 
MIM cadres who abandoned the organization and, led by a university 
graduate, Nur Misuari, went on to form the militant Moro National Liberation 
Front (MNLF). The organization's main objective was the compete liberation 
of the Mores' homeland. The MNLF attracted the support of large numbers of 
Filipino Muslims who considered the movement to be spearheading a jihad 
against the Marcos regime. The MNLF opened an armed wing, the Bangso 
Moro Army (DMA), consisting of militant Muslim youths and they engaged 
in guerrilla warfare against the Philippines Army. The MNLF also sought the 
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support of the overseas Muslims and reported their grievances to the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). When President Marcos 
declared martial law in 1972, the MNLF continued its activities underground. 
Thousands of people lost their lives and properly in the armed struggle in 
Mindanao. 
In spite of the Marcos regime's tactics, the consequences of the armed 
struggle aroused the concern of the OIC countries over the conditions of 
Muslims in the Philippines. A delegation of four foreign ministers from 
Libya, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, and Somalia visited the Philippines to discuss 
the situation of the Muslims there with the Marcos government. The 
involvement of the Muslim states eventually culminated in the signing of the 
Tripoli Agreement on December 23, 1976, in Tripoli, Libya. This agreement 
provided for the creation of an autonomous region in Mindanao consisting of 
13 provinces and nine cities. In return, the MNLF was forced to reduce its 
demand for complete independence to autonomy, settling for a peace that 
would keep the Bangsomoro homeland part of the Republic of the 
Philippines. However, after returning home the Marcos government 
interpreted "autonomy" as an internal matter that should be solved within the 
framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
Philippines. Marcos insisted that the attainment of autonomy was subject to 
the Philippine constitutional process. This required that a referendum be held 
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to determine which among the provinces and cities claimed in the Tripoh 
Agreement should be included in the autonomous region. 
The breakdown of the Tripoli Agreement undermined the credibility of 
the MNLF leadership. Misuari was challenged by the chairman of MNLF's 
Foreign Affairs Bureau, Hashim Salamat. He accused Misuari of being a 
failure, corrupt, and a communist sympathizer."*^ Shortly thereafter, he broke 
away from the mainstream MNLF and established the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF). Salamat claimed, "We want an Islamic political 
system and way of life and can be achieved through effective Da'wah, 
Tarbiyyah, and Jihad "'^'^ The MNLF and MILF conducted simultaneous 
guerrilla warfare campaigns against the Marcos regime. In the 1980s, both 
provided strong support to Corazon Aquino when she led the mass upheavals 
for democratic government. In return, Aquino promised to grant autonomy to 
the Mindanao region if elected. After assuming office in 1986, President 
Aquino offered a new Constitution and declared the establishment of the 
Autonomous Regions in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The MNLF was 
dissatisfied with this, however, as it granted autonomy to only four provinces, 
not 13 provinces and nine cities indicated in the Tripoli Agreement. Misuari 
called on the MNLF's various factions to unite and renew their armed struggle 
for a sovereign Bangsomoro Republic.'*^ 
The ascendance of Fidel Ramos to the presidency of the Philippines in 
1992 gave Misuari renewed hope to recoup his shattered prestige. President 
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Ramos opened negotiations with the MNLF, and in 1996 an agreement was 
signed making the MNLF the overseer of economic development projects in 
all provinces in Mindanao for three years. The Southern Philippines Council 
for Peace and Development (SPCPD) was established with Misuari as the 
region's governor directly under President Ramos. The Ramos-MNLF 
agreement appears to have brought peace in the Philippines by ending the 
armed struggle in Mindanao. Many of Southeast Asia's leaders felt great 
relief, such as, Indonesian President Suharto who commented that: 
The peaceful solution to the conflict in the Southern Philippines 
could serve to prove before the intemational community that 
conflicts within the region could by solved by the region or the 
community of nations concerned using their own resources, their 
creativity and their determination to achieve peace. In fact, I 
would not be surprised if analysts of intemational politics would 
see in the peace process in the southern Philippines valuable 
lessons with possibly some applications elsewhere.''^  
Despite the appearance that the Philippines's Moro problem was under 
control, MNLF leader Hashim Salamat declared in 1996 that while autonomy 
in the Bangsomoro region was a feasible first step to independence, its 
effectiveness would depend upon the type of autonomy and the personalities 
of those involved in running the region. Salamat believed that the only viable 
solution to the plight of the Moros was complete independence and the 
establishment of an Islamic state. Thus, despite the MNLF's seeming break 
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through, the MILF remained engaged in armed struggle and so President 
Ramos opened negotiations with the group. In his sixth State of the Nation 
Address given on July 28, 1997, he stated that steps had been taken toward 
opening peace talks with the MILF. The government promised that "all 
legislative measures aiming to promote economic and social conditions of the 
Muslim indigenous cultural group in the country will be given priority. These 
include measures to recognize the ancestral domain of Muslim and cultural 
minorities."''^ President Ramos hoped that peace agreement would be signed 
in the near future and ends Mindanao's decade-old social unrest. Both the 
government and MILF pledged in late 1997 that the peace agreement would 
be signed before January 30, 1998, declaring, "We are one final step away 
from an agreement that would guarantee an enduring peace in Mindanao". 
-Muslim Autonomy and Independence Movement 
In the Philippines, the minority Muslims have been deprived in many 
respects for a long period of time. However, the degree of deprivation is 
much lower than Muslim minority in the southern Thailand, and the sense of 
deprivation is correspondingly much deeper among the Moros than among 
the Malay Muslims in Thailand. This result has resulted in making the Moros 
more aggressive in their struggle. In fact, the level of social, economic, and 
political subjugation is much lower in Patani than Mindanao. In Patani, the 
Thai government is interested mainly in political domination and not in 
religious conversion, i.e. "Buddhification" of Patani society by transferring 
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Buddhists there from other parts of Thailand. In Mindanao, governments 
since the Spanish colonial period have been interested in both political 
domination and religious conversion. The domination continued after 
Independence as thousands of Catholics migrated to Mindanao at the 
government's will. The Moros now constitute only 22% of the population in 
their own homeland. Today much of the wealth in Mindanao belongs either to 
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Catholics or foreign mvestors. 
On the other hand, the Moro liberation movement has always been led 
by strong organizations. Datu Untog Matalim, a member of a traditional 
aristocrat family who had run for governor of Cotabato Province in 1967 and 
lost, founded MIM with other Muslim elites in the wake of the Jabaidah 
massacre to mobilize Muslim support and articulate calls for Muslim unity 
and autonomy for Mindanao. Initially, the MIM was a haven for the 
traditional Moro power elite who attempted to regain their lost political 
prestige and power. The rise of the MNLF was a challenge to both the 
traditional local elites as well as the Philippine government. There is no doubt 
that the MNLF was a very strong organization, it survived until it achieved its 
goal in 1996. Its leadership came from educated youth who understood 
political tactics and strategy. It is true that the MNLF was divided later and 
that this resuhed in the formation of the MILF. However, there is no record of 
fighting between the two. Both focused their efforts against the government 
forces. It is also true that the MILF remains unhappy with mere autonomy. It 
still demands complete independence and the establishment of an Islamic 
state in Mindanao, and the Ramos government was compelled to open 
negotiations with the MILF. Nonetheless, strong organization has always 
provided a cohesive force in the Moro liberation movement. 
2.6 Islam in Thailand 
One of the most common mistakes many people make when looking at 
Thailand is to imagine that it is a homogeneous Thai-Buddhist state, pure and 
simple. Thailand has been variably portrayed in academic as well as popular 
literature as a Thai-Buddhist country. The state religion in Thailand is 
Buddhism but that does not necessarily mean that all Thais are Buddhists. 
Thailand too is a multi-ethnic state and has its own share of ethno-cultural 
and religious pluralism.^' 
About 90 percent of the Thai population of approximately 60 million 
adheres to the Theravada Buddhist faith. The second largest religious 
affiliation is Islamic. Approximately six million people in Thailand profess 
Islam (although the official record is much lower than mentioned) and 
maintain more than 2,000 mosques. Muslims in Thailand comprise two broad, 
self-defined categories consisting of Malay Muslims residing primarily in 
southern Thailand, and Thai Muslims residing in central and northern 
Thailand. The Malay-speaking Muslims are mostly concentrated in the 
southern provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani, Satun, and Yala. They were 
incorporated into the Thai polity during the latter part of the eighteenth 
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century. Active assimilationist policies have resulted largely in irredentist and 
separatist ethnic and religious movements among the Malay Muslims of 
Thailand. 
The Thai Muslim population is a much more heterogeneous group than 
the Malay Muslim populace of Thailand. The Thai Muslims include 
descendants of Iranians, Chams, Indians, Pakistanis, and Chinese, who reside 
in the predominantly Thai Buddhist regions of central and northern Thailand. 
The vast majority of these Muslims speak Thai and have assimilated into the 
mainstream of Thai society. Most of the descendants of Iranians, Chams, 
Indonesians, Indians, and Pakistanis reside in Bangkok and the surrounding 
communities of central Thailand. Smaller communities of Chinese, Indian, 
and Pakistani Muslims reside in the northern provinces of Chiangmai, 
Chaingrai, and Lamphun. 
Traditionally Islamic thought, beliefs, and practices in both the Malay 
Muslim and Thai Muslim communities of Thailand were suffused with 
Hindu-Buddhist and folk-animistic accretions. 
Patani, south of Thailand, had been an independent kingdom. 
Originally known as the ancient kingdom of Langkasuka, its name was 
changed to the kingdom of Patani at some point in the 14* century. It was an 
important commercial centre for Asian and European traders. Hinduism and 
Buddhism seem to have been practiced until the adoption of Islam as the state 
religion in the 15* century. Arab merchants had spread the religion 
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throughout the area between the 12* and 15"" centuries side by side with their 
trade, and a large number of people were converted. However, the most 
significant development in its spread occurred when the king of Patani 
himself embraced Islam and declared his kingdom to be an Islamic state in 
1457. The Islamization of Patani replaced many elements of the Hindu-
Buddhist culture and its institutions. The Muslim religious elites (ulama) 
came to dominate the kingdom's socio-political system. The Muslim dynasty 
was abolished in 1786 when Patani was conquered by the king of Siam. The 
Siamese government divided Patani into seven provinces both for 
administrative purposes as well as to weaken the Muslim power. The 
provinces were governed by appointed bureaucrats under a centralized 
administrative structure. There were sporadic rebellions in protest of the 
administrative reforms, but the Siamese government forces were strong 
enough to suppress them.^ 
Nonetheless, such rebellious activity and later external pressure from 
the British in Burma did make the Siamese government control over Patani 
uncertain through the end of the 19"^  century. Control was finally consolidated 
with the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909. '^' The British renounced the extra 
territoriality rights it had claimed previously and recognized Siam's 
governance of the province, though this came at the cost of conceding control 
of four other Malay states to the European power. The firm guarantee of 
Siamese control over Patani allowed the government to take various measures 
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aimed at weakening the Islamic identity of the people in Patani in order to 
develop." The government first replaced the Islamic Shari'ah and adat laws 
with Siamese law. Second, an act was passed in 1921 that required all 
children to attend Siamese primary schools, institutions designed to offer a 
secular education where the medium of instruction was the Thai language. 
Thus, the local pondoks (Islamic schools) were closed, an action that 
"undermined the very roots of the ulama's power.^ ^ Third, administration was 
further centralized by recognizing the seven provinces into three, Patani, 
Yala, and Narathiwat (now four, including Satun), and replacing the local 
rulers with Thai governors. This change led to the loss of political power of 
the traditional aristocrats. Fourth, during the Second World War, the Phibun 
regime issued the Thai Customs Decree prohibiting the "wearing of sarongs, 
the use of Malay Muslim names and the Malay language," which angered the 
common people. At the end of the war, Patani's districts and local 
governments were brought under the direct control of Bangkok. 
All these measures were attempts to integrate Patani Muslim into the 
larger framework of Thailand, and they created serious resentment among 
them. The traditional elite and pondok religious teachers were very unhappy 
and objected to the introduction of secular education and the Thai language in 
schools. Haji Sulong, president of the Islamic Religious Council, submitted a 
seven-point demand to the Thai government. It called for (i) the "appointment 
of a single individual with full powers to govern the four Patani 
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provinces...this individual to be locai-bom in one of the four provinces... and 
to be elected by the people", (ii) 80% of government servants in those 
provinces to profess the Muslim religion, (iii) Malay and Siamese to be the 
official languages, (iv) Malay to be the medium of instruction in the primary 
schools, (v) Islamic law to be recognized and enforced in a separate Muslim 
court other than the civil court, (vi) any revenue and income derived from the 
four provinces to be utilized within them, and (iiv) the formation of a Muslim 
Board.^'' As a consequence of making this demand, Haji Sulong and his 
associates were arrested and charged with treason. At the end of the Second 
World War, the Patani separatist movement was brought under control by the 
Thai state through military intervention. 
-Muslim Separatist Movement 
In the initial post-war period, the Thai government adopted a policy of 
accommodation towards the Muslims. However, the state penetration in pre-
war years into the civil society of Patani Muslims, together with the absence 
of political participation of Patani elites and especially the arrest of Haji 
Sulong in the late 1940s, contributed to the Dusun Nyiur incident, a violent 
clash between the Thai police and the Patani Muslims on 28 April 1948.^ ^ 
The Thai government was able to suppress the revolt but the political 
situation in Patani remained very tense in the 1950s. In 1948, the government 
declared a state of emergency, an act that reinforced the Patani Muslim 
perception of the Thai nation as an "alien state." Once the emergency ended, 
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Tengku Abdul Jalal, a follower of Haji Sulong, in 1959 formed an 
underground organization, Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani (BNPP, or 
Patani National Liberation Front), that drew support from traditional 
aristocrats as well as the religious elite. The organization's objective was 
complete independence and the establishment of an Islamic state. It adopted a 
strategy of armed guerrilla warfare and, consequently, intermittent violent 
clashes occurred between government forces and BNPP cadres throughout the 
1960s. 
A fall in rubber prices led to a decline in the Patani economy in the late 
1960s. This led to a fall in the region's per capita income compared to that of 
the rest of Thailand.^^ Muslims believed that "the central government thinks 
in terms of taxes and duties which can be extracted from the region rather 
than in terms of investment and technical support, and the region's tin and 
rubber resources are siphoned off by Thai Buddhists and the Thai Chinese." ° 
Concurrently, many Patani youth who had been educated in Egypt, 
Pakistan and India now found on their return that the government was 
reluctant to employ them. These factors combined to make them politically 
active separatists. They differed in. their orientation from the traditional 
aristocrats and were also divided among themselves between Islamists and 
secularists. The Islamists founded an organization, Barisan Revolusi Nasional 
(BRN, or National Revolutionary Front), whose aim was to establish the 
Islamic Republic of Patani. The BRN's base of support lay mainly in the 
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pondoks. The secularists formed the Patani United Liberation Organization 
(PULO), which claimed that it had an "invisible government" whose tactic 
was to work by ambush. 
In response to the Patani separatist movement, Thai government 
launched a series of military operations against the guerrillas while adopting a 
policy of accommodating certain demands. In 1961, the government repealed 
the Thai Customs Decree and allowed pondok schools to continue provided 
they offered both secular and Islamic education. The Patani Muslims were 
also allowed to keep their names. In the 1970s, the government offered some 
special privileges to Muslims. These included quotas for admissions of 
Muslims to the universities and government bureaucracy, the establishment of 
National and Provincial Councils for Islamic Affairs, and the creation of the 
position of Chularajmontri, or state councillor for Islamic Affairs. Finally, 
the government initiated massive economic projects to construct roads, 
schools, colleges, and universities in the Muslim majority provinces. With 
respect to agriculture, the rubber plantation owners were given incentives to 
replace old trees with a high-yield variety. An irrigation system and flood 
control projects were started in the region. Not all of these government 
programs have been viewed positively by Muslims. Instead, many perceive 
such measures as tricks of the Thai government to penetrate Patani culture, 
economy, and society. Guerrilla activities continue. An aspiring elite still 
seeks the complete independence of Patani and the creation of a dar al-Islam. 
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The opposition movement has remained factionaUzed. In late 1997, activists 
across the political spectrum joined to form an underground organization 
called the Council of the Muslim People of Patani (MPRMP). Taking 
inspiration from the Moros' success, they sought to pressure the Thai 
government to come to an understa.nding with the Patani Muslims. The 
strategy remains the same, i.e., guerrilla attacks on police stations and 
government offices. Since the Council is quite new, it is difficult to predict 
the success of the organization. 
-Degree of Deprivation 
In both Thailand and the Philippines, the minority Muslims have been 
deprived in many respects for a long period of time. However, the degree of 
deprivation is much lower in Thailand than in the Philippines, and the sense 
of deprivation is correspondingly much deeper among the Moros than among 
their Patani counterparts. This fact has resulted in making the Moros more 
aggressive in their struggle. In fact, the level of social, economic, and 
political subjugation is much lower in Patani than Mindanao. In Patani, the 
Thai government is interested mainly in political domination and not in 
religious conversions, i.e. "Buddhification" of Patani society by transferring 
Buddhists there from other parts of Thailand. In Mindanao, governments 
since the Spanish colonial period have been interested in both political 
domination and religious conversions. The domination continued after 
Independence as thousands of Catholics migrated to Mindanao at the 
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government's urging. The Moros now constitute only 22% of the population 
in their own homeland. Today much of the wealth in Mindanao belongs either 
to Catholics or foreign investors. In contrast no such land grabs took place in 
Patani and so the Malay Muslims' armed struggle lacked the communal 
aspect present in Mindanao. 
Economically, Patani has encountered less exploitation than 
Mindanao. Patani is rich in rubber plantations and other natural resources, 
and the government initiated several projects to improve the socio-economic 
conditions of the people and enhance the loyalty of the Muslims toward the 
Thai govemment. '^^  
Politically speaking, while the Thai government took many steps to 
earn the loyalty of the Muslims in Patani, the Philippine government adopted 
repressive measures in Mindanao. From the beginning, the government 
adopted integrative and assimilationist policies through a "control model". A 
commission for national integration was established in 1957, but rather than 
earning the loyalty of the Moros, its activities only deepened their sense of 
deprivation. There was a continuous denial of participation to the newly 
educated elites. The Muslims had neither the chance to become part of the 
ruling political elite in their region nor were any administrative jobs open to 
them in the 1980's, T.J.S. George wrote, "Two decades after the Philippines 
became independent, Muslims in Mindanao were a devitalized people, their 
economic conditions stagnant, their social conditions in jeopardy, their laws 
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and customs in danger of disintegrating".^^ The Moros had no choice but to 
resort to violence and a war of attrition. In contrast, the Patani Muslims 
resorted to only a low level of violence. The Thai government's policy of 
integration was moderated by effective socio-economic and political moves 
that have lessened the movement toward a more violent response. 
2.7 Islam in Myanmar 
The Union of Myanmar, also known as Burma, is a country in 
Southeast Asia. The country has been ruled by a military government since a 
coup in 1988. The country is becoming an underdeveloped country. It has a 
population of approximately 54 million.^^ The Muslim population of 
Myanmar consists of two ethnic groups and counted for only 3.9 percent of 
the country's population. The first are those who consisted of Indo-Pakistani 
origin and have strong links with the Indian sub-continent and speak Urdu and 
Tamil fluently. And the others are of Burmese origin, the longest-
established Muslim community can trace its origins back to the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries. 
The most recently established section of the Muslim community 
arrived following the colonization of Myanmar by the British in the 
nineteenth century. By making British Burma a province of India until 1937, 
the colonial government encouraged significant numbers of the immigrants 
and casual labourers, as well as traders and civil servants, to settle mainly in 
and around Yangon, the colonial capital and entrepot. These Indian Muslims, 
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who by the 1930s accounted for more than a third of those who followed 
Islam, maintained strong links with the religious and cultural practices of their 
home-lands. This often brought them into conflict with the Buddhist majority 
and the Burmese Muslims over matters of marriage and property law as well 
as the role of Islam in Myanmar's political life. Another Muslim community 
is settled in the Myanmar state of Arakan or Rahkine, which borders 
Bangladesh. The largest proportion of Muslims in Burma are of Bengali 
descent, and the majority of these reside in Rahkine State. 
Indian immigration and the rise of nationalism generated significant 
tensions among the three Muslim communities in Burnia, as well as between 
them and the Buddhist majority. While many of the Indian Muslims became 
involved in organizations and societies with their origins in the Indian 
subcontinent, the long-established Burmese Muslim population tended to 
identify with the Buddhist majority and supported the Burmese nationalist 
movement. The Rahkine Muslims remained detached from both and have 
continued to develop their own history separate from the other communities. 
After the independence of Myanmar in 1948 the roles of the Muslim 
communities continued to be divided. The Burmese Muslims found places in 
the government of the devout Buddhist Prime Minister U Nu, and many 
continued to serve in the military and socialist governments of General Ne 
Win after the coup of 1962. The more outward-looking and commercially 
oriented Indian Muslims found life more difficult after independence and 
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sought political alliances with Burmese politicians or returned to India and 
Pakistan. Following the wholesale nationalization of the economy by Ne 
Win's Revolutionary Council government in 1963, several hundred thousand 
South Asians, including many Muslims, returned to the countries of their 
ancestors. A significant Muslim community, however, remains in Yangon 
(Rangoon) and other cities in southern Myanmar. 
2.8 Islam in Cambodia 
Islam is the religion of a majority of the Cham (also called Khmer 
Islam) and Malay minorities in Cambodia. There were 150,000 to 200,000 
Muslims in Cambodia as late as 1975. Persecution under the Khmer Rouge*"^  
eroded their numbers, however, and by the late 1980s they probably had not 
regained their former strength. All of the Cham Muslims are Sunnis of the 
Shafi'i school.^^ 
The Muslim community of Cambodia prior to the victory of the Khmer 
Rouge in 1975 was essentially composed of Cams (or Chams) from the 
former kingdom of Campa (Champa). These people had been converted by 
Arab and Indian merchants and artisans. Large numbers of Cams emigrated to 
Cambodia in the fifteenth century. Also included in the Muslim community 
were Malays from present-day Malaysia and Indonesia, who also began to 
arrive in the fifteenth century, as well as Arabs, emigrants from the Indian 
subcontinent, and some indigenous converts. Cambodian Muslims have 
primarily been Sunni with practices and beliefs similar to other orthodox 
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Southeast Asian Muslims. They have tended to follow religious practices 
more regularly than their Vietnamese counterparts. In 1975 there were 
between 113 and 120 mosques with some three hundred religious teachers 
and three hundred preachers. A great many of these teachers had studied in 
Kelantan, Malaysia, and at Islamic universities in Cairo, India, or Medina. 
The years from independence to 1975 also saw the formation of Islamic 
organizations, for examples, the Islamic Association in Phnom Penh, which 
attempted to coordinate all cultural and religious activities, and an Islamic 
youth group that sought to encourage young people to study at the 
university.^' 
There were good relations between the Muslims and the majority 
Buddhist communities. During the pre-French period, Muslims played 
important military and political roles under the kings and held high titles 
through the centuries. Many Muslims acted as merchants who were also 
translators for the monarchs in their dealings with Europeans. During the 
French colonial period Muslims were completely removed from national 
decision making. 
However, with the return of independence in 1953 Muslims again were 
placed on significant posts, including high ranks in the Cambodian military. 
The mass murder inflicted on the Cambodian population by the Khmer Rouge 
after 1975 severely decimated the Muslim population. An untold numbers 
were killed, and some twelve to fifteen thousand left the country for nearby 
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refugee camps or settlement overseas. Nearly half of the refugees went to 
Muslim-ruled Malaysia, while others settled in France, Australia, and the 
United States. Muslims also became part of anticommunist military units 
based on the Thai-Cambodian border. In 1980, of almost six hundred 
preachers and religious teachers who had resided in Cambodia in 1975, fewer 
than forty remained, of the nearly 700,000 Muslims prior to 1975, only 
150,000 to 190,000 remained. Cambodia's elite were especially targeted by 
the Khmer Rouge, and this was also true for the Muslim leadership. For 
example, only one of the country's-nine graduates of al-Azhar University 
survived. During this period most of Cambodia's mosques and Muslim 
religious books were also destroyed. The new government allowed the return 
of religious freedom, and many Muslims moved into important government 
posts. 
Although the Muslim communities of Cambodia suffered from a real 
genocide during the period from 1975 to January 1979, now the members of 
the communities freely practice their religious obligations, and the current 
Government is making serious attempts to give them representations at all 
levels.^^ 
2.9 Islam in Vietnam 
A sizeable Muslim community lives in the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam. They are settled in three different regions: in the ce«rre-east in Ho-
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Chi-Minh city, in tiie south-west at Tay Ninh, and on the frontier with 
Cambodia at An GiangJ'' 
The exact date of Islam's spread in Indo-China is not known for 
certain. However, generally speaking, Islam arrived in Indo-China before it 
reached China during the Tang Dynasty (618-907). It was introduced by 
merchants from the Muslim world who sailed along the coastal cities. What is 
known for sure is that by the 11th century, Islam was already in Vietnam as 
evident from the recent discovery of two gravestones belonging to the 
Champa Muslims, dating the early 11th century.''^ 
The oldest of these communities is on the coastal planes of central 
Vietnam, in the former Annam, in the region of Thun Hai, This region is 
more than 300 km. North-east of Ho-Chi-Minh city, formerly Saigon. The 
members of this community also belong to the Cham ethnic group. It was this 
ethnic group which created the kingdom of Champa, a kingdom which 
reached its zenith during the 6 and the 13 centuries, before being destroyed 
by the Vietnamese in 1470. According to Phan Due Duonc, Deputy Director 
of the Ethnographic Institute of Hanoi, and Phuan Mewyen Long, specialists 
in the study of minorities and particularly the Cham, the Cham in this region 
are either Brahmins or Muslims, the latter represented a third of the 
population of 40,000 according to the 1964 census, the figures today are not 
precisely known. A large number of Muslim community lives in the major 
city of South Vietnam. Members of the community come from different 
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origins. Along with the Cham there are a sizable number of Indonesians, 
Malays, Indo-Pakistanis, Yemenis, Omanis, and North Africans. Before the 
re-unification of Viet Nam in 1975 there were in all more than 60,000 
Muslims. The greater part, however, fled. Today, it is estimated that about 
10,000 remain, all of them Vietnamese citizens.^^ 
2.10 East Timor 
The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste or East Timor is the 
newest independent country in the world, located in south eastern Asia. It 
consists of the eastern half of the island of Timor, the nearby islands of 
Atauro and Jaco, and Oecussi-Ambeno, an exclave of East Timor situated on 
the north western side of the island, surrounded by Indonesian West Timor. 
The small country is located about 400 miles northwest of Darwin, Australia. 
The name Timor is derived from timur the Malay word for 'east', which 
became Timor in Portuguese. The Portuguese name Timor-Leste and Tetum 
name Timor Lorosa'e are sometimes used in English. Lorosa'e means 'rising 
sun' in Tetum. East Timor has the lowest per capita GDP (Purchasing Power 
Parity adjusted) in the world of only $400 (which corresponds to the 192nd, 
and last, position). However, regarding HDI, it is in 140th place among the 
world's nations, which corresponds to medium human development. 
Colonized by Portugal in the 16th century, East Timor was known as 
Portuguese Timor for centuries. It was invaded by Indonesia in 1975, which 
occupied it until 1999. Following the UN-sponsored act of self-determination 
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that year, Indonesia relinquished control of the territory, which achieved full 
independence on May 20, 2002. With the Philippines, East Timor is one of 
only two majority Roman Catholic countries in Asia. 
The population is predominantly Roman Catholic (90%), with sizable 
Muslim (5%) and Protestant (3%) minorities. Smaller Hindu, Buddhist and 
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animist minorities make up the remainder. 
Islam has taken root within Southeast Asia since the fourteenth 
century, when port cities began to adopt the Sunni faith of Arab and Indian 
maritime traders. This conversion extended northwards through the Malay 
peninsular into southern Thailand and south and east through the northern 
coasts of the Indonesian Archipelago and then northwards from Borneo to the 
island of Luzon in the Philippines. In the case of Myanmar (Burma), Islam 
spread to the Arakan region overland from India. Islam became identified 
with state power in Southeast Asia from the fifteenth century shortly after the 
foundation of the trading empire of Malacca based on the west coast of the 
Malay Peninsula. But after the fall of Malacca to the Portuguese in the early 
sixteenth century, its adherents dispersed to other parts of the Indonesian 
Archipelago where their faith became most deeply accepted among coastal 
trading communities. In Java, Islam was later adopted by local princes to 
underpin their mystical power but primarily as a cultural veneer on 
entrenched animist and Hindu-Buddhist beliefs whose syncretic legacy is to 
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be found in eastern and central parts of the island. The Islamic faith was also 
employed to mobilize opposition to Dutch colonial control. 
Islam is in a minority position in Cambodia, Myanmar (Burma), the 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. With the exceptions of Cambodia and 
Singapore, heightened ethno-religious identity in the face of discrimination by 
the dominant culture has led to abortive separatist violence which has been 
met with repressive reaction. The Cham Islamic minority in Cambodia are the 
displaced survivors of the Kingdom of Champa (once located in central 
Vietnam), which was extinguished by the drive southwards of the Vietnamese 
in the fifteenth century. They enjoyed a tolerated existence after independence 
until they became victims of civil war and the bestiality of the Khmer Rouge 
during the 1970s. A significant number escaped as refugees to Malaysia, since 
the downfall of the Khmer Rouge regime in 1979, the Cambodian Cham have 
virtually disappeared as a separate community. 
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Qadiriyah, Qadiri brotherhood is one of the oldest Sufi orders, taking its name 
from Persian theologian Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (1078-1166). An expert in 
Hanbali law, Abd al-Qadir embraced Sufism late in his life. His preaching 
inspired disciples from all over the Islamic world, including Christians and 
Jews. Abd al-Qadir's teachings reconciled mysticism with the teachings of 
Islamic law. He believed Muslims should embark on a personal Jihad to 
conquer their desires and submit to the will of God. After Abd al-Qadir"s 
death, his followers created legends about him, some of which eamed him the 
wrath of his colleagues. According to oral tradition, Abd al-Qadir's grandson 
brought the movement to Spain. Christian persecution, however, forced the 
Qadiriyah to flee to North Africa in the 1400s. The order gained strength in 
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and the Sudan. By the 1800s, it had reached 
Nigeria, Mali, Guinea, and Senegal. Several offshoot movements formed in 
Africa. The Qadiriyah movement remains strong today, with a following in 
India, Pakistan, Turkey, and the Middle East. In addition, the Qadiri's have 
formed communities in China, Indonesia, Central Asia, southern Europe, 
Somalia, and the East African coast. 
Naqshbandiyah, refers to one of the most widespread and active orders within 
Sufism. Naqshbandi groups exist in most Islamic regions of Asia, but until 
recently they have not been common among Arabs. Naqshbandis are found in 
Turkey, Bosnia and some states of the former Soviet Union, and much of 
Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia. The order is characterized by strict 
observance of traditional Islamic law, avoidance of music and dance, and a 
preference for silent dhikr (Sufi chant for the remembrance of God). The order 
has tended to be politically active. The Naqshbandiyah originated in the late 
1300s in Bukhara, a city in present-day Uzbekistan, a republic in the former 
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Soviet Union. Within 100 years, the order spread to adjacent areas of the 
MusUm world. A branch of the order, called the Mujaddidi, became especially 
popular. It was founded by Sheikh Ahmad Sirhindi, who was known as the 
first mujaddid, or "renewer", of Islam, In the early 1800s, India emerged as an 
important centre of the Naqshbandi order, largely because of a teacher named 
Ghulam Ali. Attracting followers from India, Central Asia, and the Middle 
East, his students continued to spread his teachings throughout the Muslim 
world. One of Ghulam All's students, Mawlana Khalld, began another branch 
of Naqshbandiyah, called Khalidiyah. Maulana Khalid is sometimes 
considered to be the second "renewer" of Islam. He tried to centralize the 
Khalidiyah, making it a disciplined order focused on himself. In other ways, 
the Khalidiyah resembled the Mujaddidi branch. Khalidiyah spread quickly, 
reaching Southeast Asia within a few decades. In recent years, Naqshbandi 
teachers have become more prominent in the Eastern Arab world and in North 
America. 
Madrasahs play a major role in Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. The madrasahs in these nations exist 
within an educational system called pondok in Malay archipelagoes and 
pesantren in Indonesian islands. Derived from the terms for "iim" and 
"religious students", pesantren are boarding schools that teach various aspects 
of theology. In Indonesia, some 40,000 pesantren teach about 8 million 
students, mostly in rural areas. Most pesantren admit male students, where 
they live together, cook their own meals and wash their own clothes. A few 
admit women, and others have separate dormitories for men and women. 
Students travel among the pesantren to study different subjects, earning a 
certificate from each teacher. Each pesantren is headed by a teacher-leader 
{kiyayi), who serves as the driving force behind the school, and most pesantren 
decline following the death or departure of the Kiyayi. The pesantren operate 
solely through personal donations. The Indonesian government, however, 
sponsors state-run madrasahs that prepare students for higher religious 
education after they have learned secular subjects. These madrasahs operate at 
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the elementary, middle, and high school levels. Since the 1970s, the 
government has added secular subjects to the elementary school madrasahs. 
Around 70 percent of the instruction in these schools and 30 percent of the 
instruction in the high schools resolves around nonreligious subject matter. 
Singapore claims nearly 40 madrasahs, each offering either elementary or 
secondary education. In the 1970s, secular subjects were added to the curricula 
of these schools. Madrasah students can take the same examinations as 
students from secular schools. Those who wish to travel to the Middle East for 
higher education must complete a year at Madrasah al-Juneid al-Islamiyah, 
the only one of Singapore's madrasahs from which al-Azhar accepts 
certificates. Because Thailand has a tiny Muslim population, Muslim schools 
encourage students to spread Islam by preaching in remote areas. In the 1960s, 
Thai government worked to standardize madrasahs. It converted all of the 
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Introduction 
The Malaysian domestic political process rests within the framework 
of a constitutional monarchy, parliamentary democracy, based on the British 
model, and federal system of government administering eleven states 
including the Peninsula (West Malaysia) and the North Borneo states of 
Sabah and Sarawak (East Malaysia). To understand this framework we must 
understand the realities of the contemporary political scene which revolve 
around communal political representation on the part of Malay, Chinese, 
Indian and other minority interests. The political definition of the Malaysian 
state since the declaration of the sovereign independence of its Malayan core 
in 1957 has rested on the axis of a non-negotiable Malay dominance (later to 
be defined in the distinction between the category of Bumiputra- i.e. as native 
to the land-from other Malaysians) in both political and economic terms but 
fully cognizant of, and necessarily committed to, the essentially multi-ethnic 
character of the state. 
3.1 Islam in Malay Political Culture 
Since its introduction to the Peninsula between the eleventh and 
thirteenth centuries, Islam contributed significantly to ideas and offices of 
political authority and was anchored in Malay identity. Historically, it has 
constituted only one ingredient of Malay political life and has had to compete 
with and accommodate at least two other fundamental organizing concepts, 
Malay kingship and Malay nationalism. The combination of these forces have 
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themselves been affected by the transformation of the country, by the turn of 
the twentieth century, into a complex poly-ethnic and multi-religious society. 
Islam made significant contributions in legitimizing the earliest form 
of political authority in Malay society. It was acknowledged as a pre-
condition of political and social participation but acted as an embellishment 
on the existing political order and its social values. Political society was 
essentially ordered around separate states each with their own ruler (Sultan) 
and court. Motivated by Islamic symbols and a culture constituting myriad 
influences from the Islamic world through the Indian subcontinent, The 
Sultanates were also influenced by religious leaders and scholars (ulama) who 
increasingly constituted an elite substratum of Malay society.' 
The unity of the state was symbolized by Islam, mentioned in the 
covenant defining the loyalty of the Malays to their ruler whose authority and 
divine power were in turn rationalized and legitimized by Islam. However, the 
capacity of the religion to both support as well as challenge traditional 
political authority {kerajaan), re-enforcing existing institutions and practices 
but also qualifying the legitimacy of the Sultans to rule, indicated its earliest 
tendencies both to accommodate and to struggle against other constituents of 
traditional Malay culture. 
The subversion of such political structures through the intervening 
period of colonialism in fact underlined the link between royal authority and 
Islam by diverting the powers of the Sultan to purely ceremonial and religious 
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matters. The sustenance of parochial Malay loyalties towards state and locale 
were enabled by the retardation of Islam's development in political terms even 
as British rule enabled the codification and development of Islamic law and 
an expansion of a religious bureaucracy. 
Over time, however, even these powers have increasingly been 
rendered ambiguous as the oldest political institution in Malay society has 
been increasingly challenged by the struggle between the forces of Malay 
nationalism and a form of Islamic republicanism. In contemporary Malaysia, 
particularly under the Mahathir administration, the institution of kingship has 
come under sever attack and challenge. None the less, continued commitment 
to kingship as a significant feature of Malay culture has both added to and 
detracted form the development of Islam in the political process."* 
3.2 Islam and Malay Nationalism 
Reformist influences on Islam in Malay were more widely evident by 
the early twentieth century. To some extent, these ideas, carried from Muslim 
societies in the Middle East and Indian subcontinent, were placed within the 
context of dramatic socio-economic change in the Peninsula, the large scale 
immigration of Chinese and Indians attracted by new economic activities, the 
emergence of a money economy, the spread of a modem bureaucracy, the 
expansion of secular education and rapid urbanization, as by products of 
colonial expansion. Improvements in communication were also to indirectly 
aid in the infusion of new religious ideas, contact with the Middle East and 
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Mecca in particular provided for exchange between Muslim elites and their 
ideas, bringing confidence and connection for a Muslim community at the 
furthermost reaches of the Islamic heartland. 
While Reformist ideas were to help inject life into the concept of a 
universal Muslim community, through the umma, in the development of 
Malay identity, these ideas were also germane to a strengthened synonymity 
between the ethnic and religious qualifications of Malay and Muslim which 
had held pre-colonial roots, the Malay language itself expressing the process 
of conversion to Islam as one of "entering the Malay community" (Masuk 
Melayu).^ The imperatives of a Malay nationalism articulated through ethnic 
and religious perspectives were the recognition of a significant threat to 
Malay numerical predominance in the country. Rapidly reversed demographic 
patterns through liberal immigration policies effected by the British indicated 
a threat to Malay prerogative, underlined by economic policies which 
provided opportunities for economic initiative and prosperity for non-Malays 
without a corresponding attention to the vast majority of Malays. 
Islamic Reformism as it was articulated by the Kaum Muda in British 
Malay, helped establish a strong basis for the spread of essentially urban 
based "modernist" ideas, that sought a return to "the pristine purity of early 
Islam" while urging the development of Malays through rafional, independent 
interpretation of religious sources and modem education and by verbalizing 
nationalist and anti-colonial sentiments. This movement was undoubtedly to 
\ \2 
challenge traditional religious authorities located in the village based ulama, 
scholars and functionaries to the Sultans, largely constituted by the Kaum Tua 
movement whose ideals rested in the preservation of the supremacy of the 
Malay elites and of the royal courts.^ 
Inevhably, Reformism was harnessed towards improving the position 
of the Malays, challenging any elite connection to, and control of Islam and, 
very importantly, establishing the first linkage between religion and politics in 
earliest forms of Malay nationalism. Religious cleavage between the Kaum 
Muda and Kaum Tua movements in the 1920s and 1930s did not however 
detract from the fact that, for the Malays, Islam still provided the symbol of 
their exclusivity and prerogative rights to the country, invigorating intellectual 
and political exchange and securing significant influence in nationalist 
agitation by the 1940s.'' 
Instrumental in germinating its seeds, Reformism also influenced the 
devolution of Malay nationalism into a variety of expressions. Its earliest 
articulation through popular politics found some combination between Malay 
nationalist and Islamic ideals, supported even by the ulama, at least until the 
late 1940s. Indeed, rather than any intense struggle between nationalism and 
Islam as dominating political concepts, Malay conviction in the propriety of 
the fusion of these ideals may be explained by the sense of particularism and 
cohesion that religious identity offered within an increasingly ethnically 
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plural society.^ Historically then, Malay nationalism, more accurately, 
reflected an ethnic assertiveness incorporating religious identity. 
Large-scale Malay political mobilization was not however possible 
until the United Malay National Organization (UMNO), emerged in 1946,^  
weaving together divergent strands of Malay nationalism in resistance to the 
Malayan Union scheme devised by the British. This would have had the effect 
of liberal citizenship guarantees to all domiciled non-Malay communities, 
inviting drastic alterations to the country's demographic patterns while 
relieving the Malay rulers of even their symbolic political prerogative over 
religious and ceremonial matters. 
UMNO's express purpose in establishment was thus for the protection 
of Malay identity and rights in the face of the immigrant threat. Amidst its 
representation of a wide spectrum of Malay nationalism its core leadership 
comprised a largely traditional elite with basically administrative and 
aristocratic backgrounds, underlining its mainly conservative expressions in 
particular towards religious matters. UMNO's political legendary image was 
assured with its success at obtaining Britain's retraction of its Malayan Union 
proposals to be eventually replaced by the Federation of Malaya Agreement 
(essentially negotiated between the UMNO and the British).'° 
Any unanimous Malay alliance under UMNO was, however, only 
temporarily successful as the allegiance of all Malays was fought for between 
parties of different political persuasions." Although Islamic reformists had 
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been at the forefront of the nationalist struggle, their choice of an independent 
organization reflected a considerable Malay disapproval and distrust of 
UMNO's secular leadership, thus underlining a continuing division between 
conservative and radical political interests. In fact. Islamic reformism had 
found expressly political representation through the establishment of the 
Hizbul Muslimin in 1947, aimed at achieving independence through an 
Islamic based society and the consequent establishment of an Islamic state 
(Darul Islam) in Malaya. Such an organization was to provide a suitable 
challenge towards UMNO's secular-nationalist ideology and those already 
oriented towards clearer Islamic objectives. 
UMNO's subsequent attempts at including religious leaders as 
important components of the Party by 1950 could not withstand the 
persistence of differing ideologies and was eventually to lead to their large-
scale defection into the establishment of a new party, the Pan-Malayan 
Islamic Party (PMIP) in 1951, its name later changed to Parti Islam Se-
Malaysia (FAS).^^ 
While the leadership of that party emphasized its intent in having Islam 
shape the political and economic affairs of the state and serve as a guide for 
worship and morality, its diverse origins also ensured a periodic flux between 
a Malay nationalist character and that of a more purely Islamic identity. In 
fact, any alternative of more radical Islamic expression was denied by the 
experience of the Emergency in 1948, declared to fight a Communist 
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insurgency, by British colonial policy, radical Malay politics and its 
collaboration with non-Malay left-wing forces are important elements of 
Malaysian political history but cannot be adequately dealt with here. Amidst 
the gradual crystallization of inter-ethnic and more secularly attuned political 
representation then, UMNO and PAS predominated national politics. 
The legacy of religious reformism in Malay was in its promotion of an 
active tradition of Islamic dissent. It was to constitute a permanent feature of 
Malay Muslim politics in time to come. It brought new ideas that were to 
prove an important source of future religious and political debates, witnessing 
the further entrenchment of Islam as a significant paradigm for Malay society 
and of politics in general. Over a period of time, accompanying important 
structural changes in Malay and Malaysian society, Malay ethnic nationalism 
itself has come to be reworked, such as through the contemporary popularity 
of the Melayu Baru (new Malay) concept. Even, while it has also suffered 
some tensions against this. Indeed, the dilemma of reconciling Islam's 
universality with the demands of an environment favouring ethnic nationalism 
has never been entirely resolved and has been further registered in 
contemporary Malay-Islamic discourse. Although UMNO remained the 
primary symbol of Malay nationalism for some time, in more recent years, it 
has had to fight more intensively for this mantle amidst the increasing 
fragmentation of ethnic political representation. The greater number of Malay 
parties fighting some combination of a Malay nationalist-cum-Islamic cause, 
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has at any rate demonstrated the continued marriage between these elements 
in the characterization of Malay identity, even as that marriage is continually 
being redefined. 
3.3 Islam in a Multi-Ethnic Context 
Islam in Malaysia's domestic context serves as an expression of 
confessional, ethnic interest in a society that is ethnically divided between 
Malays and non-Malays. The political perception of Malaysia as inherently 
Malay, with special rights due to that ethnic community, is balanced against 
the large-scale presence of other ethnic communities as an irreversible fact 
and by the constitutional commitment to the parliamentary process which 
enables communal representation. The poly-ethnic complexity of Malaysian 
society has been shaped against the political context of Malay dominance and 
by the fragile "balance" of the Malaysian population overall. 
A Constitutional guarantee to Malay special rights was "bargained" 
against a corresponding recognition of jus solid right for the non-Malay 
communities. The exchange of Malay political leadership for unhindered 
Chinese economic activity served as the unwritten covenant, although some 
Malay opposition continued against such inter-communal co-operation and 
the "selling away of the birthright of the Malays", led in particular by PAS. 
Nevertheless, the electoral success of the first inter-communal coalition party, 
the Alliance (a tripartite coalition representing the main ethnic communities 
through UMNO, the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malayan 
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Indian Congress (MIC), in 1955 and the dominance of UMNO within that 
organization helped its claim to a mandate of leading Malay to 
independence. 
Initial inter communal political co-operation was a strategy devised for 
negotiating independence from the British. This ultimately proved more 
durable in the long run as political governance became determined by an 
interpretation of consociationalism-important decisions affecting each ethnic 
co-operation, it was also strategically underpinned by Malay power. 
The consociationalist system did not remain intact through Malaysia's 
poHtical history. After racial riots in 1969, the pressures for greater Malay 
dominance and the subsequent structural changes to politics and government 
were to greatly emasculate the system of inter-elite bargaining. The term 
Biimiputra was to hold greater political validity after 1969 in the promotion of 
their rights by the State. The imperative of Malay unity has been based on the 
belief that politics represents the primary means for guaranteeing the 
Malayness of the country and the community's continued dominance within 
the political system. UMNO's continued ability to secure Malay prerogative 
and political dominance has given some support to the idea that it is 
ultimately the only party capable of ensuring Malay unity and hence power. 
After 1969, however, the structural changes instituted in governmental 
policy and representation in a more Malay oriented direction, also 
significantly altered the principles and processes for inter-ethnic political co-
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operation. Theoretically, of course, Malay political parties do not require non-
Malay support to predominate, but while the complex patterns of ethnic and 
religious alignment are built into the system of popular representation, any 
political entity intent on stable national leadership has not only to represent 
and protect the interests of its own community but in doing so must mot risk 
alienating the other ethnic communities. Thus the national aims of political 
stability and economic development can only be served by a clear 
commitment to the maintenance of inter-communal harmony. The sizeable 
minority that the non-Malays represent both in overall population as well as 
electoral terms combined with their considerable contribution to and stake in 
the economy of the country stand as political facts which any ruling party has 
had to recognize. Thus the basic form of multi ethnic co-operation and 
government first instituted under the Alliance has continued to the present 
day, with even wider ethnic representation, under the Barisan Nasionals (BN-
National Front), albeit significantly shaped by the inclinations of different 
national administrations, under lining an important principle in Malaysia's 
political process. 
The exercise of political power is further complicated by the fact that 
its attainment is not entirely accounted for by numerical superiority. Malay 
political power was also rooted in a system that provided greater political 
weight to rural constituencies, where majority of Malays traditionally resided, 
over urban ones. In part, the ruling party's calculafions of the possible effects 
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of its intensified struggle for the Malay vote on the non-Malay communities 
and how this translated into electoral support must be understood within the 
context of unequal representation and gerrymandering in order to amplify 
Malay political power. In particular, new constituency delimitations 
considerably increased the principle of rural over-representation, while some 
non-Malay constituencies held up to three times the population of the smallest 
Malay majority constituency. In 1969, Malays constituted 60 per cent of 
federal constituencies but by 1984, this had grown to 74 per cent.'^ 
In defining Malay identity, Islam is critical not only to Malay politics 
but also to Malay exclusivity within an ethnically divided society. However, 
the maintenance of communal harmony within the context of ethnic divisions 
is both threatened by and dependent upon the political system. The reality of a 
multi-ethnic context has meant that the role of Islam must be measured, to 
some extent, against the maintenance of the ethnic balance, which UMNO or 
any Malay political entity vying for leadership of Malaysian political society 
must ensure. Thus the ethnic equation has continued to serve as the 
predominant factor shaping political alignments, determining the structure 
and role of institutions and defining the basic priorities in public policy in 
Malaysia. It has also affected the political development of Islam and served as 
an obstacle to the evolution of a more universal identity for that religion 
within the Malaysian society. 
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It is thus necessary to situate religious identity and politics within its 
widest context, bearing in mind that the State, political parties, indeed all 
social entities and movements, even those which are more distinctly non-
Muslim, are part of any debate on the role of Islam in Malaysian society 
whether directly or otherwise. The debate is part of a dialogic process of 
politics, which consists of the interplay between all social and political 
variables in the Malaysian context. Ultimately, although religious politics has 
been directed to a large extent by the machinations of intra-Malay rivalry, it 
has had an important bearing on Muslim/non-Muslim relations. All actors in 
Malaysian religious politics have consistently been made aware of this. 
3.4 Islam in Malaysian Constitution 
Although ensured secular impartiality to all Malaysian citizens, the 
Malayan/Malaysian Constitution has added great weight to the ethnic basis of 
politics, entrenching Islam in Malay identity, as well as the special position of 
Malays within the country. Issues of religion were highly significant to 
Constitutional negotiations, in particular over the propriety of identifying 
Islam as the Federation's official religion. In the event, its establishment as 
the state religion was deemed necessary to the definition of Malay identity 
and towards enshrining Malay prerogative. Even so, some Muslim opposition, 
such as that of PAS, to the secular spirit of the Constitution was founded on 
its denial of the development of the religion in Malaysia and as such 
necessitated the party's persistent struggle for an Islamic state. 
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In defining Islam as the established religion of the State, the 
Constitution also safeguards the freedom of religious expression. 
Proselytization among Muslims is forbidden, thus legitimizing the promotion 
of Islam amongst non-Malays. On the other hand, the recommendation to 
officially recognize Islam was claimed not to have the intent of negating the 
establishment of the Federation as a secular state.^' 
Important provisions were also made for retaining the practice of each 
Sultan as the head of Islam in individual states. However, the division 
between state and federal prerogative in Islamic affairs was never made 
explicit, neither was the extent to which Islam belonged in national political 
institutions, thus magnifying issues of authority and legitimacy in terms of 
religion. This has proved particularly pertinent to the position and role of 
Islam within the contemporary Malaysian political system where the 
relationship between the state and centre (federal government) has been 
fraught with tension. 
More importantly, the Constitution also guarantees the "special 
position" of the Malays, and in granting them certain special rights and 
privileges defines a Malay as one who professes the religion of Islam, 
habitually speaks the Malay language and conforms to Malay custom. Malay 
special rights are therefore recognized through the Constitution as bearing a 
religious qualification, further reinforcing not only the synonymity of Islam 
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with Malay culture but also the special needs of the Malays and therefore of 
the Muslim community. 
The Constitution, in legitimizing Malay prerogative through Islam, 
indirectly but inevitably sanctioned the place of religion in the main arena of 
politics. The so-called "innocuous" provision for Islam, as it stands in the 
Constitution, has left unresolved the precise role of religion in the 
contemporary state. Indeed, the conclusion that Malaysia lies somewhere 
between the character of a secular state and a theocracy, in legal terms at 
least, has contributed to confusion and unease among the Malaysian public, 
not to mention the institutional pressure that it has placed on the government, 
in contemporary times, towards resolving this ambivalence. 
Islam, in defining Malay identity, enshrined in the Constitution, is 
therefore also inextricably bound to the concept of protection of the Malay 
community. Its resonance as a political concept has, over time, also enabled 
the object of protection to underwrite the State's promotion of Islam in 
Malaysia. It has also remained an important component of the relationship 
between Malay nationalism and Islam. And the Malays are the single example 
in the modern world where a language speaking community follows a single 
religion, whenever they are found to live. 
Even as more recent attempts haven made by national leadership at 
discounting the culture of protection in politics, including allowing for the 
membership of other indigenous and non-Malay Muslims within the party in 
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more recent years, and in processes of social and economic development, it 
has demonstrated a remarkable tenacity in Malaysian political culture. 
3.5 Islam in Malaysian Political Development 
The ideal of Islam's unifying potential within the Malay community 
has been perpetuated in ethnic politics even as conflict and dissensions have 
continued over its role within that community. UMNO's primacy in Malay 
politics in the immediate post-war years did not liquidate significant support 
for an alternative PAS. Whereas challenge from other Malay political 
interests proved surmountable, UMNO-PAS rivalry was marked by a 
fundamental difference in ideology and policy issues pertaining to the Malay 
community and importantly, in the multi-ethnic context, which party afforded 
'5'* 
better protection for the Malays. " 
UMNO's political objectives, among which were "the excellence of the 
religion of Islam and to propagate the same", had been outlined in its first 
Constitution adopted in 1949. Through the Alliance government, however, 
this entailed attention to building a Islamic state infrastructure, mosques, 
education, conferences, even as the viability of a Islamic state was considered 
impractical. This possibly represented a bias of a predominantly Western-
educated elite committed to the traditions of a secular state while underlining 
the imperatives of Malay socio-economic development through wider 
interpretations of Islam.^ "^  
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Indeed, although reUgious authority was actively recruited and by 1959 
a substantive section of ulama were represented within the party, these were 
within basically secular political structures, and limits on further recruitment 
explained by UMNO's participation within the Alliance coalition. 
PAS's initial leadership, after the first election in 1955, stood in 
significant contrast, as its religious scholars and Malay nationalists mobilized 
Malay support through the employment of a religious idiom for the 
expression of Malay interests and for the protection and preservation of Islam 
against "infidel" influence. 
Religion did serve as a significant issue in most electoral campaigns up 
to 1969. Matters of state assistance towards the promotion of Islam and the 
necessity for vigilance against over-compromise in intra-communal relations 
were important, but more significantly, Islam was involved in the controversy 
over how Malay identity should be preserved and protected. 
External events also played an influential role in determining intra-
Malay rivalry, particularly where it involved questions of a pan-Malay 
identity within the Southeast Asian region. They did so also in UMNO-PAS 
differences over what should, in effect, constitute the Malaysian state, 
namely, whether the inclusion of large non-Malay components such as 
Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak in the Federation concept of Malaysia would 
ensure the loss of Malay dominance. Early UMNO-PAS rivalry was also, in 
part, a function of tensions within Federal state relations. While Islamic 
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matters, Malay culture and land were the jurisdictions of the state 
government, the vital functions of education, finance, defence and economic 
development remained federally administered. Thus the Federal government's 
vast powers over the state governments has found its authority in Islam 
extremely vulnerable when a state has been governed by an opposition 
party.^ ^ Although early campaigns for greater national co-ordination of 
Islamic affairs existed, UMNO had in fact insisted on the individual 
responsibility of the Sultans in their respective states. By 1969, however, 
increasing challenge from within the Party and from PAS convinced national 
leadership of the need to establish a National Council of Islamic Affairs 
within the Prime Minister's Office. 
Despite the fears of non-Muslim and non-Malay encroachment, 
religion remained a point of intra-Malay contention and religious appeals 
directed at political ends, while the objective of unifying the community 
through its exclusive identity had the undesirable effect of further fragmenting 
it. In fact, UMNO's symbolic attention to Islam over two decades allowed for 
the perception of Islam by non-Malays as simply an additional index of Malay 
identity, it did not yet affect them directly.^^ The early period of Malay and 
inter-communal relations was also marked by a politics of ambiguity, 
particularly useful as electoral strategy. Subsequent tensions in the areas of 
social policy, however, increased over time, leading to growing support for 
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UMNO's and the Alliance's competitors and by increased ethno-religious 
demands from within UMNO itself. 
Serious inter-ethnic differences revolving around issues of language, 
education, and economic opportunity did, however, overshadow Malay 
differences at this point as inequalities arising from the developmental process 
were compounded and made more delicate by the inescapable fact that 
poverty and economic inequality coincided with racial or ethnic demarcations 
in Malaysian society. Indeed, political dominance had ensured neither 
economic advancement nor social improvement for a large majority of 
Malays. Prior to 1969, the Malaysian economy was founded on a relatively 
free capitalist basis emphasizing growth through trade, commerce and foreign 
investment. Malays were protected by quotas and reservations as outlined in 
the Constitution but the majority of Malays remained rurally based and 
engaged in traditional occupations. Glaring economic disparities continued 
between Malays and non-Malays (particularly Chinese) in terms of urban and 
rural commerce, ownership and share capital and in the general distribution of 
income, all of which ultimately lent support to the official interpretation of 
ethnic motivation in the 1969 riots.^ ^ 
Agitation over UMNO's limited success in meeting its "protector" 
functions, initiated from within the party by younger members constituting 
the "new guard" {pimpinan baru) against elite leadership, were representative 
of intensified Malay nationalist demands and of Malay frustration at what was 
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perceived to be the neglect of Malay problems. Although lack of attention to 
Islam was not specifically part of their grievances, these demands inevitably 
accorded a greater attention to Islam as a symbol of the identity. 
Subsequently, UMNO's incremental attention to religion served as a response 
to external and internal agitation, for a more Islamic character, particularly at 
the level of state and regional politics. 
Outside of intra and inter-party rivalry, student politics, the active 
organization, numbers and sophistication of which had swelled in the 1960s, 
was another platform for the articulation of dissent from government policy 
on issues of Malay economic and social backwardness and of the non-
implementation of Malay as the national language.^ *^ 
The intensely communal general election campaign of 1969 heightened 
the polarization between the Malay and non-Malay communities and was to 
take its toll in the racial riots of that year. The government response was to 
suspend Parliament and institute a period of emergency rule which was to 
provide primarily for a reassessment by Malay political leaders of the future 
political development of the country and for the subsequent restructuring of 
government. 
The major changes to the conduct of politics through the watershed of 
13 May 1969 served to highlight the quest for a Malay identity even as they 
continued to accentuate tensions between, and within, racial and religious 
communities. The politics of the previous years contributed in one way or 
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another, but the most immediate catalyst of serious ethnic rioting in Kuala 
Lumpur were the dramatic results of the 1969 General Elections when the 
Alliance coalition lost its two-thirds majority in Parliament and the 
Opposition parties, most significantly the PAS. Changes were instituted in 
government policy and priorities as a response, many of which were to 
gradually aher the structures of Malaysian political society and, more 
importantly, to further stimulate processes of Islamic revivalism which have 
continued to the present. 
Even as the concepts of communal incorporations and representations 
were widened within the new political framework of the Barisan Nasional 
(BN), directed towards national unity through the achievement of new 
economic and social goals, a fundamental shift to greater Malay 
predominance and orientation within the Malaysian political system was 
unmistakable. Political restructuring was also directed at entrenching 
UMNO's standing, stymieing the erosion of popular support and implicitly the 
stability of the political regime it headed. 
UMNO's efforts were therefore directed at Malay unity, clear 
confirmation of Malay political power, predominance and reaffirmation of a 
Malay identity for the country. Younger leadership, representative of the 
ascendant nationalist critique within UMNO, helped articulate this new 
direction. In as much as the term Bumiputra had been supported since 
UMNO's birth, restructuring after 1969 ensured its institution as a norm in 
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national politics. This was accompanied by a new national ideology, the 
Rukunegara, based on the principles of belief in God, loyalty to the King and 
country, defending the Constitution and rule of law, good behaviour and 
morality. 
A qualified pro-Malay emphasis, continued recognition that greater 
dominance also entailed the protection of non-Malay interests, rested on the 
assumption that UMNO would always be the ruling party, constitutionally 
recognized by the fact that all government policies should henceforth be 
initiated or approved by the UMNO Supreme Council. 
Most significantly, greater attention was paid to the mediation of 
Malay identity through Islam, even as this continued to refer to some extent to 
traditional Malay culture. A National Cultural Congress held in 1971 set such 
guidelines through proposals that a Malaysian culture would also rely on the 
bases of the culture of its "natural inhabitants", i.e. the Malays, including 
Islam and other "appropriate" elements. The Congress was also important for 
its recommendations for the provision of a suitable context for the spread of 
Islamic moral values, the wide teaching of the religion's significance in 
founding the modem era in Malaysia and the unification of Islamic and civil 
law under a basically Islamic structure.^^ 
Henceforth, communal harmony was envisioned as being protected by 
the constitutional proscription of any public discussion of issues deemed too 
sensitive, including the special position of the Malays, the rights of the other 
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ethnic communities and the position of the Sultans. Major changes in 
language and education policies were intended to raise dramatically the 
proportion of Malay representation at tertiary and professional levels while 
efforts were made to reform Islamic education, which was to be a compulsory 
topic for Muslim students at some universities.^^ 
The grater attention to Islamic affairs worked partly as a response to 
the challenge from PAS but partly also as recognition of competition from 
student movements in the political expression of Islam and, more importantly, 
in the context of a global reassertion of the religion. The semblance of greater 
Malay unity was in fact obtained through PAS's incorporation within the BN 
coalition party, further enhancing the new Government's affirmation of its 
commitment to Islam as central to national development. PAS's own General 
Assembly in 1971 had reflected its greater preparedness for "the reality of 
Malaysia" as wide-ranging changes to party ideology underlined its goal of 
uniting the umma "regardless of party affiliation or race".^ '* 
Significant to the coalition agreement was the recognition that Islamic 
values would be propagated without restriction. In fact, PAS continued to 
champion the creation of an Islamic state, the implementation of Islamic laws, 
the establishment of an Islamic university and the complete overhaul of the 
political, economic and educational systems to reflect Islamic rules and 
values, throughout its tenure within the BN coalition, managing to extract 
concessions amounting to a recognition of its specifically Islamic role in the 
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coalition government, PAS representatives in the Government and the 
Legislature were guaranteed the freedom to question any initiative or Bill on 
the grounds that they contravened the teachings of Islam. 
Yet intra-Malay rivalry did not really abate. The political realities of 
two Malay-Muslim parties continuing to vie for the same basis of support, 
even within a coalition, in fact magnified tensions between the two, 
aggravated by the absence of grassroots support for PAS within the BN. 
Strains then continued to build over ideology and insecurities over UMNO's 
commitment to PAS political representation at state and national levels, all of 
which were to eventually climax in a crisis in Kelantan in 1977 when a 
protracted struggle over state control by either party resulted in the Federal 
declaration of an emergency, and eventual takeover of the state that signalled 
PAS's exit from the BN. Despite these setbacks, the five years spent within 
the Government had provided the party, to some extent, with nation-wide 
respectability and was to greatly lend confidence in waging more intense 
political competition outside traditional strongholds.^^ 
Although the PAS challenge was not initially substantially electoral, its 
raison d'etre proved a symbolic enough one to UMNO. Over time, however, 
evidence of the growing support for PAS from the constituencies of the 
greatest relevance to Malay politics was demonstrated by a significant and 
growing shift by many Malays in the rural heartlands and regions in favour of 
PAS. The Party had in fact gained a 20 per cent increase in its share of the 
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total vote though four General Elections, from 1955-1969. The obvious 
potential for a dramatic jump in these figures in constituencies with absolute 
Malay majorities underlined the serious challenge that PAS posed to UMNO 
in terms of the Malay vote by 1978, it had obtained approximately 40 per cent 
of that vote in Peninsular Malaysia. 
Structural changes were also induced by the New Economic Policy 
(NEP), supporting official opinion that national unity was only possible 
through the alleviation of Malay economic problems requiring their greater 
protection and that this was linked to national survival in "harmony". It 
essentially sought to restructure the society by removing the identification of 
race or ethnicity with economic function within a target of twenty years and 
also to eradicate poverty. The NEP aimed for Bumiputra management and 
ownership, at a projected 30 per cent of Malaysia's total corporate wealth, and 
sought for employment patterns at all levels and sectors, rural and urban, to 
reflect the racial composition of the population.^^ Such socio-economic 
redistribution was primarily to be facilitated by direct government 
intervention and investment in the economy. 
While PAS articulated opposition to the NEP, in principle criticism 
from other quarters focused on its implementation, the relative success of the 
redistribution of wealth and resources on an inter-ethnic basis against the 
emerging gulf in intra-ethnic terms, as well as the continued high incidence of 
poverty inspite of or due to the NEP. However, criticism of the Policy held 
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political limitations. The increasing equation of the NEP with UMNO meant 
that its protection, continued promotion or even existence, were perceived as 
unquestionable facts, as political survival, for all ethnic communities, was 
frequently determined by support for NEP. 
Politics was also determined by complementary changes in the 
machinery of the government. As Gordon Means points out, policy changes 
introduced after 1969 accelerated the Malaysianization of the government 
apparatus, enabling the rapid development of a largely Malay bureaucracy. 
The growth in its scale and importance in planning and policy initiatives 
helped the bureaucracy function as another bastion of Malay dominance, 
inevitably intertwining with politics as it became exceedingly important for 
political elites to gain access to the bureaucratic structures of decision 
making.'"' This was ultimately also to underline the congruence of political 
and bureaucratic support for a greater Islamic orientation in public policy. 
3.6 Islamic Revivaiism as Political Challenge 
While Islam's principal political manifestation in the preceding two 
decades was a source of cleavage within the Malay community, by the 1970s 
its socio-political force and agenda had extended its role beyond the 
parameters of the party system. Religious resurgence in Malaysia in this 
period was clearly an integral part of the global resurgence that Muslims 
themselves had prophesied for Islam. The fifteenth century was to herald a 
new golden age for Islam and an expansion of the faith. While the 
134 
international context did hold important repercussions on domestic 
developments, the Islamic revival in Malaysia was also rooted within its own 
domestic circumstances, which shaped the development and attitude of 
religious revivalist currents referred to as dakwah. 
Dakwah is a generic term that describes multi-functional realities. 
Reflective of a global phenomenon in the growth of Islamic activism, its 
primary emphasis has remained that of the promotion of Islam through 
missionary effort but with the contemporary qualification of socio-political 
activity and movements aimed at creating "better Muslims", by raising the 
level of Islamic consciousness in everyday life reflected particularly in 
religious and ritual observance. Although political dawah in Malaysia has 
emphasized both, it would appear that the intellectual foundations of the 
phenomenon were more slowly entrenched than the ritual.'" As a constituent 
of Islamic revivalism in Malaysia, its character has been distinguished by its 
heterogeneity of form and purpose. 
Accelerated structural and social changes through the NEP provided 
the background against which such developments emerged. Significant 
changes in social demography, the massive rural-urban shift and increased 
opportunities in the tertiary sector were all to mark significant changes for 
Malay society and therefore Malay politics, and in many ways provided a 
direct link to the resurgence. The brief UMNO-PAS coalition had also created 
a political vacuum of a kind. While proclaiming an aversion to party politics. 
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many within the dakwah movement gained the opportunity for political 
expression in activities which were not overtly so but were carried out in the 
name of religion. Although student politics had initially reflected the concerns 
of Malay ethnic nationalism, its conduct displayed a greater Islamic 
orientation by 1973, occasioned by the influence of the cultural and 
intellectual phenomenon of dakwah. In the decade of the seventies, most 
associational activities linked with it were on university campuses, and many 
transformed the student politics to "struggle" through the banner of Islam. 
ABIM {Angkatan Bella Islam Malaysia) or Muslim Youth Movement 
of Malaysia, launched in 1971 as an "organizational platform for Muslim 
graduates to play a legitimate role in building a society based on Islam", was 
among the most successful of these revivalist movements. Indeed, throughout 
the 1970s, under the leadership of Anwar Ibrahim, it was the most articulate 
and successful critic on the manner of government and public policy, 
lobbying against corruption, abuse of power, economic injustice and the 
failings of the education system. It proposed instead Islam as an economic, 
political and social blueprint for the Malaysian society. While the 
establishment of Shari'ah law within an Islamic state in Malaysia was an 
articulated goal, this was also perceived as being a viable solution to 
structural Malay disadvantage as well as to communalism.'*^ 
Other major revivalist organizations such as Darul Arqam and the 
Jama'ah Tabligh while sharing similar objectives, proposed different methods 
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for their achievement. Their essentially non-political character indicated their 
lesser threat to the status quo, at least in the short term. Their attitude of 
religious quietism, however, also indicated withdrawal from the prevailing 
Malaysian socio-political system which in the long run was to prove 
threatening to the government. PERKIM (Malaysian Muslim Welfare 
Organization), an officially state patronized organization, was also involved 
in dakwah work, but at its own insistence remained entirely apolitical and 
thus peripheral to subsequent political developments. ^  
More religious aims were offered by other revivalist movements, in 
particular among the Malaysian student populations abroad, such as Suara 
Islam (The Voice of Islam) and the Islamic Representative Council (IRC) 
who more clearly registered grievances against the Government, denouncing 
UMNO leadership as infidels, envisaging ideological struggle towards the 
establishment of an Islamic state, and dismissing the moderation and 
ambiguity of groups like ABIM.'*'' 
Dakwah activities and discourses frequently focused on theological 
debate over issues of Islamic justice, the Islamic state and the qualities of 
political leadership, sufficiently then consfitution political discourse. Debate 
over the viability of an Islamic economy inevitably called into question 
official plans for modernization and development on the Malays, primarily 
through the NEP, reflected or denounced because of its basis of race and 
ethnicity. In lamenting the Malaysia:n economy's overdependence upon the 
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international capitalist system, ABIM had also been critical of modernization 
processes and Western-oriented development as causes of chaos that plagued 
Muslim countries like Malaysia."*^ 
The greatest relevancy of the phenomenon of dakwah has been in its 
longer term effects on orienting Islamic consciousness towards the 
articulation of and search for social justice, however broadly defined. To 
some extent this meant that dakwah held a less obvious political agenda in the 
Malaysian context, at least for a time, but its tenure and popularity have also 
allowed for its long-term and wider influence. However, as social entities 
given to politics, whether directly or indirectly, Islamic movements have not 
been formed by social processes elsewhere but are shaped through the 
political process in which they engage, they are not independent of their 
context, but organic to it."*^  In the Malaysian context, dakwah was inevitably 
harnessed to mainstream political process and debate, even as some 
organizations remained apolitical, more concerned with individual conversion 
and the promotion of a more purely social agenda. In general then, as Islamic 
social theories informed these dakwah movements and were debated among 
them. This had for-reaching implications for the very nature and structure of 
the Malaysian society, including necessarily, the authority of the powers that 
be an UMNO dominated government and of the place of Islam in a multi-
ethnic, multi-religious society. 
138 
Dakwah movements give challenge and lay in structural features, their 
constituents tended to comprise that pool of highly educated Malay political 
talent that the State might look to for their future leaders and that UMNO 
might eventually draw from. More precisely, in addressing Malaysia's 
Muslims and therefore Malay audience, their discourse implicitly challenged 
UMNO's role as the protector of Malay interests, even as it reshaped the 
agenda of socio-economic context of intra-Malay rivalry in the political 
domain which set the scene for the Malaysian government's attempts to meet 
such a new challenge to its authority.'*^ 
A vast expansion of the Federal religious bureaucracy was projected, 
in part as a response to state prerogative in Islamic affairs. In 1974, the 
Yayasan Dakwah Islamiah (Islamic Missionary Foundation) was created 
directly out of the Prime Minister's Office. The National Fatwa Council, 
established in 1978 to co-ordinate state religious council activities, also held 
the power to issue rulings on any religious matter affecting Muslims. The 
influence of Islamic revivalist discourse was to lead the Government towards 
a re-emphasis of its national development goals as relying on the twin tracks 
of material and spiritual endeavour.''^ On the coercive front, a litany of 
legislation was introduced that could be used against associational activities 
concerned with Islam. Dakwah songsang (false dakwah), projected as a 
serious threat to communal harmony though "extremist" and "deviationist" 
practices, was proscribed. In 1981, the Societies Act Amendment Bill was 
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introduced, aimed primarily at restricting a new category of political 
association, it was seen as being largely aimed at ABIM. Dakwah did also 
help renew the vigour of Islam as an issue in electoral politics. As the original 
architect of an Islamic vision for Malaysia, PAS was to benefit directly and 
greatly from the popularity of dakwah. Its religious identity and its 
participation within the national Islamic bureaucracy from 1973 to 1977 
positioned it ideally to direct the political energies of the Islamic revival and 
to address the question of the place of Islam in society. Its anti-secular image 
and view of Islam as ad-deen, (complete way of life), echoed many of the 
central themes, if not the spirit, of dahvah.^^ 
Despite UMNO's superior party machinery, the termination of its 
alliance with PAS renewed a fundamental challenge to its legitimacy. In order 
to avoid the emergence of further Malay challenge, UMNO exerted great 
efforts to project itself as a guardian of the religion. Islam was recognized in 
particular as a bulwark against other competitive ideologies among the 
Malays, in particular Communism and Socialism. Increasingly, UMNO 
General Assemblies were occasions for reaffirming the party's commitment to 
Islam while proclaiming its moderate nature, although party members were 
advised to be vigilant against competition to appear more Islamic than others 
because it was a responsible party. 
Political rivalry through Islam was significantly revived by a tacit 
alliance between ABIM and PAS in the 1978 General Elections, following its 
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exit from the BN coalition. Their ideological affinity was further cemented in 
1980 in their combined efforts in facilitating peasant demonstrations against 
controlled rice prices and hunger in Kedah, which proved highly 
embarrassing to the Government and to UMNO. 
PAS was itself revitalized by the influx of new, younger members 
between 1978 and 1982, with more advanced educational qualifications, 
beneficiaries of expanded educational opportunities under the NEP, 
frequently of a technical nature but also those more learned in the religious 
field. Despite the party's overall failure in the 1978 General Elections, it still 
managed to secure more than one-third of the total Malay votes cast. Indeed, 
PAS had adopted a new strategy of expanding its support base in the north of 
the Peninsula, particularly in Trengganu and Kedah, which was to provide the 
consummate challenge to UMNO. By 1980, UMNO was increasingly alarmed 
by the narrower margin obtained between BN victors and PAS candidates and 
by record increases in votes polled for PAS in a series of by-elections. 
Its perceived vulnerability over such developments was reflected in 
growing calls from within UMNO itself for the proscription of both PAS and 
of the term "Islamic" from the names of political parties. ABIM's activities 
were increasingly regulated, its supporters in government penalized and 
authorization for rural public activities increasingly limited. Although 
couched in new language, the propaganda war between PAS and UMNO 
continued (particularly for UMNO) to focus on the basis of Malay support. 
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Seizing upon a common theme of global Islamic resurgence, that of the unity 
of the umma (the Islamic Nation), consistent challenge and persistent 
"slander" by PAS against the country's leaders were deemed to be placing this 
goal even further out of reach. On the other hand, UMNO's efforts and record 
of achievements in promoting Islam and particularly Islamic education were 
proclaimed concrete against PAS lip service towards the defence of Islam, 
despite its nineteen-year rule of Kelantan. 
By the end of the decade, however, the State's record of commitment to 
Islam and dakwah remained primarily symbolic. The Government appeared 
no closer to any serious meeting of Islamic revivalist demands and appeared 
committed to the perpetuation of the political process and the State in its 
traditional forni. The change in national leadership in 1981, however, was to 
significantly alter and in turn was itself altered by the Islamic challenge in 
Malaysian society. While political rhetoric concerning Islam had been 
magnified in the 1970s, this represented a continuation of past trends. The 
1980s were, however, to prove that responses to increasing demands would be 
forced to go beyond rhetoric. 
3.7 Islam and Politics in a Plural Society 
Religion in Malaysia has remained everywhere an index of ethnic 
identity. The centralization of Malay-Muslim rivalry in fact marginalized the 
field of muhi-ethnic politics, although, this was also to be explained by 
serious internal differences within the non-Malay parties themselves. 
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At any rate, this served increasingly to divert the non-Malay 
communities from straight politics. Although Chinese politics has not 
remained completely docile in the face of greater pressures for Malay-Muslim 
dominance, periodic attempts at regaining Chinese rights have consistently 
met with UMNO pressure for the elimination of such radical interests from 
within the BN for fear of upsetting the balance achieved thus far. While non-
Malay coalition partners within the BN necessarily muted their responses to 
Islamization, some opposition parties like the DAP seized the opportunity for 
presenting themselves as actively protecting non-Malay rights, campaigning 
upon the problem of religious Muslim extremism and the potential for further 
Malay imposition on non-Malays through religion and culture. 
In 1983, a conference on National Unity and Ethnic Relations elicited 
strong emotions from non-Muslim participants over the perceived marginality 
of their position within the country. Fear and frustration were articulated over 
such issues as the acquisition of land for religious buildings and burial 
grounds and the increasing scope and implementation of Shari'ah laws over 
non-Muslim lives and interests. The Malaysian Consultative Council on 
Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism and Sikhism formed in 1983, with the 
specific aim of combating the image of non-Muslim weakness due to the 
differences between them, deliberately excluded any Muslim organizations 
from participation.^'* At an influential seminar on National Integration held in 
1985, opinions and observations expressed by non-Malay BN leaders 
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indicated levels of polarization perceived even at elite levels and deep 
misgiving over widespread "bureaucratic racism" that had made non-Muslims 
feel "increasingly insecure".^^ 
Islamic revivalism has also been met by heightened cultural and 
religious revivalism within the non-Malay communities. Some studies on 
non-Muslim religious innovation and ethnic identity in Malaysia demote the 
arousal of non-Muslim sentiments as an aspect of the larger problem of ethnic 
identity formation, suggesting that many non-Malays retreat into diverse 
religious activities as convenient alternatives for ethnic expression.^^ Others 
suggest that it is also possible to read such heightened religious innovation as 
reflecting and generating new patterns of Muslim and non-Muslim "this-
worldly" orientations towards either community. Both arguments hold 
important implications for long-term social processes in determining the role 
and development of Islam and religion in general in Malaysian society. They 
also indicate the continued connection between Muslims and non-Muslims in 
defining and determining that role. 
Even while working, for the most part, to confirm ethnic particularism 
the Islamic resurgence has also addressed itself to the pluralistic nature of 
Malaysian society. The Administration's Islamization policy and the 
increasing centrality of the religion to Malay politics had engendered a debate 
over the legitimacy of the ideas of Bumiputraism and Malay nationalism 
within an Islamic framework. The PAS General Assemblies of 1981 and 1982 
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witnessed attempts by the party to eradicate its racial image by assuring 
Malaysians of the Party's ability to "deliver the message of unity and 
prosperity for all", opening its doors to all Muslims, irrespective of race and 
establishing programmes to inform non-Muslims of the party's objectives. 
Subscribing to a nonconformist view that Islam is supreme and cannot be 
made subordinate to narrow ethnic concepts such as nationalism, PAS's own 
campaign against assabiyah (ethnic chauvinism) has also constituted an effort 
to recruit more non-Malays to its membership ranks. 
Its sponsorship of a National Unity Conference in 1985 aimed at 
addressing a multi-racial audience, proclaimed Islam as a universal religion 
that envisioned equality within its community and suggested the possibility 
for a pious Chinese or Indian Muslim to assume, eventually, the post of Prime 
Minister in Malaysia. Subsequent allegations about PAS dispensation with 
Bumiputra rights and privileges were it to come to power, initiated extreme 
response from all Malay quarters (including UMNO and ABIM), accusing the 
party of treason, treachery and betrayal of the Malays. These vehement 
reactions are perhaps best understood in the context of the imminent UMNO 
General Assembly at the end of the same month, where Dr. Mahathir chose to 
sound a warming that UMNO's willingness to co-operate with other ethnically 
based parties could not be taken for granted. 
Although PAS attempted to mobilize Chinese electoral support and has 
been occasionally successful at arriving at co-operative electoral supports and 
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at co-operative electoral strategies with other opposition parties to deter BN 
dominance, such as in the 1990 General Elections, there remains general fear 
that inspite of PAS claims, the establishment of an Islamic state, would 
simply replace an ethnic dichotomy in Malaysia with a religious one. 
UMNO's successful depiction of potential PAS betrayal of Malay prerogative 
and its insistence that the objective of an Islamic state is, contemporarily at 
least, non-negotiable, ultimately defeated its attempts at inter-communal co-
operation. 
In fact, as serious intra-Malay rivalry in the late 1980s was 
compounded, this also precipitated initiatives from PAS for the formation of 
an Islamic Front {Barisan Islamiah) composed of all the Malay-Muslim 
parties in Malaysia, in an effort to protect the interest of Islam. Indeed, the 
prospect of Malay (now often referred to as Islamic) unity in Malaysia, has 
traditionally served as a precursor to elections or as a deterrent to non-Malay 
disputes or demands.^^ The 1990 elections demonstrated the political limits of 
even national leadership commitment to a balanced approach. At a point when 
Semangat '46's^^ potential to wrest power from UMNO through a similar 
multi-ethnic coalition was perceived as an imminent threat, Dr Muhathir 
employed brinkmanship strategy to discredit his major rival. Semangafs 
President, Tenku Rezaleigh, was depicted as a betrayer of the Malay-Muslim 
cause because of his Party's coalition with the Christian Kadazan-dominated 
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Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS), the implication being that only UMNO held the 
capacity to protect Malays, and therefore Muslims, against such threats.^' 
Even while Government leadership has repeatedly asserted that non-
Muslims have nothing to fear from further Islamization and their rights as 
constitutionally guaranteed, it is apparent that the concept and necessity of 
Malay exclusivity are often conveniently expressed in the Islamic idiom, 
whether intended or otherwise. Furthermore, non-Muslims have in fact been 
increasingly affected by legislations directed at issues of religious conversion, 
apostasy and Islamic reform, even if indirectly, a product of heightened 
competition between states in the entrenchment of their Islamic identities as 
well as of the predominance and prerogative of state legislation in religious 
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matters over that of Federal adjudication. 
Another important aspect of contemporary problems in Malaysian 
politics, is that the myth of monolithic ethnic communities is rapidly 
disintegrating. This has clearly been a product of structural change, the rapid 
economic development and modernization, in particular the Malay 
community (through rural-urban migration and the rapid expansion of a 
Malay middle class via the NEP) has also accelerated changes in political 
attitudes. Such fundamental social alterations are perhaps occurring faster 
than the existing political structures can either understand or accommodate.''^ 
The irony of the unitary depiction of Malay-Muslim identity is the 
disaggregating of its reality. Even as. Malays claim distinctly integrative role 
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for Islam, the very concept of Malay.-Muslim identity is being remoulded by 
divergent paths. The question is begged if in fact any alternative ideological 
apparatus to Islam could or would effectively install and sustain Malay unity?. 
In as much as Islam continues to be linked to Malay identity and works 
primarily as an ethnic manifestation within the milieu of a multi-ethnic 
society, then the role of religion in political development has continued to be 
expressed through a politics of identity. 
Since political organizations in Malaysia remain essentially 
communally bound, and politicians are ultimately divided by their ethnic 
origins, then Islam, as the prime component of one community's identity, has 
stood little chance of gaining a national image. Furthermore, there remains to 
some extent at least, the vested interests of communal parties in the 
perpetuation of a system which has thus far enabled their continued political 
power. UMNO, with its essential ideology of protection of Malay interests 
and as the ultimate arbiter of conflicting interests in Malaysian society, as the 
ruling party, is the corporal culprit and also the victim of this syndrome. In the 
context of the 1990s, however, the Mahathir administration has manifested 
the search for a definition of Islam acceptable to all, including the non-
Muslim communities. 
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4.1 Islamic Movements from the Periphery 
Islamic revivalism, as well as other religious revivalisms, is a social 
phenomenon, it usually emerges in response to social, economic, or political 
crises such as moral decline, corruption, economic stagnation or foreign 
threat. The Islamic revivalisms differ from one society to another according to 
the social, political and economic diversity of every Muslim society, but all 
have a common goal, that is the return to the Islamic rule i.e., Shari'ah, as the 
supreme authority of the state constitution. Nevertheless, it can be understood 
by analyzing the relationships between society, state and religion.' Moreover, 
Islamic revival has not been the work of opposition groups alone, the 
government has made its own share of contribution.^ 
The difficult social and political conditions experienced by the Muslim 
world in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as result of the colonial power 
and later post-independent nationalist political regimes, have led some Islamic 
thinkers and primarily the Ulama to lead the intellectual and the political 
struggle against the status quo and seek change. The Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt was one of the most powerful Islamic movements, founded in 1928 by 
Hasan al-Banna. It tried to reshape the Islamic identity of Muslims in the era 
of nation-state modem society after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 
1924. 
The movement called for the revival of the Khilafah to heal the 
divisions between Arabs and Muslirhs in order to face the foreign colonial 
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powers. Despite this call for unity among Muslims, Hasan al-Banna, the 
founder of the movement, as Abdelnasser indicates: 
Rejected any argument for the contradiction among Egyptian 
patriotism, Arabism and Islamic universalism. Al-Banna argued 
that Arab unity promoted Islamic unity because both were 
overlapping. He believed that Arabs had been the guardians of 
Islam, and the first Muslims. He argued that Islam reached other 
peoples through Arabs, and the Qur'an was revealed in the Arabic 
language, which was the language of all Muslims at the time of the 
strength of the Islamic state. Consequently, al-Banna urged all 
Muslims to strive to revive Arab unity and to support it. While 
highlighting the importance of Arabism, the organization clearly 
dissociated that term from any secular connections.'^  
The movement also rejected the secularization idea regarding the 
separation between religion and state. Nevertheless, the movement joined the 
western efforts in their fight against communism. With time the movement 
grew and its message became widely accepted not only locally but even 
beyond the Egyptian borders. By late the 1940's the Muslim Brotherhood 
movement had established several branches in the Arab countries such as 
Yemen, Jordan, Sudan, Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The spread of its 
message, and the wide support it had received, made it the model for many 
subsequent Islamic movements."* 
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Many Islamic movements recently have started to follow the path of 
democracy, causing change whenever a political regime chooses to widen its 
political participation. Many countries like Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, Turkey 
and Malaysia demonstrate this fact. 
Malaysia has had one of the longest democratic experiences in the 
Islamic world. Since the first election held in 1955, the Islamic party has 
participated on a regular basis. Nevertheless, in the last two decades, Islam in 
Malaysia has become more visible than ever before. Although several local 
factors have influenced the growth of Islamic resurgence in Malaysia such as 
modernization, urbanization, and capitalist development, the ethnic 
dichotomization of the society between Malay Muslims and non-Muslims is 
the main factor among them.^ The Islamic resurgence has become more 
associated with the social, political, and economic orders, as the Islamic 
movements emphasize more and more on the establishment of an Islamic 
educational system, an Islamic economy, an Islamic political order and an 
Islamic legal framework. In other words, they pressed for the creation of an 
Islamic state.^ 
Many books have discussed the Islamic resurgence in Malaysia from 
different points of view. Yet the majority of the discussions have emphasized 
the rise of the dakwah movement, as the most manifested phenomenon of 
Malaysian Islamic resurgence. Dakwah is an Arabic term that means "to call 
or invite to Islam". Nevertheless, it involves more than this concept, it moves 
156 
to a wider behavioural and intellectual phenomenon in Malaysia. As Nagata 
indicates that, "Dakwah may be highly visible in matters of dress for women, 
Arab robes and turbans for men, as well as in rituals, prayer and attention to 
food taboos".^ 
In general, the Dakwah movement has rotated around three major 
organizations, ABIM, Jama'at Tabligh and Darul Arqam, adding to them the 
Islamic party in the political arena. "Islam is the solution" and "Islam is a way 
of life" are common slogans among all them. 
The main mass attraction of the dakwah movement was its ability, 
even if limited, to combine theory and practice by attempting to 
implement the doctrinal prospects of fundamentalist Islamic 
ideology in the context of the collective existence of the Malay 
Muslims in Malaysia and a multi-ethnic situation in the country.^  
This very clear in the case of Darul Arqam. Those active in the 
movement were able to establish and develop their own residential commune. 
The Muslim males wore the Arabic turban, while the females covered their 
faces and bodies. It also created an independent economy, one based upon 
village industry-style manufacturing and the sale of food and other basic 
products. These transactions were based on the recognition of Islamic 
principles. The Arqam also established its own Islamic trading network where 
it could distribute and advertise its products to other Malay communal 
societies in Malaysia. Moreover, the movement utilized the Islamic finance 
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system such as charity for the needy (zakat) and voluntary work to operate its 
enterprises. It also established its own medical centres, combining Western 
and Malay traditional medicine and facilities. The Arqam community and its 
provided services worked within an. Islamic environment that targeted the 
enhancement of religious and spiritual piety, and physical, moral cleanliness.^ 
Both ABIM and Jama'at Tabligh are highly organized. ABIM, as 
student organization, joins all Muslim youth students in Malaysia and has 
demonstrated its coordination as one body among all Malay student leaders 
and sub-organizations on all campuses. The students who were activists in 
this organization have gained a high level of social and organizational skills 
and political awareness that enhanced the performance of the political parties 
or the non-government organizations they joined after their graduation.'° On 
the other hand, Jama'at Tabligh, an exclusive Dakwah movement, spread all 
over the world and remains distinguished by its strict method of organization. 
The Jama'ah Tabligh is identical everywhere in terms of the way of 
preaching, the textbook they read and the method through which they recruit 
people. 
In terms of political domain, the PAS party provides the only 
opposition Islamic political party in Malaysia. Kelantan is the stronghold of 
PAS party and has been in its control since 1990. The party added 
Terengganu state to its pocket in the last election in 1999.'^ 
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Kessler indicates in his book, Islam and politics in Malay state, that 
the Kelantanese support the PAS in both the historical and sociological 
context. He claims that before the Malaysian independence, "politics had 
been noble politics, centred upon the rivalry of the princely families and 
chiefly the aristocrats". Yet the situation changed after independence. The 
electoral democracy of Malaysia engaged in redistributing the power between 
the nobility and the peasantry who voted for the newly created Islamic party, 
PAS. As Kessler argued, the Party enabled the peasant leaders to capture the 
local council that used to be in the hands of the middle-class elite during the 
colonial time. He concludes that a large part of PAS' political power comes 
from representing the peasantry class' interests.''^ 
Safie bin Ibrahim discussed the rise of PAS in a multi-racial society. 
He emphasizes on the importance of PAS religious ideology. He argued that 
PAS represented a normative ideology that propagates ideal values for the 
society and government. These norms are driven from PAS understanding of 
Islam. Such a view is quite attractive in a highly conservative and religious 
society such as Kelantan.'"* 
In this chapter, I would like to discuss, analyze and investigate the 
success and failure of the Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) in accommodating 
the implementation of Islamic Shari'ah in the Malaysian society. And also to 
study the details of the historical and political development of the Islamic 
movements in Malaysia. 
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4.2 Historical and Political Development of Islamic Movements in 
Malaysia 
External as well as internal factors influenced Islamic revivalism in 
Malaysia. The Dakwah movement and PAS represent the most important 
phenomenon that are attached to the spread of Islamic revivalism in Malaysia. 
The Dakwah movement and PAS have targeted the return of Malay society to 
the Islamic way of life and fought secularization. 
Local Islamic and Dakwah organizations closely monitored the above 
historical development The writing of Sayyid Qutub, Hasan al-Banna and 
Sheikh Muhammad al-Ghazali, the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood 
Movement in Egypt, as well as Abul Ala Maududi, the founder of Jama'at 
Islami in Pakistan, were translated into the Malay language and widely 
disseminated in Islamic movement circles. Such foreign Islamic literatures 
transferred the ideas, thoughts, experiences, and challenges facing the foreign 
Islamic movements. Accordingly, these writings influenced the mentality of 
the Dakwah movements and inspired them to follow the path of struggle to 
establish the Islamic Shari'ah law.'^ 
On the other hand, several domestic factors revived the Islamic 
movements in Malaysia. The racial riots of 1969 contributed greatly to the 
development of the Dakwah movement in Malaysia. On May 13, 1969, a 
racial clash between the Chinese and the Malays occurred in Kuala Lumpur 
and consequently spread throughout the country.'^ 
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A major reason for this riot stemmed from the Malay MusHms' 
feehngs of economic disadvantage in comparison to other races, especially 
the Chinese. As a result of this riot, the government initiated the New 
Economic Policy (NEP) that targeted the development of the economic 
standard of the Malay people. One of the consequences of the NEP was a 
redefinition of Malay identity. "Malay-ness" is defined in terms of three 
pillars of Agama (Islam), Bahasa (Malay language) and Raja (adherence to 
Sultan). Since the constitution requires that Islam is one of the three cores of 
Malayness identity, non-Muslims cannot be considered Malay, or at least real 
Malay, unless they become Muslims. This emphasis on the Islamic character 
of the Malay people transferred the concept of Islam from a symbolic term to 
a practical one associated with all economic and non-economic life of the 
Malay people. 
By emphasizing the Malay Muslim identity, the NEP contributed to 
the revival of the Islamic identity as the character of the Malays. It made 
Islam not only the shield that protects the Malay ethnicity in a multi-racial 
country, but also entitled Muslims to take advantage of the new government 
policy. Thus Islamic revivalism not only reflected the external impact but also 
became as a reflection of their identity search in a rapidly modernizing plural 
society.'^ 
The urbanization growth enhanced the Dakwah movement's capability 
to influence a higher portion of the society than before. As the NEP increased 
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the chance of employment for Malays in urban areas, it also provided them 
with a higher quota in university seats. This has also increased the Islamic 
movement power as many Malays become involved in universities and 
become part of the Islamic youth movement (ABIM), established in 1972. 
The students who travelled outside Malaysia to pursue their higher 
education in the 1970s also had the opportunity to engage in the Muslim 
Student's Associations in the Middle East and the Western countries and to be 
in close touch with Muslim scholars. As Abu Bakar states: 
In both the United Kingdom and the United States of America, 
where there exist large congregations of Malay students, These 
Malay youths-in contrast to their predecessors-were able to 
acclimatize better to Islam, having had relatively good background 
knowledge of religious subjects. The view that they were prone to 
outside manipulation is an exaggeration, for they responded 
naturally to the teaching of visiting Ulama and respected Ustaz, 
and organized Islamic activities undertaken by students from other 
countries. 
Upon their return to Malaysia, many of them became involved in 
Islamic organizations or joined university faculties. Unlike the former 
westernized Malay scholars, the new generation of scholars felt proud of their 
Islamic identity and thus played an important role in promoting the Islamic 
character and providing Islamic re-education to the younger generations. 
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By the early 1980.S, the Dakwah movement gained much support from 
the Malay middle class. This made the federal government under the leading 
party (UMNO) fear that Islamic expansion could be used by its opponent 
Islamic Party (PAS) to strengthen its political status. Thus, UMNO decided to 
adopt a new strategy through assuming more Islamic values as a political 
response to the rise of the Islamic movements. Datuk Hussein Onn, the former 
Prime Minister, clarified that in 1982: 
You may wonder, why we spent so much money on Islam. If we 
don't, we face two major problems. First, Party Islam will get at 
us. The party will, and does, claim we are not religious and the 
people will lose faith. Second we are to strengthen the faith of the 
people, which is another way to fight communist ideology.^ ' 
Initially, since it has a coalition with non-Muslim parties, such as the 
Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) and Malaysian Chinese Association 
(MCA), UMNO hesitated to manipulate Islam for the sake of politics.^^ Yet 
such reluctance was dismissed with the arrival of Dr. Mahathir Mohamad to 
the head of the government in 1981. Once Dr. Mahathir became the Prime 
Minister, he decided to launch an Islamization program as a tactic to drag the 
rug from underneath the PAS and contain the non-governmental Islamic 
organizations. The most effective tactics that harmed the Dakwah movement 
was inviting prominent Islamic figures into the UMNO party. Such notable 
individuals included Yusof Noor, Dean of the faculty of Islamic Studies at the 
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University of Kebangsaan Malaysia, Zainal Abidin Kadir, Director of Pusat 
Islam (the Islamic Centre), and Anwar Ibrahim, the leader of ABIM.^ ^ 
Another tactics included upgrading the religious branch within the 
UMNO to a departmental level to make it the centre of the Islamic religious 
referral in the country. It was called the Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia 
(the Department of Islamic Development) or JAKIM?'^ Also, the government 
founded the Islamic Bank in late 1982, the International Islamic University in 
1983, and enforced the Islamic laws regarding fasting in Ramadan.^^ 
The Islamization process was manifested in the Fifth Malaysian Plan, 
which indicated that the economic development could not be achieved 
without spiritual guidance. 
Material development alone at the expense of the spiritual needs 
of man will be detrimental to the well being of Malaysian society. 
The universal values of Islam, together with similar values are 
necessary for maintaining and furthering stability in the country. It 
is in recognition of this that the government has taken the lead in 
inculcating the values of clean, efficient and trustworthy into 
government administration with a view of raising the level of 
efficiency and productivity among civil servants at all levels.'^ ^ 
Dr. Mahathir Mohammad invented the "Look East" policy as a 
substitution for Western values of industrial development.^^ Also, it might be 
more surprising to find that Dr. Mahathir himself on one occasion claimed to 
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be a fundamentalist Muslim. Even in its foreign policy, the government stated 
in 1983 that the Non-Aligned Movement and Commonwealth were no longer 
as important as the Muslim Bloc. 
Obviously, a major explanation of Dr. Mahathir's support of the 
Islamic reform was his attempt to stem the threat of Islamic Party, PAS, as 
the party that represents Malay Muslims' interests. The use of Islam as a 
political agenda to break PAS and the Islamic Dakwah movement has 
weakened UMNO's claim and heritage as a secular party. Actually the new 
government-led process to Islamize the country created a perception among 
many Malays that the government welcomes the Dakwah activity, which 
strengthened the Dakwah movement instead of containing it. 
It can be argued, paradoxically, the government has become the 
victim of its own success. This is because its efforts at 
implementing Islamic programs have not only encouraged Islamic 
development in the country but have also raised the problem of 
controllmg its expansion. 
Such expansion has intensified the competition between UMNO and 
PAS to win the votes of Malay people and has caused a great division among 
Malays. This division extends beyond the level of constituency deeper to the 
level of neighbourhoods, and sometimes even to families, as many families 
have broken up because of their political ideology different, such as husband 
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support for the UMNO and wife support for PAS or simultaneously and 
ultimately lead to the divorce. 
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4.3 PAS Political Ideology 
The earliest Malay Islamic party was founded before independence on 
March 14, 1948 and called the Hizbul Muslimin (the Muslim Party). The 
foundation of this party came just two years after the establishment of UMNO 
on May 11, 1946. Hizbul Muslimin made its first priority the liberation of 
Malay from foreign control and establishment of the Islamic State.^ ^ Only six 
months after its foundation, the British authorities arrested the mead members 
and its activities were suspended. Today it no longer exists. Although the 
Party lived for a short time, its significance comes from being the first 
political party possessing an Islamic orientation.^' 
Not to be attached to Hizbul Muslimin, UMNO created its own 
department for religious affairs. Actually, since the beginning of its 
fonnation, UMNO considered religion in its ideology to attract religious 
groups and teachers who had great influence among the masses in the rural 
areas. Thus, it appointed several people, who were religious minded, to the 
executive body of the organization, however, their numbers were 
considerably smaller than the secular body of the organization.'^ ^ In the 1950 
UMNO meeting, the party established the Persatuan Ulama-Ulama Se-
Malaya (the Pan Malay Religious Scholar Union) as an organization under 
the administration of UMNO. From this organization the PAS developed 
when the Ulama committee of that organization decided in their third Ulama 
meeting, held at Butterworth, Penang, to establish an independent political 
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party. Accordingly, the Persatmn Islam Se-Malaysia or PAS(Pan Malayan 
Islamic Party-PMIA) was established on November 25, 1951. The Ulama 
committee established this new party with the belief that Persatuan Ulama-
Ulama Se-Malaya could not promote Islamic affairs while it was under a 
secular party, UMNO, whose constitution was not based on Islamic sources of 
the Holy Qur'an and the Prophetic Sunnah. Also, the Ulama disagreed with 
UMNO's step to sponsor a federal lottery.'''' 
The new party lay down four constitutional objectives, first, unify the 
constitution and religious administration in Malaya, second, protect and 
defend rights, interests, and honour of religion and the Islamic Umma, third, 
establish an Islamic brotherhood, fourth, cooperate with other political 
organizations as long as the Islamic teachings are preserved with this co-
operation.'''* 
In 1955, PAS entered the general election as an independent party.^ ^ 
However, the party did not perform well in this election due to its narrow 
support base and the absence of electoral experience. Despite its defeat, the 
Party members did not lose faith in their future success and their goal of 
establishing an Islamic state. In 1956, Burhanuddin al-Helmy, an Islamic 
Malay nationalist leader, was elected as the President of the party. He 
advocated the idea of nationalism and linked that to the establishment of the 
Islamic state. His ideology of combining Islam and Malay nationality was 
influential in drawing the broad lines of PAS' early ideology and political 
agenda.'^ ^ 
The PAS ideology rested on three principles. The first principle is 
Ugama (religion). The PAS established as its most important principle, 
promoted among the Malays, the Islamic state based on the teaching of the 
Holy Qur'dn and Prophet tradition. The party has fought for the practical 
implementation of Islamic principles in all affairs of life, not just the 
constitutional recognition of Islam as the official religion of the Malaysian 
state. Social conduct should also be consistent with Islamic morality. In other 
words, the government policies should not be based solely on political and 
economic interests, but also on how much these decisions and interests are 
consistent with Shari'ah laws. The second ideological principle is Bangsa 
(race / ethnicity).^ The party calls for forming an Islamic state that favours 
the Malay "race". Because Malays are the original people of the land, the state 
laws should be moulded to serve their interests first. "They are the people to 
whom Malaysia belongs, others are guests, immigrants, transients or 
sojourners. They are the rightful lords of the land, and others must live by 
their permission or sufferance".-'^  Thus, the party stresses the Malaynization 
of education, the armed forces, and the political leadership by reserving the 
head of the state armed forces for Malay people only, and making the Malay 
language the official language. The third principle stresses the increase of the 
Maiay people's share in the economy, controlled by the Chinese. The party 
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believes that the wealth of the nation should be in the hands of the Malay 
people.^^ 
The above principles are highly appealing to the Malays, especially the 
villagers who suffer most from poverty. PAS, in its early years, outlines these 
principles to distinguish its political agenda from UMNO, which PAS accuses 
of being a party benefiting the elite and the foreigners at the expense of the 
majority of Malays.'*^ Yet the implementation of the NEP that was launched 
by UMNO in 1971, after the race riot, reduced the differences in the political 
agenda between PAS and UMNO. 
To understand the ideology of PAS is important to understand its 
views about the structure of its ideological and social development. In this 
regard, some light will be shed on the PAS' understanding of Islam as a way 
of development, and how it relates to nationalism. 
PAS believes in all teachings of Islam and thus, the party's struggle for 
the implementation of the Islamic teachings as a whole. Utilizing some part of 
the Islamic beliefs and neglecting others clashes with the sincere belief in 
Islam. This highlights the main difference between PAS and UMNO. While 
PAS wants to apply all Islamic teaching as a complete system of belief or 
ideology, the UMNO limits Islamic principles to certain areas, such as family 
matters. As a social, political and economic system, PAS stresses that Islam 
does not mean a rejection of worldly life. PAS realizes that a human is 
composed of dual elements, spiritual and physical. A balanced life requires 
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the fulfilment of both sides. Nevertheless, the party does emphasize the 
regulation oi Shah'ah law in managing the worldly needs. For example, the 
Party fights for establishing Khilafah (rule of God on earth). In general to 
PAS as well to other Islamic groups, Islam "is not simply a creed but as deen 
wa duniah or both faith and way of life".'*' The other principle that PAS 
stresses in its political ideology is nationalism. The Malay nationalism 
concept was present in the mentality of PAS members since its establishment, 
yet it was not a prominent factor. Thus the PAS constitution, declared in 
1951, did not mention the promotion of Malay nationalism as one of the party 
objectives. Only when Burhanuddin took over the presidency in 1956 did 
nationalism become widely expressed in the Party ideology, speech, and 
literature.'*^ 
At that time, Islam and Malay nationalism became well matched for 
the interest of the party, since the party was led by religious leaders and 
prospered in Malay populated areas. It is important to realize that 
Burhanuddin's advocacy of nationalism did not come when he became the 
leader of PAS. Rather, he formed his political thoughts long before he joined 
the PAS."*^  After his graduation from the primary school, Burhanuddin joined 
the Islamic school in Sumatra. He then pursued his higher education at the 
Aligarh Muslim University in India and studied philosophy. During this time, 
he became involved in anti-colonial activities.'*'* After his return to Malaya, he 
engaged in anti-Japanese activities. In 1947, he was one of the members who 
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played a role in forming Hizbul Muslimin.^^ In 1956, the PAS invited him to 
be the leader of PAS. It appears that the educational and political background 
of Burhanuddin had a major impact on forming his Islamic-nationalist 
philosophy. His ideology was based on the idea that Islam does not reject 
nationalism, h later became the ideology of the Party. Since the party was 
formed before independence, his idea of nationalism, once accepted, achieved 
independence from the British. He argued, "nationalism is instrumental in 
establishing a social independence in which the principles of the holy religion 
are realized".'*^ 
Although Burhanuddin was instrumental for establishing the 
nationalist identity of the party, the worry of Malay people about the future of 
their country and their position in contrast to other ethnicities, especially the 
Chinese, contributed to the promotion of nationalism. PAS saw in Islam a 
buffer that protects itself, and also a legitimate factor that distinguishes 
Malayan nationality. Since all Malays are Muslims. PAS found both Islam 
and nationalism to be prominent factors in its ideology. It is natural to see 
both Islam and nationalism as prominent factors in the PAS' ideology. Thus 
the PAS offered a natural to link both. 
The active nationalist and Islamic movements in the Middle East, 
Indonesia, and Pakistan, as well as the writing of the prominent Islamic 
thinkers such as Hasan al-Banna, the founder of Muslim Brotherhood, and al-
Maududi, the founder of Jama'at Islami, have also influenced the PAS 
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ideology. Such impact is clear in the third objective of the 1951 party 
constitution, which emphasizes the establishment of the Islamic Brotherhood. 
Such political ideology bore some fruits in the general elections of 
1959, when PAS succeeded in seizing Kelantan and Terengganu, two states 
with a high percentage of Malays. PAS' victory in the 1959 general elections 
gave a shock to UMNO and its allies, as PAS became the first opposition 
party that formed a state government in the federation of Malaysia. 
Since then, the political contest over the Malay votes heated up 
between the two parties. Clearly, such victory came as a result of the PAS' 
emphasis on the idea of defending the right of the Malays and the 
establishment of an Islamic state. Hence, the party was able to raise its strong 
foundation in states where Malays are in majority. Therefore, it was not 
surprising to find the stronghold of PAS is in Kelantan, where the people's 
commitment to religion is the highest in the Peninsula. 
4.4 Political Competition of PAS 
In Malay, political Islam has taken on characteristics quite different 
form those of its counterpart in Indonesia. Whereas Indonesian national 
identity has been defined in non-religious terms, Malaysia defines itself as an 
Islamic country. The political debate within the dominant Malay community 
is not whether Malaysia should be a secular or an Islamic state, but what kind 
of Islamic state it should be. 
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The question is the crux of the competition between UMNO, the 
dominant partner in the ruUng Barisan Nasional (National Front), and the 
Islamic political party (Partai Islam Se-Malaysia-PAS). 
PAS was established as the Pan Malaysian Islamic Party (PMIP) in 
1951 by dissidents from UMNO's Bureau of Religious Affairs, and has 
participated in every parliamentary election in Malaysia since 1955. In 1959, 
it came to power in the states of Kelantan and Trengganu. In Kelantan h has 
subsequently kept control, except from 1978-1990 and it lost control of 
Trengganu in 1961, but regained it in 1999. From 1973 to 1978, the party 
formed part of the National Front, until forced out after the UMNO-inspired 
overthrow of the PAS-controlled government of Kelantan. From the outset, 
the party's goal was a Shari'ah based state with economic, political and social 
systems confomiing thoroughly with Islamic values, but during the first three 
decades of its existence its ideology had a strong tinge of Malay nationalism. 
After the parliamentary elections in 1978, in which PAS suffered one 
of its worst defeats, the party began to take a decidedly more theocratic 
stance. Its reorientation as a more religious party was the result of several 
factors. The ulama began to play a more important role in party affairs, 
particularly in Kelantan. There was also an infusion of cadres and ideology 
from the Islamic Youth Movement (Angkatan Bella Islam Malaysia-ABIM), 
which contributed a new ideological thrust and orientation. ABIM, a 
university-based organization headed by Anwar Ibrahim aided the ideological 
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foundations of modem political Islam in Malaysia. It organized training 
programmes for its members and ran schools throughout the country. Its 
primary aim was to inculcate what it considered to be a proper understanding 
of Islam in the population, particularly young Muslims. The group criticized 
the government for promoting Malay nationalism on the grounds that this 
subordinated Islamic identity to a narrow ethnic concept. Like other Islamic 
movements, ABIM also criticized economic inequality, Western-oriented 
economic development models and cultural influence, corruption and the 
abuse of internal security laws. 
A turning-point in Malaysia's political evolution came in 1982, when a 
new generation, many with an ABIM background, took over the leadership of 
PAS.^ ^ The party came under the ideological influence of the Iranian 
Revolution, accepting the Iranian concept of the supremacy of the religious 
hierarchy. PAS began to propose a vision of an Islamic state that included an 
elected parliament with limited legislative authority, subordinated to a 
religious body, the Council of Ulama, and with Shari'ah as the exclusive 
source of law.^° PAS also began to characterize itself and its followers as 
mustazaffin (the oppressed) as against mustakbirin (the oppressors), a 
terminology popularized by the Iranian Revolution.^' 
While ABIM was providing much of PAS' new leadership, in 1982 the 
leading ABIM personality, Anwar Ibrahim, and a number of his followers 
joined UMNO, which had launched its own Islamization programme under 
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the new Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad. This was known as the 
Penerapan Nilai-nilai Islam (Inculcation of Islamic Values). UMNO strategy 
since 1982 has been to accommodate Islam through pro-Islamic rhetoric and 
initiatives such as the Dakwah Foundation, to coordinate Islamic propagation 
activities throughout the country, the International Islamic University, 
Compulsory 'Islamic civilization' courses for Muslim university students, and 
Islamic banking and insurance schemes. The strategy has been blunt PAS' 
appeal by blurring the distinctions between the two parties' agenda. 
In response to PAS' demand for an Islamic state, UMNO leaders took 
the position that Malaysia was already an Islamic country. This manifests 
itself in diverse ways, including the offering of Muslim prayers at official 
functions, the construction of mosques by the state, and the holding of 
gwr'a«-reading competitions etc. But the state agencies' organizational 
campaign has not changed the fundamental structure of the country's legal, 
political and administrative system, which is based on the British model and 
to a large extent reflects Western political traditions. 
The prospects for political Islam in Malaysia were dealt a significant 
blow in the late 1990s with the dismissal of Anwar, the Deputy Prime 
Minister and Mahathir's heir apparent. The rift between the two surfaced in 
differences over how to handle the effects of the economic crisis of 1997-98. 
Anwar, who was also the Finance Minister, favoured stabilization and 
demanded that the government halt the bailout of indebted companies, stop 
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funding large public projects and clean up the banking system. Mahathir 
rejected this advice and decided instead on a course of strict currency and 
capital controls." Against the background of political change in Indonesia, 
Anwar projected himself as the avatar of reforms, and admired dismissed 
Mahathir as an obsolete authoritarian destined to share Suharto's fate. 
Underestimating Mahathir turned out to be a fatal political mistake. 
The prime minister pre-empted a challenge by Anwar for the UMNO 
leadership by tightening the rules for the nomination of leadership candidates 
and removing officials loyal to Anwar. On September 2, 1998 Mahathir 
dismissed his former deputy, calling him morally unfit. Anwar was arrested 
18 days later. He was convicted in April 1999 on four charges of corruption, 
and sentenced to six years in prison! A second trial, on charges of sodomy 
with his former driver, opened in June 1999 and closed the flowing year with 
Anwar's conviction, and his sentencing to a further nine years in jail. Anwar 
was also disqualified from holding public office for five years after his 
release. 
Anwar's contention that he was the victim of a conspiracy resonated 
with the public. In elections in November 1999, PAS made significant inroads 
into the traditional UMNO strongholds. It increased its parliamentary 
representation from seven to 27 seats, regained control of Trenggamu state 
and became the main opposition party. The UMNO-led National Front 
coalition retained its two-thirds majority in parliament, but suffered 
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substantial loses in the Malay belt of northern states. Its share of the vote fell 
to 56% and the number of parliamentary seats it held dropped from 94 to 72. 
In peninsular Malaysia, UMNO's strength went down from 78 to 60, out of 
144 seats). For the first time, UMNO had fewer seats in parliament than its 
coalition partners combined. 
Despite these electoral loses, Anwar's downfall was a major setback 
for political Islam in Malaysia. As the Singaporean political scientist Hussin 
Mutalib noted 'had he succeeded Mahathir, he would have found himself 
under great pressure form some of his followers to move Malaysia closer to 
conformity with Islamic principles'.^^ His removal from Malaysian politics 
has precluded this possibility. 
As elsewhere in Southeast Asia, September 11, and the war on 
terrorism significantly altered the Malaysian political environment, provoking 
a flow of moderate Muslims and non-Muslims back to the ruling coalition. In 
response, PAS abandoned the posture that it had assumed for the 1999 
elections. PAS declared a figurative jihad against the US, and mounted 
demonstrations in front of the US Embassy. PAS also attempted to exploit the 
Palestinian issue by sponsoring a forum with Hamas and HizboUah 
militants.^^ This posture was, however, a serious tactical error as it frightened 
and alienated moderate Muslims, and PAS's Muslim political allies. The 
ethnic Chinese opposition Democratic Action Party (DAP) broke off its 
alliance. The Partai Keadilan, which represented Anwar's supporters, also lost 
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credibility because of its association with the PAS. The government took full 
advantage of these mis-steps to break the opposition's momentum and put 
PAS on the defensive. 
PAS leaders appear to have taken these setbacks philosophically. They 
understand that, in Malaysia's multi-ethnic and multi-religious society, their 
political programme can only be implemented incrementally. They say that 
the two PAS-controlled state, Kelantan and Trengganu, are, testing grounds 
for the party's programme. However, there are limits to what PAS can achieve 
at state level. The PAS-controlled legislature in Kelantan passed a law in 
1993 to implement Islamic criminal law in the state, but could not enforce it 
without amending the federal constitution, which requires a two-thirds vote in 
parliament. This is not likely to occur soon. The current demographic and 
electoral map of Malaysia rules out a PAS victory for the foreseeable future. 
Even if PAS were to win every parliamentary seat in the northern belt of 
Malay state, it would still fall well short of a majority. 
In the wake of his surprise announcement in July 2002 that he would 
be retiring the following year, Mahathir proposed a series of measures 
designed to break the hold of militant Islam on Malaysian education. 
Mahathir's plan includes relocating religious education in the state system to 
after-school class purged of political content, close government regulation of 
private Islamic schools (which senior government officials believe are a 
breeding ground for radical Islam), and establishing compulsory national 
179 
service for youths in order to break down ethnic barriers and strengthen 
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commitment to national unity. 
4.5 Political Islam in Malaysia 
It is unfortunate that over the decades Islam in Malaysia has come to 
be seen in communal perspectives. 'Communal in this context does not mean 
mere association with a particular community. It is perhaps unavoidable that 
in a situation where all Malay are Muslims, Islam will be perceived as a 
Malay religion by both Malays and non-Malays. As long as there is sufficient 
awareness that Islam does not belong exclusively to the Malays and that there 
are millions upon millions of non-Malays who are also Muslims, no one can 
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say that such a perception is in itself communal. 
What makes the prevailing attitude towards Islam communal is the 
tendency to link the religion with what should be termed Malayism and 
Bumiputraism when it is apparent that both the premises of these two almost 
identical 'isms' and their implications have nothing to do with Islam. By 
Malayism it means that whole philosophy that argues that, as the indigenous 
community the Malays have certain political, economic and cultural right that 
distinguish them from the non-indigenous communities. Bumiputraism rests 
upon the same premise except that it also encompassed indigenous non-
Malay, non-Muslim communities whose interests may conflict with those of 
the Malays.^^ A clear instance would be the political pre-eminence in relation 
to the non-Malay, non-Muslim indigenous communities.^° 
180 
Since both elements are founded upon the notion of an indigenous 
people. The Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) has all along demanded the 
restoration of Malay sovereignty primarily because of the indigenous status of 
the community. What is important is that its demand has invariably been 
presented in the name of Islam. Even a cursory analysis of PAS's philosophy 
will reveal its insistence upon Malay political pre-eminence, Malay economic 
pre-eminence and Malay cultural pre-eminence have been articulated as a way 
of protecting the integrity of Islam. In fact, Islam does not recognize an 
indigenous, non-indigenous dichotomy as the basis of any social system. If 
terms like indigenous and non-indigenous are used merely as descriptions of 
categories within the population which have emerged as a result of the 
evolution of the Malaysian nation, it would not be altogether antithetical to 
Islamic principles. For then the categories concerned would be of historical 
rather than social relevance. But since the PAS argument is that public life 
should be conducted on the basis of an indigenous-non-indigenous 
dichotomy, one would be right in describing it as an un-Islamic stance. There 
are three important reasons for saying so. Firstly, it is seldom realized that by 
distinguishing the indigenous community from the non-indigenous 
communities one is dividing the Muslims since there are Muslims who are 
non-bumiputras just as there are bumiputras who are non-Muslims. Islamic 
teachings are opposed to any covert or overt attempt to divide Muslims. This 
is bome out by the importance attached to the very well-known principle in 
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Islam that "the Believers are but a single Brotherhood, so make peace and 
reconciliation between your two contender brothers".^' And also it is stated in 
the Holy Qur'dn that "Allah will not leave the Believers in the state in which 
ye are now until He separates what is evil from what is good". Dividmg 
non-indigenous Muslims from indigenous Muslims in matters relating to 
politics, economics, education and culture is certainly not a case of separating 
evil from good. Secondly, even if all Bumiputras were Muslims and all non-
Bumiputras non-Muslims, it would still be wrong to differentiate between the 
two groups in employment, education and other similar areas where the 
paramount consideration should be the welfare of the human being. The 
Qur'an itself prohibits such discrimination. ^ The Constitution of Medina 
{Mithaq -i- Madinah) formulated by Prophet Muhammad (SAW) provided 
equal rights and responsibilities to Muslims and non-Muslims alike. 
Illustrious Caliphs in early Islam like Abu Bakr, Umar and Ali took great 
pains to ensure that their non-Muslim citizens were well looked after. 
According to the 8'*^  century Hanafi jurist, Abu Yusuf, the second Caliph 
Umar even fixed special pensions for the non-Muslims living in Damascus.^'' 
Thirdly, by placing the whole Bumiputra - non - Bumiputra dichotomy at the 
centre of things one has elevated ethnicity and ancestry to a level which is 
repugnant to genuine Islamic values. One of the Hadith, the Prophet's 
tradition, reminds mankind that "there is no pride whatsoever in ancestry, 
there is no merit in an Arab as against a non-Arab nor in a non-Arab as 
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against an Arab".^^ What is at the kernel of Islam is not ethnicity or ancestry 
but unity of God. And the one most significant implication of that unity is the 
unity of the whole of mankind. The Qur'an for instance, observes, "O 
mankind! We created you from a single pair of a male and a female, and made 
you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other, not the ye may 
despise each other. Verily, the most honoured of you in the sight of Allah is 
one who is the most righteous of you".^ ^ This concept of unity is in fact linked 
to the idea of equality within the human community as suggested in Surah Al 
-i- Imran: 195. In other words, the very endeavour to sustain and strengthen 
ethnic dichotomies like the indigenous-non-indigenous distinction amounts to 
a denunciation of the central principle of Islam itself, the principle of the unity 
of God or Tauhid. 
Obviously, PAS cannot justify Bumiputraism by using or misusing 
Islam. Of course it is not just PAS that advocated Bumiputraism. It is, as we 
know, the whole basis of public policy formulation. However, in all fairness 
to the UMNO-led government which is responsible for this, must recognize 
that it does not justify Bumiputraism in the name of Islam. 
There is little doubt that the influence of Islam in Malaysia has become 
more pervasive than ever before. The younger generation will continue to 
romanticize the ideal of pristine Islam in spite of the obstacles placed in the 
way of Islamic revivalism. As such, Muslim revivalism will continue to 
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agitate the minds of all groups, the government, the political parties, and the 
general public, Malays and non-Malays alike. 
At the same time, the forces against the new Islam may raise a greater 
challenge to it. Apart from the non-Muslim Malaysians who will object to the 
strict Islamization of the society, which still imbued with the old conception 
of religion, is likely to remain opposed to the current revivalism. The 
kampong folk in particular would abhor any move by the revivalists to marry 
Islam to politics. Man naturally does not want to change what they believed 
especially in the religious matter. The ruling party, UMNO, already 
accustomed to the exercise of power, will continue to contain the forces of 
Islam, even though for political reasons. It will also allow some of its 
programs to be influenced in the direction of religious orthodoxy. In 
conclusion, therefore, it is clear that the conflict between the two opposing 
streams is bound to persist in the future. Only time will tell whether Islam will 
hold the stage in the future political process or lose its present topical 
character.^'' 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
The result of spreading of Islam to various parts of coastal India set the 
stage for its further expansion to island Southeast Asia. As we have seen, the 
Arab traders and sailors regularly visited the ports of Southeast Asia long 
before they converted to Islam. Initially the region was little more than a 
middle ground where the trading complex met the Indian Ocean trading zone 
to the west. 
As the coastal trade and shipping of India came to be controlled (from 
8"^  century onwards) increasingly by Muslims from regions as Gujarat and 
various parts of south India, elements of Islamic culture began to filter into 
island Southeast Asia. But only in the 13"^  century after the collapse of the 
far-flung trading empire of Shrivijaya was the way open for the widespread 
proselytization of Islam. 
Since the rulers and officials of Shrivijaya were devout Buddhists, 
however, there was little incentive for the traders and sailors of Southeast 
Asian ports to convert to Islam. With the fall of Shrivijaya, the way was open 
for the establishment of Muslim trading centers and efforts to preach the faith 
to the coastal peoples. Muslim conquests in areas such as Gujarat and Bengal, 
which separated Southeast Asia from Buddhist centers in India from the 11'*^  
century onward, also played a role in opening the way for the conversion to 
Islam. 
As was the case in most of the areas to which Islam spread, peaceful 
and voluntary conversion was far more important than conquest and force in 
190 
spreading the faith of Islam in Southeast Asia. Almost everywhere in the 
islands of the region, trading contacts paved the way for conversion. The 
ships also carried Sufis from India to various parts of Southeast Asia where 
they were destined to play a vital role in the conversion. It's undeniable that 
Sufis also played a role in the spread of Islam in the region. Sufis had much to 
do with the mystical quality of the religion and its tolerance for coexistence 
with earlier animist, Hindu, and Buddhist beliefs and rituals. The Sufis who 
spread Islam in Southeast Asia varied widely in personality and approach. 
And virtually the Sufis established mosque and school centers from which 
they travelled in neighboring regions to preach Islam. 
In winning converts, the Sufis were willing to allow the inhabitants of 
island Southeast Asia to retain their pre-Islamic beliefs and practices that 
many Islamic scholars would clearly have found contrary to Islamic doctrines. 
Pre-Islamic customary law remained important in regulating social 
interaction.lt is a fact that, had the more orthodox Arabs been the first to bring 
Islam into Southeast Asia long before the process of Islamization took place, 
their insistence, that the locals entirely abandon their old customs, might have 
dissuaded them from converting. Thus, Islam in Southeast Asia has a different 
character than orthodox Islam in Arabia. If it had not been for the tolerance of 
the Indian Sufis and missionaries, Islam may not have even taken root in 
Southeast Asia. 
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In the context of Malaysia, some may disagree that Islam has become 
a major force in Malaysian politics. The political Islam in Malaysia has 
mostly centered on detailing the UMNO-PAS confrontation. While it is 
important to understand the depths of this phenomenon of political Islam, it is 
equally vital that attempts be made to relate it to broader socio-political 
structure in the complex Malaysian landscape in order to better appreciate the 
nature and trajectory of the politicization of Islam in Malaysia. Focusing on 
PAS as the institutional manifestation of Islam of politicized Islam in 
Malaysia, this study advances two arguments. First, PAS has been successful 
insofar as it has managed to relate Islam to the pressing issue of the day. 
Second, the best electoral performances turned in by PAS have all coincided 
with problems with UMNO and the broader coalition. Islam then appears to 
be less vital to the politics of PAS than is widely perceived. 
Has Islam become a real major force in Malaysian politics today? The 
extent to which it has been the primary determinant of the shape of this 
politics is less clear. 
With increasing fascination over the so-called Tslamization' between 
UMNO and PAS, scholarship on political Islam in Malaysia has in fact 
narrowed considerably, focusing primarily on detailing this rivalry. This study 
suggests that there is need to relocate our understanding of the politicization 
of Islam in Malaysia in the wider context by relating it to the underlying 
socio-political structure that define the parameters of the socio-political 
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environment in which this process takes place. After all, even though the 
Malay-Muslim community is widely recognized as the key constituency in 
Malaysian politics, Muslims constitute half of the Malaysian population. 
In contending that political Islam in Malaysia needs to be understood 
in context, the study draws three observations. First, it suggests that PAS's 
commitment on the implementation of Shari 'ah law and the Islamic state. 
Second, PAS has always been prepared to accommodate, negotiate and 
compromise on its agenda. The party's emphasis on the Islamization of 
societal values and political structure has been accommodation than 
commonly believed, shifting to conform to socio-political circumstances and 
contingencies such as imperatives of cultural pluralism and pressures for 
democratization. Finally, many of PAS's electoral successes have resulted 
from problems and crises within UMNO. The studies have implications for 
how the so-called 'Islamic turn' in Malaysian politics, embodied in the 
expansion of PAS influence, can be better comprehended. 
In general, academic interest in the subject has resolved around the 
question of how political Islam defined as the mobilization of political 
support on the basis of religion, surfaced and intensified in Malaysia. 
Historians had already identified the role of Islam in the emergence of 
nationalism in the Malay peninsula, it provided a rallying point for anti-
colonial sentiments among the Malay population. As far as the politicization 
of Islam in more recent times is concerned, many have emphasized the need 
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to locate it against the backdrop of a global Islamic revival traceable to the 
early 1970s. Others, while acknowledging external influences on Malay-
Muslim consciousness, have nevertheless attempted to identify local 
dynamics to the resurgence of Islam in Malay society. One opines the idea 
and ties Islam to the Malay community's ongoing construction of identity, 
where the effort to redefine Malayness led to the mainstreaming of Islam into 
all domains of Malaysian social life. On the other hand, one argues that it was 
particularly during the Dr. Mahathir's administration that Islam was 
'redefined or reinvented' in accordance with Malaysia's distinct racial, 
developmental and political circumstances. And another opinion that 
highlight Muslim consciousness in Malaysia was facilitated by stringent curbs 
on political activity and freedom set in place by the Malaysian government in 
the aftermath of the racial riots of 1969, where religion and religious issues 
were not regarded as 'sensitive', thereby enabling Muslim students to resort to 
Islam as a strong vehicle for expressing Malay-Muslim grievances and ideas. 
The characterization of Islam as a 'political' phenomenon nevertheless 
assumes that it is necessarily subjected to the norms of negotiation and 
compromise that it is the very essence of 'polities'. Indeed, this becomes 
clearly evident when one traces the political fortunes of PAS, popularly seen 
as the organizational expression of politicized Islam in Malaysia. For it 
becomes obviously that seemingly all consuming issues such as the Islamic 
state, the implementation of Shari 'ah and Hudud, and the primacy of Ulama 
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in society, as articulated in PAS rhetoric, have interfaced with broader agenda 
such as Malay politico-economic primacy, minority and human rights, 
democratization, social justice and economic inequality. 
The finding study is that the Islamization of Malay politics needs to be 
appreciated in relation to shifting socio-political ideas and boundaries that 
define the political process in Malaysia. The research has studied the 
relationship between political Islam and the context and the perspectives that 
necessarily define its parameters and role in the popular politics of Malaysia. 
Through a perusal of the historical political campaigns and fortunes of 
the Islamic opposition PAS, the study has identified two major conditions that 
have accounted for its popularity among the Malay-Muslim community. It is 
the fact that, while the popularity of PAS is often associated with its Islamic 
platform and agenda. In actual fact the conditions highlight what little direct 
relationship support for the party has to this agenda. First, PAS has been 
successful insofar as it has managed to relate Islam to the pressing issues of 
the day. The record of PAS's political fortune indicates that the Ulamas have 
never been able to engage successfully in mainstream Malaysian politics on 
purely doctrinaire and ideological terms. Rather, the party's early successes 
resulted from its ability to capitalize on Malay discontent by justifying their 
struggle in terms of the defense of Malay identity and primacy, of which 
Islam was a component aspect. More recently, PAS has used Islam as a voice 
of dissident, portraying as a champion of civil justice, human rights and 
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democratization. Second, the best electoral performances turned in by PAS 
have all coincided with problems with PAS and the broader coalition, the 
recovery of Kelantan and Trengganu, recently, was aided by the release of 
Anwar Ibrahim from imprisonment. This triumph was facilitated by tension 
within state UMNO institutions as well as friction between component parties 
of the Alliance. 
The popularity of PAS is not determined by its religious credentials 
per se, UMNO's strategy of intensifying Islamization in order to counter 
PAS's burgeoning influence might well be misplaced. Such a strategy risks 
alienating the non-Muslim votes it has come to depend on for political 
survival, and in any case is like to erode Malay support for PAS either. 
Indeed, Malaysia's sophisticated ethno-cultural political landscape has 
spawned resolute challenges foe Muslim politics. With the end of Mahathir 
Muhammad administration, Malaysia is primed for yet another political 
transition. As to whether or not the trajectory of this transition is towards 
greater Islamization, much will depend on how the new UMNO leadership 
reads the threat from PAS. However, UMNO's attempt to regain support lost 
to PAS might well be better serve by addressing issues as intra-party power 
struggles, which are already surfacing, the increasingly authoritarian 
tendencies of the government it front, and corruption and economic 
inequalities, than by an attempt to up the Islamization ante PAS any further. 
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It is unfortunate that over the .decades Islam in Malaysia has come to 
be seen in communal perspectives. The Islamic party of Malaysia (PAS) has 
all along demanded the "restoration of Malay sovereignty" primarily because 
of the indigenous status of the community. What is important to us is that its 
demand has invariably been presented in the name of Islam. Even a cursory 
analysis of PAS's philosophy will reveal that its insistence upon Malay 
political pre-eminence, Malay economic pre-eminence and Malay cultural 
pre-eminence have been articulated as a way of protecting the integrity of 
Islam. What is at the kernel of Islam is not ethnicity or ancestry but unity of 
God. And the one significant implication of that unity is the unity of the 
whole mankind.' The Qur'an for instance, observes, 
'j]x> JLJC OUI o i J l^SJf fiUI 5jp J^]>St o l 
("O mankind! We created you from a single pair of a male and a 
female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know 
each other, not that ye may despise each other. Verily, the most 
honoured of you in the sight of Allah is he who is the most 
righteous of you"). Surah al- Hujrat: 13 
This concept of unity is in fact linked to the idea of equality within the 
human community as suggested in the Holy Qur'an; 
pvng.i v^ Jul jjl ^ ^ Q9 pSio Jplc Joe gjAiol ^ ( ^ i^j f^ LJIS J^LIIS 
IJIJISJ vjviulj vjvS IjSjIj jAjlji OP l i ^ j ^ ' i Ij j>l4 QjiJlS i/£iaj op 
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<-il3ill (>>> o3Jp <iUl3 filil >ic OP (jl3J 
("And their Lord hath accepted of them, and answered them: 
"Never will I suffer to be lost the work of any of you, be he male 
or female: Ye are members, one of another: Those who have left 
their homes, or been driven out there from, or suffered harm in My 
Cause, or fought or been slain,- verily, I will blot out from them 
their iniquities, and admit them into Gardens with rivers flowing 
beneath;- A reward from the presence of Allah, and from His 
presence is the best of rewards.") Surah Al -i- Imran: 195 
In commenting upon this Surah Yusuf Ali notes," In Islam, the equal 
status of the sexes is not only recognized but insisted on. If sex distinction 
which is a distinction in nature, does not count in spiritual matters, still less of 
course would count the artificial distinctions such as rank, wealth, position, 
race, colour, birth, etc.,"^ 
Today, political Islam is the major political opposition across most of 
the Muslim world. 
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GLOSSARY 
Glossary 
Abangan 
Adat 
Assabiyah 
Bangsa 
Bumiputra 
Chularajmontri 
Dakwah 
Dar al-Islam 
Datuk 
Hajj 
Halal 
Hudud 
Ijtihad 
The term applied to the majority of rural Javanese who 
acknowledge adherence to Islam but order their lives 
according to precepts and practices drawn from animist 
and Hindu values. 
Tradition or custom 
Communal or ethnic parochialism or chauvinism 
Race or Nation 
"sons of the soil", official term referring to ethnic 
Malays and other "Indigenous" peoples 
The head of Islamic Council of Thailand 
Refers to Muslim missionary activity which in the 
Malaysian sense also serves as a generic term for 
Muslim youth and missionary organizations 
Islamic kingdom 
Highest honorific title given by the Ruler or Sultan of a 
state in Malaysia 
Annual pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina; one of the 
five pillars or duties of Islam required of Muslims at 
least once in their lifetime 
That which is (religiously) permissible 
Mandatory law 
Individual reasoning or judgement to establish a legal 
ruling by creative interpretation of the existing body of 
law 
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Jihad 
Kaum Muda 
Kaum Tua 
Masuk Melayu 
Mustazaffin 
Mustakbirin 
Pancasila 
Pesantren 
Pondok 
Pusat Islam 
Qur'an 
Rukunegara 
Santri 
Shari'ah 
Slametan 
Means to struggle or to put effort to elevate the social, 
political, economic or spiritual conditions of the 
Muslims 
Younger generation; refers in Malay political history to 
reformist Ulama 
Older generation; traditionalist ulama 
Entering the Malay community by accepting the faith of 
Islam, accustom with Malay traditions and speak Malay 
language 
The oppressed or wretched, the powerless 
The oppressors, the materially wealthy 
National ideology of Indonesia 
Islamic religious schools in Indonesia 
Islamic religious schools in Malaysia and Southern of 
Thailand 
Islamic Centre 
Immutable body of revelations received by the Prophet 
Muhammad (SAW) 
National ideology of Malaysia 
Is An Indonesian term deriving from pesantren, which 
is the name for a village religious school. It has come to 
by employed, primarily in Java, to distinguish 
Indonesian Muslims of a strict orthodoxy from the 
Abangan. 
Divinely ordained law of Islam which governs all 
aspects of a Muslim's life 
Festival feasts in Indonesia 
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Sufi 
Sunnah 
Taqlid 
Tunku(Tengku) 
Ulama 
Umma 
Follower of Siifism, the Islamic mystical path 
Custom sanctioned by tradition, particularly of the 
Prophet enshrined in Hadith 
Adhere to tradition 
A hereditary title denoting royalty; prince 
Learned religious authorities 
Universal Islamic community 
Yang di-Pertuan Agung Paramount ruler of Malaysia over the other Suntans of 
the states of Peninsular Malaysia elected by the other 
rulers every five years 
Zakat Alms-giving; one of the five pillars of Islam 
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